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Abstract 
In the post-World War II era,the concept that all humans possess certain fundamental 
rights has achieved widespread acceptance. While no geographic limitations are 
acknowledged to the universality of human rights and the availability of remedies for 
the violation of those rights, temporal limitations seem to persist. That is, even very 
serious human rights violations of the distant past have often failed to attract 
remedies, particularly judicial remedies. The result can be lingering societal 
discontent. One example has been the case of Chinese immigrants to Canada, who for 
many decades were required to pay a "head tax" and were for a.further period banned 
altogether. An examination of the history of Canada's Chinese Immigration Act 
provides evidence of the need for courts to be able to effectively consider and, where 
appropriate, provide remedies for human rights violations of the distant past. 
Recommended changes that would facilitate this include: recognition that at least 
some human rights exist independently of the legislative instruments that have been 
created to protect them, and can be given judicial effect without recourse to those 
legislative instruments; recognition that the policy grounds underpinning judicial 
remediation of human rights violations are essentially the same as those underpinning 
judicial remediation of criminal offences; and development of a reasoned approach by 
which to distinguish between those cases for which the courts should provide 
remedies and those for which they should not. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
What is the relationship between human rights and time? More specifically, why does 
the obligation to respect human rights seem to be relegated to a small band of present 
time, with no recognition of an obligation on present generations to either take the 
human rights of future generations into account in decision-making or to address 
unresolved human rights violations that were committed by and against people in 
times past? This is the fundamental question that prompts this inquiry. The 
experiences of Chinese immigrants to Canada who had to pay a "head tax" beginning 
in the nineteenth century and were excluded altogether. for two decades of the 
twentieth century will be the vehicle for exploring this topic. 
Perhaps it is not immediately apparent that time has, in fact, any relevance to human 
rights, or that there might be any reason to look forward to the future or back to the 
past when considering questions of human rights. If human rights are important, 
however - and it will be asserted in this paper that they are - then they should be 
promoted and protected in all times and places and in the face of whatever challenges 
there might be to their recognition and affirmation. The more obvious obstacles to the 
protection and promotion of human rights are, of course, not directly connected to the 
passage of time. Prejudice; xenophobia; hatred; greed; the pursuit of power through 
the ·exploitation of societal divisions: all of these are easily recognized as factors that 
contribute to human rights being ignored or deliberately infringed. When such 
infringements happen in the present or the narrow band of time that surrounds it, this 
generates concern and possibly action on the part of governments, individuals and 
non-governmental organizations. It must be suggested, however, that concern for the 
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protection of human rights fails to extend into either the future or the past to any 
meaningful degree. 
Consider the effect that contemporary actions are predicted to have on future 
generations. Anthropogenic climate change, for example, is expected to have 
disastrous consequences, including increased sea levels which in turn will cause 
island nations and coastal lowlands and deltas to disappear, turning countless millions 
of people into refugees. Discussion of these and other effects, however, is generally 
relegated to the intellectual ghetto of the "environment", with no consideration of 
whether contributing to climate change, such as by driving to work or to the 
supermarket, constitutes a human rights violation being committed against people of 
the future by people of the present.' 
If looking at the relationship between current actions and future rights seems too 
speculative or difficult to conceptualize, then it might be thought that human rights 
questions related to the past would pose less difficulty. After all, other than the 
transient moment of "the present", it is only the past that is real to us, and only those 
events that have occurred in the past which most of us can ever hope to understand.2 
Indeed, it could be argued that virtually every consideration of human rights 
1 A notable exception was the March 1, 2007 testimony before the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights of the Organization of American States of Sheila Watt-Cloutier and Martin Wagner 
concerning the effect of global warming on the human rights of indigenous peoples in the Arctic. The 
Commission had previously refused to consider a complaint that greenhouse gas emissions by the 
U.S.A. constituted a human rights violation. See <http://www.earthustice.org/news/press/007/nobel-
prize-nominee-testifies-about-global-warming.html>. 
2 
"In daily life we divide time into three parts: past, present and future. The grammatical structure of 
language revolves around this fundamental distinction. Reality is associated with the present moment. 
The past we think of as having slipped out of existence, whereas the future is even more shadowy, its 
details still unformed." Paul Davies, "That Mysterious Flow", Scientific American, Volume 288, No.9 
(September 2002), pp. 40-47, at p. 40. 
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violations is, in fact, a consideration of human rights violations that have occurred in 
the past. 
Granted that this is so, it must still be argued that a problem arises when we tum our 
attention from human rights violations that have occurred in the recent past to those 
that have occurred in the more distant past, and it is this problem that will be the 
specific focus of this paper. Despite history being full of examples of serious human 
rights violations, there seems to be little impetus for governmental action to redress 
these incidents, whether by administrative, legislative or judicial action. Instead, as 
such incidents recede into the distant past, the likelihood of them being addressed 
appears to diminish, so that human rights violations that resulted in thousands or 
millions of people losing their lives, their liberty, or all of their possessions a lifetime 
ago are less likely to be dealt with by government-sponsored human rights 
mechanisms than are relatively trivial incidents involving hurt feelings that took place 
a week or a month ago. 
Does this matter? Is it significant if the passage of time results in human rights 
violations remaining indefinitely unresolved? Or would a suggestion that remedies 
can and should be provided for human rights violations that took place in the distant 
past seem hopelessly out-of-touch with the pragmatic realities of legal and political 
life, the sort of lofty philosophizing or moralizing that has no place in the "real" 
world? 
The answers to such questions will be central to this paper, which will argue that legal 
remedies can be and should be provided for human rights violations that have 
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occurred in the distant past. The policy grounds for arguing that unresolved human 
rights violations should be addressed are readily apparent when one considers the 
consequences of the failure to address them. On the day that these words are being 
written, for example, the news media feature prominent stories about political 
controversies in France, Sweden, and Turkey all of which arise from the Armenian 
genocide, an event that occurred ninety years earlier but which the Turkish 
government continues to deny and therefore continues to fail to remediate? Many 
other examples could easily be cited of situations where the failure to address 
unresolved human rights grievances has led to them continuing to fester, as well as of 
the reverse, instances of new governments recognizing the importance of setting up 
mechanisms such as truth and reconciliation commissions by which the unfortunate 
legaQy of human rights violations can be addressed in order to allow their countries to 
move forward. 
The case that will be made in this paper for providing legal remedies for outstanding 
human rights violations from the distant past - i.e. remedies that can be pursued as a 
matter of right through the ordinary court system rather than through the political 
system - may require greater explication. A summary version, however, might be 
stated as follows. Modem democratic states universally recognize the concept of 
"human rights." Although the concept can be shown to be a relatively modem 
invention, it is one that relies upon a shared belief in the universality and 
enforceability of human rights, regardless of whether or not any particular 
government regime chooses to endorse t~e concept; thus, those who authorize human 
rights violations can be held accountable for doing so, even if their powers as the 
3 Debate on this issue has been revived by Turkey's bid to join the European Union. See, for example, 
Bernhard Zand, "Armenian Genocide Plagues Ankara 90 Years On," Spiegel Online International, 
April25, 2005, <http://www.spiegel.de/intemationaV0,1518,353274,00.html>. 
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governments of sovereign nation-states might otherwise seem to give them unlimited 
authority and immunity. If the concept of human rights is indeed to be deemed 
universal rather than being a phenomenon that was invented and is therefore subject 
to repeal, then human rights must also be deemed to have existed prior to any 
statutory instrument that purports to embody them. That is, if human rights are 
"universal" then that must have consequences not merely for their geographic or 
spatial application but also for their temporal application. Just as we can view certain 
human rights violations as having happened in Turkey or Chile, for example, so can 
we look at those same events as having happened in 1915 or 1973, and can be equally 
certain that neither their location nor their date makes them justifiable or excuses the 
governments that committed them from responsibility. And because a "right" is a 
form of legal entitlement, it must give rise to a legal remedy that should continue to 
exist unless it has been legally extinguished or has become impossible to exercise for 
practical reasons. The mere passage of time should not, by itself, constitute an 
impediment to the provision of remedies for human rights violations. 
To make this argument is not to deny that human rights violations do, in fact, go 
unremedied. In fact, it seems likely that the more serious a human rights violation is, 
the less likely it is to be promptly redressed. The most serious human rights 
violations are often committed by governments themselves, governments that will not 
be quick to redress human rights violations that they have only recently committed. 
Instead, it is more likely that time will have to pass before there is any real hope of 
redress, time during which societal. attitudes can progress and the incumbents in 
government offices can be replaced, but time during which those responsible for the 
human rights violations will be continuously resisting any demands for redress. Even 
6 
after time has passed and governments have changed, however, there is no guarantee 
that redress will be provided, since new governments may be reluctant to accept the 
moral or financial responsibility for dealing with problems created by their 
predecessors, while voters may not place matters that have begun to seem more like 
history than politics very high on their agendas. 
If enough of a delay occurs, then eventually memories will fade, witnesses will move 
away, evidence will be lost, and finally the individuals whose human rights were 
directly violated will all die. Once these things happen, do governments get to 
metaphorically shrug their shoulders, pronounce the appropriate platitudes, and then 
carry on with their other business without ever having to resolve outstanding 
grievances? Yes, unfortunately, as will be discussed in this paper, it appears they may 
often be able to do exactly that. The effluxion of time would seem to have the effect 
of diminishing the prospect that unresolved human rights violations will ever give rise 
to remedies. 
Why is this the case? Is it, perhaps, for a reason as grand as our inability to 
comprehend the nature of time itself? A contemporary physicist has noted that, "To 
be perfectly honest, neither scientists or philosophers really know what time is or why 
it exists." 4 Or, as St. Augustine put it fifteen hundred years ago:5 
What, then, is time? If no one ask of me, I know; ifl wish to explain to 
him who asks, I know not. 
4 Ibid., at p. 41. 
5 St. Augustine, Confessions, Book XI, Chapter XIV. 
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Perhaps we are instead reluctant to address past human rights violations because we 
are uncomfortable about applying our own contemporary human rights standards to 
past eras. As Macklin puts it, perhaps we worry that: 
The modernist conceit of progress inclines us towards the belief that 
we are endowed with a moral acuity superior to our ancestors. 6 
Or it may be that difficulties in dealing with time's relationship to human rights issues 
are attributable to factors as mundane as the fragility of human memory or the 
overcrowded agendas of human rights agencies. 
Whatever the reason, this paper will attempt to shed light on the problem. And while 
not seeking to deny that the legislative and executive branches of government can 
have a role to play in remediating past human rights violations, this paper will 
specifically consider why legal systems do not function effectively as mechanisms for 
holding governments to account for past human rights violations and, perhaps more 
importantly, whether there are changes that could be made to permit remedies to be 
provided for human rights violations that have remained unresolved for long periods 
of time. 
In order to consider these and related questions, the focus will be on one specific 
human rights violation that took place over a period of sixty years, from the late · 
nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century? Beginning in 1885, the Government 
of Canada introduced immigration laws that discriminated against Chinese people, 
6 Audrey Macklin, "Can We Do Wrong to Strangers?', in David Dyzenhaus and Mayo Moran, Calling 
Power to Account (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), pp. 60-91, at p. 82. 
7 For a more detailed account, see Chapter II. 
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imposing restricti~ns upon them that were not faced by any other race. For forty 
years, they had to pay a "head tax" to enter the country, a tax at rates which escalated 
dramatically throughout this period in increasingly drastic attempts at discouraging 
Chinese entry to Canada. When this financial penalty failed to achieve its goal, 
Chinese immigrants to Canada were eventually banned completely from entering the 
country, a situation that persisted for another twenty years. 
Admittedly, Canada's Chinese head tax and exclusion laws do not represent the most 
serious human rights violation that could be extracted from the historical record, and 
although thpusands of people were affected directly and thousands more indirectly, 
. there are many other historical examples of human rights violations that affected more 
people and with greater severity. If anything, Canada's anti-Chinese laws might seem 
mundane for their time, given that other jurisdictions, includi1,1g Australia, New 
Zealand, the United States, and Newfoundland & Labrador, all had similar statutes at 
approximately the same time. These laws did not, howeve/, seem mundane to 
members of Canada's Chinese population, who for another sixty years after the repeal 
of the legislation made repeated attempts to obtain redress for the violation of their 
human rights, having recourse to both the political and legal systems in their pursuit 
of a remedy. During these six decades, those who had paid the head tax and those 
who had been separated from their families by the ban on Chinese immigration 
gradually grew old and the vast majority died, so that it began to seem certain that 
there would be no one left to hold government to account. 
Surprisingly, however, a remedy was eventually provi~ed and closure of sorts 
achieved in 2006. The many years before that occurred, however, provide useful 
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elements for a consideration of the relationship between human rights and the 
effluxion of time, namely a serious and undeniable human rights violation, obdurate 
government administrations unwilling to acknowledge that any wrong had occurred, 
aggrieved citizens refusing to allow the issue to disappear from the agenda, and legal 
institutions unable or unwilling to provide any recourse, all combining to result in the 
passage of a very significant length of time during which the issue remained alive but 
" 
unresolved. This paper will therefore use Canada's anti-Chinese legislation as a 
vehicle by which to explore the nexus between human rights and time. While the 
result will be a paper that focuses primarily upon the Canadian legal and political 
systems, it is hoped that the issues raised will have a broader application. 
In order to understand why the Chinese head tax and exclusion laws constituted a 
human rights violation and why it was that a human rights violation in this instance 
could go for so long without attracting any remedy, it will first be useful to begin by 
considering three fundamental concepts and questions that are relevant to this inquiry: 
what are rights, particularly human rights; do they adhere only to individuals, or can 
groups, such as the collectivity of Chinese-Canadians, possess them; and do people -
in this case residents of China wishing to relocate to Canada - have a right to 
immigrate? 
A. Rights, and the Evolution of Human Rights 
The terms "rights", "human rights", "civil rights" and "fundamental rights" are used 
frequently and virtually interchangeably in the modem world, occasionally 
supplemented by less contemporary terms such as "natural rights" or "the rights of 
10 
man". The result can be a lack of intellectual rig our and a failure to understand the 
history and underlying reasons for the existence of these concepts. In countries such 
as Canada which possess human rights codes and constitutionally entrenched 
guarantees of human rights, there is seldom any need to look behind the expressly 
guaranteed rights set out in those documents. When issues arise concerning rights 
that are outside of a central core of recognized rights, however, then it becomes 
necessary to revert to first principles and consider the nature and existence of these 
concepts and the dividing line between those rights that society is prepared to protect 
and those assertions of alleged rights that society does not recognize as deserving of 
protection. In the case of the present study, this is necessitated by the fact that the 
events concerning the Chinese head tax and exclusion laws occurred before 
coQ.temporary legislative and constitutional human rights instruments were enacted. 
A starting point for the consideration of human rights and related concepts might be 
their defmition. Beginning with the broadest of concepts, Canadian courts have 
adopted the following definition of a "right": 
A right is an interest recognized and protected by a rule of right. It is 
any interest, respect for which is a duty, and the disregard of which is a 
wrong.8 
Within the broad category of "rights" will be various types of right, such as "civil 
rights": 
By the term 'civil rights,' in its broader sense, is meant those rights 
which are the outgrowth of civilization, which arise from the needs of 
civil, as distinguished from barbaric, communities, and are given, 
defined, and circumscribed by such positive laws, enacted by such 
8 R. v. Oldham (1996), 460 A.P.R. 321 at 338 (N.B.C.A.), quoting Glanville Williams ed., Salmond on 
Jurisprndence, 11th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1957) at page 261. Please note that a list of 
abbreviations used in this worK. for courts and law reports is attached as Appendix A. 
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communities, as are necessary to the maintenance of organized 
government... The word 'civil' is derived from the Latin civilis, a 
citizen, as distinguished from a savage or barbarian, and the term 'civil 
rights' comprehends all rights which civilized communities undertake, 
by the enactment of positive laws, to prescribe, abridge, protect, and 
enforce.9 
If a civil right is one that belongs to a person only by virtue of membership in a 
particular "community", such as a nation-state, then this would suggest that what is 
and is not a civil right would vary from one jurisdiction to another. It also seems 
unlikely to apply to the subject of the current study, people from one jurisdiction 
seeking to immigrate to another. A more universal type of right would now be 
considered a "human right", a concept which has its origins in the somewhat archaic 
notion of a "natural" right: 
A right that is conceived as part of natural law and that is therefore 
thought to exist independently of rights created by government or 
society, such as the right to life, liberty, and property. 10 
This idea that there are rights that exist "naturally" is linked to the broader notion that 
there are laws that exist naturally, the "immutable, unwritten laws of heaven" referred 
to in Sophocles' Antigone. At the time of the ancient Greek city states, fundamental 
rights grounded in natural law would have included at least the rights of isogoria -
equal freedom of speech- and isonomia- equality before the law. 11 Despite it being 
possible to trace these concepts back to ancient Greece, however, the history of 
natural law usually begins with the Stoics, who believed natural law to provide the 
' . 
underpinning of positive law. Cicero's principle that "true law is right reason in 
9 Hill v. Hill, [1929] 2 D.L.R. 735 (Alta. S.C.A.D.) at 740. 
10 Black's Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition (St. Paul: West Publishing, 2004), p. 1348. 
11 Maurice Cranston, What Are Human Rights? (London: Bodley Head, 1973), p. 2. G. Tenekides, 
"The Relationship Between Democracy and Human Rights", in Council of Europe, Democracy and 
Human Rights (Strasbourg: N.P. Engel, 1990), pp. 9-83, at 10-12. 
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agreement with nature"12 may be the best-known example of this belief. The concept 
of natural law remained central to western legal systems for many centuries, with the 
writings of St. Thomas Aquinas on natural law in the 13th Century being particularly 
important. 
The transition from notions of natural law to contemporary conceptions of human 
rights is .usually traced to the second of John Locke's 1690 Two Treatises of 
Government, in which he articulates those rights as "life, liberty and estate."13 The 
English Bill of Rights that was enacted contemporaneously with Locke's work 
established rights such as trial by jury, the free election of members of Parliament, 
freedom from excessive fines or bail, and freedom from cruel and unusual 
punishment. 14 
The influence of Locke on political thinking in the American colonies was explicitly 
acknowledged in documents such as Samuel Adams 1772 "Rights of the Colonists as 
Men,"15 and Locke's rights to "life, liberty and estate" became the right to "life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness" in the Declaration of Independence. The United 
States Constitution of 1789 set out additional rights, such as the right of people to be 
secure against unreasonable searches and seizures and the right to the free exercise of 
religion. 
12 Marcus Tullius Cicero, The Republic, at III, XXII. 
13 John Locke, An Essay Concerning the Trne, Original Extent and End of Civil Government, Book 2, 
Chapter 7. 
14 1 Wm. & Mary (1688), 2d Sess., ch. 2. 
15 The Rights of the Colonists by Samuel Adams at "1. Natural Rights of the Colonists As Men", 
online: Constitution Society Webpage <http://www.constitution.org/bcp/right_col.htm> (accessed 
January 17, 2005). 
13 
The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen approved by the National 
Assembly of France in 1789 closely followed the English and American models. It 
asserted that men are born free and remain equal in rights, 16 with the natural and 
imprescriptible rights of man being liberty, property, security and resistance to 
. 17 
oppressiOn. 
Subsequent to these classic declarations of natural rights, the constitutions or legal 
codes of virtually every state came to include some similar declarations of rights. In 
Canada, the constitutionally-entrenched Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 18 
(the "Charter") that was adopted in 1982 had been preceded by the Canadian Bill of 
Rights19 and by federal and provincial codes of human rights.20 
The various rights that are set out in all of these documents are presented as though 
they are self-evident; indeed, in at least one of those documents , the United States 
Declaration of Independence, the claim to being self-evident is made explicitly. This 
is not particularly helpful in terms of understanding why rights exist, and why some 
rights exist rather than others. Academic writers, however, have attempted to shed 
light on this and related questions. Cranston, for example, divides rights into two 
16 Declaration of the Rights of Man- 1789 (National Assembly of France, August 26, 1789) at Article 
1, online: Avalon Project at Yale Law School Webpage 
,http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/rightsof.htm. (accessed January 10, 2005). 
17 Ibid., Article 2. 
18 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to 
the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
19 S.C. 1960, c. 44. 
2° For a writer in the Canadian milieu, the existence of these instruments conveys the advantage that 
academic discussions about whether or not fundamental human rights exist have been rendered 
academic. It can be confidently asserted that fundamental human rights do exist, since they have been 
given legally binding recognition as such by our courts. See, for example, R. v. Demers, [2004] 2 
S.C.R. 489 at~ 91. 
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categories, legal rights and moral rights?1 He posits that what we call "human rights" 
are at least moral rights, although they may also enjoy legal protection, and differ 
from other moral rights in being the rights of all people at all times and in all 
situations.22 Counter-intuitively, Cranston says that human rights are the most 
difficult type of rights to justify, since, unlike other moral rights; they cannot be 
justified on the basis of having been bought or earned or otherwise acquired. Human 
beings possess them simply because they are human beings.23 As Cranston notes:24 
In classifying human rights as moral rights it is important to notice 
something which distinguishes them from other kinds of moral right. 
This is that they are universal. Many of the moral rights that we speak 
of belong to particular people because they are in particular situations: 
the rights of a landowner, for example, or the rights of an editor, or a 
clergyman, or a judge, or a stationmaster. These men's special rights 
arise from their special positions and are intimately linked with their 
duties. But human rights are not rights which derive from a particular 
station; they are rights which belong to a man simply because he is a 
man. 
The proposition that there are universal human rights is not universally recognized. 
Ewin,25 for example, points out that if a claimed right is really a "right", it must be 
definitive, in the sense that it is public and agreed upon by the community, determined 
by a community procedure, and disputes concerning its application and existence are 
subject to resolution by a generally accepted binding procedure. In contrast, "natural" 
21 He further subdivides them into five categories of legal rights and three categories of moral rights. 
The former include: (a) general positive rights enjoyed by and assured to everyone living under a 
given jurisdiction; (b) traditional rights and liberties; (c) nominal "legal" rights which may exist on 
paper but not be given practical effect; (d) positive rights, liberties, privileges and immunities of a 
limited class of persons, such as doctors or ratepayers or peers; (e) the positive rights, liberties, 
privileges and immunities of a single person, such as the President of the United States. Moral rights 
include: (a) moral rights of one person only, such as the right of someone who has entered into a 
contract to expect completion of the terms of that contract; (b) the moral rights of anyone in a particular 
situation, such as a parent or a schoolteacher; (c) the moral right of all people in all situations, i.e. 
human rights. Supra, note 11, pp. 19-21. 
22 Ibid., p. 21. 
23 Ibid., pp. 23-24. 
24 Ibid., p. 7. 
25 R.E. Ewin, Liberty, Community and Justice (Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987). See particularly 
Chapter 3, "All Rights Are Social Rights", pp. 36-69. 
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rights, as such, including allegedly universal human rights, tend to be ill-defined, 
subject to disagreement, and lacking in authority. On the basis of his proposition that 
rights must be definitive, Ewin argues that natural rights must become definitive 
rights or they will be useless,26 from which he suggests that it follows that rights are 
always conventional. That is, if a particular right happens to be given definitive effect 
in a particular society, it derives its authority not from being on anyone's list of 
supposedly universal human rights, but instead from the fact that it has been agreed 
upon and given effect in that particular society. Ewin states, therefore, that rights 
depend upon and emerge from the particular arrangements that people make or 
particular ways in which they cooperate, so that there will be no rights apart from 
such arrangements. He explicitly acknowledges that: 
... my thesis has the consequence that there are no human rights: there 
are no rights that everybody (or anybody) has simply because they are 
human without consideration of how they behave and how they are 
cooperatively related to other people.27 
Ewin admits, however, that reference to human rights is not necessarily pointless, 
since common talk about human rights - even if imprecise and misleading - at least 
locates problems of moral importance which are likely to result in classes of 
convention that may be recognized in most societies.28 In addition, he suggests that 
there may be some conditions for cooperation so necessary that one can sensibly talk 
of people having a human right to them. 29 
Ewin' s view that rights must be definitive is at odds with the observation by Donnelly 
that an appeal to human rights is actually testimony to the absence of enforceable 
26 Ibid., p. 48. 
27 Ibid., p. 52. 
28 Ibid., p. 60. 
29 Ibid., p. 62. 
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positive rights. 30 He suggests that all human rights claims are a sort of last resort, 
claimed only when one does not have a "lower" right, such as a constitutional or 
legislated or contractual right to what one wants. 
While Donnelly discusses the nature and source of human rights at length, he 
sidesteps the question of which rights are, in fact, human rights, dismissing this as the 
"problem oflists." He complains that attempts to identify protected rights, 
particularly the post-World War II debates about economic and social rights versus 
civil and political rights, have been grounded in ideology rather that). any sound 
conceptual foundation. 31 His complaint on this point can be supported by reference to 
Kymlicka's demonstration of just how disjointed and internally inconsistent a basis 
ideologies provide for thinking about rights. Kymlicka's examination of both liberal 
and socialist traditions with respect to the rights of ethnic and national minorities 
shows how different thinkers, historical contexts, and political agendas have resulted 
in conflicting and confused positions with respect to rights within each of these 
ideological camps. 32 
In the final analysis, it is difficult to disagree with Bobbio' s view that human rights 
are a variable category, ill-defined and heterogeneous, and that searching for an 
absolute principle for human rights is futile. 33 As he wryly observes: 
In spite of countless attempts to come up with a definitive analysis, the 
terminology for rights remains very ambiguous, lacking in rigour, and 
is often used rhetorically. There is no rule against using the same term 
.for rights which have only been proclaimed, however renowned the 
declaration, as for rights actually protected by a judicial system 
30 Jack Donnelly, The Concept of Human Rights (London: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 21. 
31 Ibid., pp. 89-91. 
32 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), Chapter 4, pp. 49-74. 
33 Norberta Bobbio, The Age of Rights (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), pp. 5-9. 
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founded on constitutional principles with impartial judges whose 
decisions have various forms of executive power. There is, however, a 
great deal of difference between the two! 34 
Despite that, there is one point that is surely undeniable, even if only on etymological 
grounds, and that seems to be agreed upon by all those who acknowledge human 
rights as possessing any significance: if the concept of"human" rights means 
anything, it must be that there are rights that accrue to all humans simply by virtue of 
their humanity. If this is so, then for the purpose of this study it will be relevant to 
note that people who lived fifty or one hundred years ago were no less human than 
those who live today, and they must therefore have possessed the same human rights. 
As the following section will indicate, however, it may be that their human rights 
were not recognized as such until much time had passed. 
B. Group Rights and Individual Rights 
The Chinese head tax. and exclusion laws exemplify a conceptual duality in the notion 
of human rights. While each Chinese immigrant who paid the head tax and each 
would-be immigrant who was refused entry suffered discrimination as an individual, 
the basis for that discrimination was their membership in a particular group, namely 
persons of Chinese ethnicity. Since this is a typical pattern in human rights violations, 
the question arises of whether rights should properly be perceived as pertaining to 
individuals or to groups. 
34Jb'd . l ., p. XlV. 
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That this is not merely an abstract question can be perceived by considering how 
remedies are to be pursued when human rights violations have occurred. In order for 
there to be some recourse or recognition arising from the violation of human rights, 
there must be some assertion of those rights. In the case of victims of rights 
violations who have died- as, for example, all but an estimated 300 of the 
approximately 81,000 Chinese who paid the head tax35 - who can assert those rights? 
While the state might be well-placed to do so, it will often be the state that was the 
human rights violator. Family members or descendants may, as will be seen later, 
have a role to play, but arguably some human rights are so important that their 
advancement should not depend upon the initiative of family members alone. This 
suggests that non-governmental organizations or groups that reflect the characteristics 
that led to the human rights violation could have a role to play. Not only may they be 
in a position to represent the interests of individual human rights victims, their 
involvement might also be a tacit acknowledgement that an injury to individual 
members of a group can also be seen as an injury to group interests. To recognize this 
is to recognize the possible existence of "group rights". 
Prior to considering group rights, however, it might be best to at least briefly consider 
what constitutes a "group". Lerner equates groups with "communities" as that term is 
used by the U.N. Secretary-General, as "groups based upon unifying and spontaneous 
(as opposed to artificial or planned) factors essentially beyond the control of the 
35 Jordana Huber and Jonathan Fowlie, "Head-tax survivors will get compensated," Vancouver Sun, 
Monday, AprillO, 2006, p. B4. Estimates of the number of surviving head tax payers vary widely, 
however, with the Toronto Star using a figure of approximately twenty surviving head tax payers: 
Joseph Hall, "Chinese Head Tax Shameful, PM says," Toronto Star, September 10, 2006, on-line< 
http://www. thestar.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Layout/ Article_ Type 1 &c=Artic 
le&cid=1157838637224&call__pageid=968350130169&StarSource=RSS>. 
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members of the group."36 Among his approaches to defining "groups" of the type that 
are of interest for discussions of human rights, is a statement of their characteristics: 
spontaneity, permanency, identification with the whole, a feeling of belonging. 
Another approach would be to simply look at those group characteristics that are 
likely to be the basis of human rights violations; in 1949, a memorandum of the U.N. 
Secretary-General37 listed "race, color, sex, ethnic origin, cultural circle, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, caste, 
social status." A more contemporary consideration might at least add sexual 
orientation to that list. 
Since it is group characteristics that may lead to a human rights violation, this leads to 
the question of whether it is only the individuals whose rights were violated who have 
any recourse for such violation, or if the group itselfhas some claim to be able to 
assert claims for rights violations. While those familiar with the conflict between 
notions of group rights versus individual rights may immediately think of the events 
of the twentieth century, the recognition of group rights significantly predates this era. 
Lerner points to international instruments beginning in the seventeenth century that 
attempted to protect religious minorities, particularly those in territories that 
underwent changes in their legal status as a result of the European wars ofreligion.38 
Examples he cites include the Treaty ofWestphalia (1648), the Treaty of Oliva 
(1660), the Treaty ofNimeguen (1678), the Treaty ofRyswick (1697), and the Treaty 
of Paris (1763), each ofwhich,recognized the rights of a Protestant or Roman 
Catholic minority. The international recognition of the rights of minority groups was 
36 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/85 (1949), p. 4, as cited at Nathan Lerner, Group Rights and Discrimination 
in International Law, Second Edition (The Hague: Martinus NijhoffPublishers, 2003), p. 34. 
37 E/CN.4/Sub.2/40/Rev. 1 
38 Lerner, supra, note 36, p. 1. 
20 
gradually expanded to include non-religious minorities. In the Final Act of the 
Congress of Vienna in 1815, for example, Poles under the rule of Russia, Austria and 
Prussia were to have been endowed with institutions to preserve their national 
existence according to such forms of political existence as the governments to which 
they belong should judge expedient and proper.39 Provisions in favour of Turks, 
Greeks and Romanians under Bulgarian Rule were included in the Treaty of Berlin 
(1878).40 
This pattern of diplomatic intervention in favour of persecuted minorities is 
\ 
acknowledged to have represented only modest progress: "No real system was 
developed; the protection extended was partial; no machinery was established."41 It 
was, however, the most significant international incarnation of the notion of"group 
rights" that predated the minority protection system between the World Wars. 
Following the Great War and the creation of the League of Nations, the notion of 
including general provisions on the rights of minority groups in the Covenant of the 
League was proposed by U.S. President Wilson but rejected.42 Instead, certain 
minority groups were recognized and protected by several types of instruments. 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Greece each entered into separate 
treaties for the protection of racial, linguistic and religious minorities in their 
territories. In addition, the general peace treaties with Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Turkey incorporated provisions on minority rights. Finally, as conditions for their 
39 Quoted in Rhona K.M. Smith, Textbook on International Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), p. 16. 
40 Lerner, supra, note 36, p. 1. 
41 Ibid., p. 8. 
42 Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals, 
Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 94. 
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admission to the League ofNations, Albania, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Iraq 
made declarations before the Council of the League undertaking the protection of 
minorities. 
Some of these instruments set out general protections for minorities, including rights 
to life, liberty, freedom from discrimination, and other rights of the sort that are now 
often set out in domestic and international rights documents. In addition, there were 
very specific rights for specific groups, such as provisions in the treaty with Poland 
protecting Jews from being compelled to perform acts which would violate the 
Sabbath. 
Although actual enforcement of the League's guarantees of minority group rights was 
uncommon, 43 it is notable that after 1920 petitions to the Council of the League of 
Nations could be brought by individuals or by associations acting on behalf of 
. . 44 
mmonty groups. 
The advent of World War II spelled the end of the minority protection approach. 
Most notably, this was because this approach had given international recognition to 
German minorities in Czechoslovakia and Poland, and the Nazis had been able to 
manipulate this situation to create a precedent for aggression.45 
43 Smith, supra., note 39, notes that in 1929 about three hundred petitions reached Geneva, with about 
half being admitted, but only eight reaching the Council, and only two finally resulting in any action 
being undertaken, namely requests by the Council that the state concerned cease the offending 
behaviour. 
44 Lerner, supra, note 36, p. 13. 
45 For a full discussion of this and other factors, see Kymlicka, supra, note 32, p. 57 ff. 
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Following World War II, the focus of human rights protection shifted almost entirely 
from the protection of groups to the protection of individuals. Thus, the violation of 
rights that were connected to group identity was now to be remedied via guarantees of 
non-discrimination against individuals. Post-war instruments such as the United 
Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant ori Civil and Political Rights all embodied this approach,46 even when- in 
the case, for example, of the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination47 - the individual rights protected were entirely 
bound up with membership in a particular group. Not untill992, when the General 
Assembly adopted the Declaration on Minorities48 was there a universal instrument 
specifically intended to address the problems and rights of minorities.49 
The subject of whether huinan rights can be best protected by conceptualizing them as 
group rights or individual rights has been the subject of much debate, in both 
academic and political fora. The fundamental divide between these two paradigms 
and the dilemma it poses is summed up by Glazer: 5° 
Can we, however, solve the problems of group discrimination by using 
the language, and the law, of individual rights? 
In that question is encapsulated the dilemma of justice for 
discriminated-against minorities. The individual has received 
46 
"In 194 7, the system for the protection of minorities, as groups, established under the League of 
Nations and considered by the United Nations to have outlived its political expediency, was replaced 
by the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These 
instruments were based on the protection of individual human rights and freedoms and the principles of 
non-discrimination and equality." Office of the U.N. Commissioner for Human Rights, "Fact Sheet 
No.18 (Rev.l), Minority Rights". , 
47 Adopted and opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 
December 1965 
48 G.A. Res. 47/135, December 18, 1992, "Declaration on the Rights ofpersons Belonging to National 
Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities". 
49 Steiner and Alston, supra, note 42, p. 987. 
50 Nathan Glazer, "Individual rights against group rights", in Eugene Kamenka and Alice Erh-Soon Tay 
Human Rights (London: Edward Arnold, 1978), pp. 87-103, at 88. 
23 
discriminatory treatment because of a group characteristic. The law is 
written so as to vindicate the rights of individuals. But can the rights 
of individuals be vindicated, can the effects of past discrimination on 
the groups be overcome, if only that individual who takes action on the 
basis of discrimination receives satisfaction and compensation as the 
result of his individual charge of discrimination? Does not every other 
individual who is a member of the group also require satisfaction and 
compensation? But if the whole concept of legal rights has been 
developed in individual terms, how do we provide justice for the 
group? 
While accepting that a focus on individual rights can result in satisfactory progress 
toward resolution of societal problems in some situations, Glazer argues that rights 
based on membership in particular groups are recognized in many countries, and that 
the example of those countries should give comfort to those who fear the recognition 
of group rights may undermine societal unity.51 
The relationship between individual and group rights is of P,articular interest in 
Canada, where ~oth types of rights are recognized, even if the relation between them 
is not always clear. Kymlicka52 quotes the 1991 constitutional proposal of the 
Government of Canada: 
In the Canadian experience, it has not been enough to protect only 
universal individual rights. Here, the Constitution and ordinary laws 
protect other rights accorded to individuals as members of certain 
communities. This accommodation ofboth types of rights makes our 
constitution unique and reflects the Canadian value of equality that 
accommodates difference. The fact that community rights exist 
alongside individual rights goes to the very heart of what Canada is all 
about."53 
51 Ibid., pp. 91, 99-103. While mentioning countries such as Malaysia, Belgium and India, Glazer 
singles out for special mention the relationship between Anglophones and Francophones in Canada, as 
well as the high degree of group maintenance among Slavic and Jewish immigrants to Canada. 
52 Will Kymlicka, "Individual and Community Rights", in Judith Baker, Group Rights (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1994), pp. 17-33. 
53 Government of Canada, Shaping Canada's Future Together: Proposals (Ottawa, September 1991) 
10, 3, quoted in Kymlicka, Ibid., p. 17. 
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Such "community rights" protected under the Charter would include minority-
language rights (s. 23), Aboriginal rights (ss. 25 and 35) and the affirmation of 
multiculturalism (s. 27). Kymlicka suggests that community rights can be 
characterized in two ways, either by: a view that communities have rights 
independent of, and perhaps conflicting with, the rights of the individuals who 
compose them; or by a view that sees community rights as owed to people as 
members of a particular community, i.e. that such rights may themselves be individual 
rights, but not universal rights, being accorded only to people who belong to certain 
communities. It is only the former version of community rights that Kymlicka would 
call "group rights", since they affirm the priority of the group over the individual. 
The latter type of rights, which he terms "special rights", are, he suggests, the most 
important in Canada, with there being little support for group rights even in minority 
communities. 54 
Lerner acknowledges that under international law, ethnic, religious and cultural or 
linguistic groups do not possess legal personalities, but points to the Western Sahara 
decision of the International Court of Justice55 as leaving open the possibility that 
such groups could claim to be legal entities distinct from their members. In 
suggesting that a first step might be to allow such groups the right to act before 
international organizations and bodies in representation of their members, he asserts 
that "This may involve problems as to who is entitled to speak or act for the group, 
but this is a practical issue that can be solved."56 As will be seen later, negotiations 
54 Kymlicka, supra, note 52, pp. 20-21. 
55 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975. 
56 Lerner, supra, note 36, p. 43. 
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concerning remedies for Chinese-Canadians illustrate that Lerner's confidence on the 
latter point may be misplaced. 
The focus on the individual is ascribed by Van Dyke to a "problem" that liberals have 
in dealing with collective entities.57 He suggests that certain kinds of collective 
entities - in which he explicitly includes ethnic and racial communities58 - have both 
legal and moral rights. While the forme.r. is one that a government is bound to uphold, 
he states that "By a moral right, I mean a claim or entitlement that ought to be 
honoured if justice is to be done or the good promoted, regardless of the attitude and 
actions of any govemment."59 He advocates granting ethnic minority communities 
special rights as collective entities, saying that failing to do so is simply a method by 
which those in a majority can insure their dominance.60 
The preceding summary of the history and academic debate on group rights versus 
individual rights illustrates that it is not a question that is likely to be definitively 
resolved. For the purposes of this paper, the discussion illustrates two relevant points. 
First, the generally accepted view that human rights accrue to individuals rather than 
groups may constitute an impediment that will make it difficult for groups to enforce 
the rights of their members, and thus make it difficult for anyone to assert the rights of 
deceased individuals whose human rights have been violated in the past. Second, and 
more importantly, the fact that the debate concerning notions of group versus 
individual rights is so much a product of the post-World War II era is related to the 
fact that our conception of human rights is also a product of this era. Undoubtedly, 
57 Vernon Van Dyke, "Collective Entities and Moral Rights: Prolbems in Liberal-Democratic 
Thought", The Journal of Politics, Volume 44, Number 1, February, 1982, pp. 21-40 at 21. 
58 Ibid., p.23. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., p. 40. 
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the origins and elements of this conception can be traced back thousands of years, and 
certainly no one connected with the debates or drafting surrounding human rights 
instruments in the post-World War II era would have claimed that they were inventing 
the concept of "human rights" out of whole cloth. It should not be surprising, 
however, that certain cnallenges will be posed by any attempts to address human 
rights violations from the pre-World War II era, a time when it would appear that 
human rights as we now know them existed in a conceptual bardo, awaiting their 
current incarnation. Such a challenge will be examined in Chapter III, in the context 
of modem litigation that sought remedies for damage caused by Canada's Chinese 
head tax and exclusion legislation. 
C. Rights and Immigration 
Many human rights violations of the past have involved governments violating the 
rights of their own citizens within their own borders. These were cases of 
discrimination between different categories of citizen, based upon criteria such as race 
or ethnicity. The violation of the rights of prospective Chinese immigrants to Canada 
was different from such situations, however, in that it principally involved the 
Government of Canada choosing to treat particular non-citizens61 differently from 
both citizens and from other non-citizens when they sought to enter Canada. 
Describing these measures in such a way, however, might suggest the possibility that 
61 Strictly speaking, there were no Canadian "citizens" during the time period discussed in this paper. 
Despite Canada having become an independent nation in 1867, it retained vestiges of its former 
colonial status for many years.· One of these was that Canadians were British subjects, and Canadian 
citizenship only came into existence on January 1, 1947. It will, however, be convenient to use the 
term "citizen" in this discussion as shorthand for a more unwieldy description of the status of those 
British subjects who were domiciled- i.e. resident for more than five years exclusive of time spent in 
prisons or lunatic asylums- in Canada, as per the Immigration Act, 1910, or "Canadian Nationals" as 
per the Canadian Nationals Act, 1921. 
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what was done was not so different from what governments do all the time with 
respect to non-citizens; that is, the very existence of nation-states and the fact that 
they have citizens indicates their intention to discriminate between citizens and non-
citizens. Can they legitimately do this, and, if so, what questions does this raise that 
may be relevant to the current inquiry? 
At a very practical level, it is easy to answer the question of whether a nation-state 
can discriminate against non-citizens of that state: yes, it can. Just as a nation-state 
can require its citizens and permanent reside~ts to discharge obligations that it would 
not expect of others - the payment of certain types of taxes, for example, or the 
performance of national service - so it can accord to them rights that it does not 
extend to others. The very existence of every nation-state is, in a sense, based upon 
the exclusion of everything and everyone that is not part of that nation-state. As noted 
by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Cain: 62 
One of the rights possessed by the supreme power in every State is the 
right to refuse to permit an alien to enter that State, to annex what 
conditions it pleases to the permission to enter it, and to expel or deport 
from the State, at pleasure, even a friendly alien, especially if it 
considers his presence in the State opposed to its peace, order, and 
good government, or to its social or material interests: Vattel, Law of 
Nations, book 1, s. 231; book 2, s. 125. 
62 Attorney General for Canada v. Cain, [1906] A. C. 542 at 545-6. A modem Supreme Court of 
Canada decision to the same effect is Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Chiarelli, 
[1992] 1 S.C.R. 711 at 714: "The most fundamental principle of immigration law is that non-citizens 
do not have an unqualified right to enter or remain in the country. At common law an alien has no right 
to enter or remain in the country: ... " This was expressed even more strongly in Kindler v. Canada 
(Minister of Justice), [1991) 2 S.C.R. 779 at 834: "The Government has the right and duty to keep out 
and to expe'! aliens from this country if it considers it advisable to do so .... If it were otherwise, Canada 
could become a haven for criminals and others whom we legitimately do not wish to have among us." 
28 
Conversely, however, it does not seem that a nation-state should accord no rights 
whatsoever to non-citizens. Non-citizens within the boundaries of any modem state 
would not, for example, expect to be arbitrarily killed by its government just as a 
result of their being non-citizens. At the very least, therefore, it may be expected that 
there will be some academic debate about where the line is drawn in the allocation or 
non-allocation of rights. 
Most of the academic debate seems to take place between liberal theorists, for whom 
the justification of discrimination can be problematic. Generally, it seems to be about 
the legitimacy of discriminating between residents and immigrants, rather than 
discriminating between different groups of immigrants, as was the case with Canada's 
anti-Chinese legislation. Ackerman, for example, explores the issue through a series 
of sometimes fanciful dialogues, such as one between the colonizers of a new planet 
and the occupants of a second space ship that arrive a split second later and demand to 
know by what right they are excluded from citizenship.63 He asserts that the only 
legitimate reason to restrict immigration is to protect the liberal nature of the state. 64 
He supports this conclusion by a dialogue based upon the division of the world into 
two nation-states, the poor East and the rich West, with the Western democratic 
institutions organized in a "liberalish" way while the East is an authoritarian 
dictatorship. Although the West has adopted a policy of admitting a large number-
"Z" - of Eastern immigrants, the amount Z is so large that it strains the capacity of 
Western institutions to sustain their liberal character; any more than Z, and the West's 
liberal standing will be endangered since the presence of so many alien newcomers 
will generate sufficient anxiety in the native population that a fascist group will seize 
63 Bruce A. Ackennan, Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 
pp. 89-92. 
64 Ibid., p. 95. 
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control and assure native control over the immigrant underclass. In this situation, he 
considers it legitimate for the West to close its border to any more than Z Easterners. 
Goodin brings a liberal egalitarian perspective to an attempt to elucidate the principal 
reasons both for and against free movement across international borders.65 The case 
for free movement he bases upon notions of egalitarianism and universalism, in that 
there should be at least rough equality in the distributions of life prospects among 
people in general; since he believes it unlikely that richer nations will make any real 
attempt at global redistribution, he accepts that free movement of people from poorer 
nations to richer nations is a "second-best" method of global redistribution.66 The 
weaker case against free movement he bases ,upon "communitarianism", a notion that 
different people and peoples are morally entitled to lead their own different lives in 
their own different ways without undue influence from other people in other 
communities organized on different premises. A stronger case against free movement 
he bases upon a pragmatic recognition that a state that provides a generous welfare 
system or pursues enlightened fiscal policies may be at risk if it opens its borders too 
freely to the movement of people or capital; this is another "second-best" alternative 
to a world where all borders would be open and all states would pursue the same 
progressive goals. 67 
65 Robert E. Goodin, "If People Were Money ... ", in Brian Barry and Robert E. ,Goodin, Free 
Movement: Ethical Issues in the Transnational Migration of People and of Money (University Park: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), pp. 6-22. 
66 Ibid., p. 8. 
67 Ibid., pp. 9-11. 
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Macklin brings this liberal perspective to a specific consideration of Canada's 
Chinese head tax, and argues that the fact that it discriminated on the basis of race 
was not its only objectionable feature: 68 
... the problem is not just that the Chinese were taxed, but rather that 
taxing migrants for the 'privilege' of entering Canada was (and is) 
presumed to constitute a legitimate exercise of state power. In my 
view, the only way in which a head tax on admission would be 
genuinely non-discriminatory is if each child born in Canada were also 
taxed upon delivery. 
In addition to academic discourse on the justification for immigration laws generally, 
there has been some consideration by a few academic authors on exclusionary laws of 
the type typified by Canada's anti-Chinese legislation. Ringer and Lawless, for 
example, consider U.S. exclusion of Chinese immigrants as part of a broader 
consideration of race and ethnicity in the United States. They point out that the law 
that was eventually used to deny citizenship to Chinese immigrants was one drafted in 
1790 in response to President Washington's request to Congress for a uniform rule of 
naturalization. 69 While the law initially restricted naturalization to any "white 
person", it was broadened during the Reconstruction to allow citizenship to aliens of 
African nativity and descent. Asians, however, were still excluded. These authors 
see the treatment of Asians within a concept of"duality", a notion of us-versus-them 
that they say has characterized the United States throughout its history. In 
considering the California-led campaign to exclude Chinese and later Japanese 
immigrants beginning in the 1860s and throughout subsequent decades, they say, in 
68Macklin, supra, note 6, at p. 83. Note that Macklin would probably take issue with being 
characterized as a liberal theorist: pp. 84-85. 
69 Benjamin B. Ringer & Elinor R. Lawless, Race-Ethnicity and Society (New York: Routledge, 1989), 
p. 110. 
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fact, that the attempts to exclude Chinese actually "revitalized" American duality at a 
time when the vestigial effects of Reconstruction were still muting .it.70 
While the academic literature on immigration and rights is interesting, it seems to lack 
any expl~cit discussion of whether or not governments can legitimately discriminate 
against particular categories of prospective immigrants on the basis of race or similar 
characteristics. It seems likely that this is because the illegitimacy of such 
discrimination is so apparent as not to be considered worthy of serious discussion. 
Alternatively, the absence of such a discussion may reflect the observation by 
Benhabib that recent attempts to develop theories of international and global justice 
have been "curiously silent" on the matter ofmigration?1 And despite the debate 
among liberal theorists such as Goodin and Ackerman about the legitimacy of state 
exclusion of immigrants or the appropriate level of permeability of state borders, there 
does not seem to be any attempt to suggest that there exists a fundamental human 
· right of immigration, as opposed to whatever legal rights might be accorded to 
immigrants under the domestic laws of a given nation. 
· This would suggest that for the purpose of this study, no special considerations arise 
\ 
from the fact that Chinese immigrants to Canada were, in fact, immigrants. That is, 
they were neither entitled to any special right of immigration nor disentitled to any 
human right which they would otherwise possess, such as the right not to be subject to 
discrimination on the basis ofrace. 
70 Ibid., p. 170. 
71 Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), p. 2. 
32 
D. Preliminary Observations and Precepts 
The preceding review indicates that there is considerable academic debate about 
several of the concepts that are central to this inquiry. There is, for example, even 
disagreement about whether fundamental human rights exist, let alone about what 
package of rights might be considered to constitute such fundamental human rights. 
In one respect, this is not surprising, given that the notion of inalienable human rights 
is an artificial rather than a natural phenomenon, and that our current conceptions of 
rights are the product of thousands of years of thought and history. 
Those of us living in the twenty-first century, however, can confidently assert the 
existence of fundamental human rights. We live in an era when such rights have been 
endorsed at the international level, and have been embraced at the domestic level by 
many countries. In Canada, where the events that are the specific subject of this 
inquiry took place, fundamental human rights have been given legally binding 
recognition by the courts, and have been incorporated into legal and constitutional 
instruments. To assert that fundamental human rights exist and that their violation 
should result in some sort of remedy is, therefore, a relatively cautious position from 
which to begin the following inquiry. 
Furthermore, while there might be some disagreement about which rights are truly 
fundamental, examination of the various human rights instruments mentioned in this 
chapter would reveal that the right not to be subject to racial discrimination is a right 
that is generally recognized. At the international level, this right is prominently · 
manifested in, for example, Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 
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Eveiyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race .... 
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination provides an even more explicit and detailed statement of the right to 
be free from discrimination on the ground of race; most saliently in Article 2, which 
states in part: 
1. States Parties condemn racial discrimination and undertake to pursue 
by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating 
racial discrimination in all its forms and promoting understanding 
among all races, and, to this end: (a) Each State Party undertakes to 
engage in no act or practice of racial discrimination against persons, 
groups of persons or institutions and to en sure that all public 
authorities and public institutions, national and local, shall act in 
conformity with this obligation; 
In Canada, the right to be free from racial discrimimition is given its strongest 
endorsement by s. 15(1) of the Charter, which states that:72 
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to 
the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without 
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, 
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or 
physical disability. 
Many more documents could be mustered in addition to those referred to above that 
would demonstrate the near-universal recognition and endorsement of a right to be 
free from discrimination on the ground of race. As discussed elsewhere in this paper, 
there may be academic debate about the existence and exact nature of human rights, 
72 Supra, note 18. 
.. 
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but as far as governments and international bodies are concerned, any such debate has 
indeed been rendered academic. In proceeding to consider the case of immigrants to 
Canada who were subject to discrimination solely on the basis that they were Chinese, 
therefore, it is clear that if that discrimination were happening today rather than a 
century ago, then those discriminated-against immigrants would have recourse to a 
powerful tools by which to assert their legal and moral right to be free from such 
discrimination. The fact that they were immigrants would not in itself seem to be an 
impediment to the recognition of their rights. While there is academic debate about 
the extent to which a state has any right to bar immigrants, nothing would seem to 
suggest that a state's legal right to control those who cross its borders can legitimately 
be exercised on a ground as objectionable as racial discrimination. Why, then, did 
such discrimination occur and what obstacles prevented remedies that might 
otherwise have been available in the case of human rights violations from being 
applied in this instance? The remainder of this paper will be devoted to exploring this 
question. 
E. Overview of Chapters II Through VI 
The exact nature of the discrimination that Chinese immigrants to Canada did, in fact, 
suffer will be recounted in Chapter II, which will provide a legal history of Canada's 
anti-Chinese legislation, including its genesis in the prejudice and competitive labour 
market of British Columbia, the federal government's gradual complaisance with 
provincial demands for exclusionary measures, the judicial challenges to both federal 
and provincial anti-Chinese statutes, and the eventual repeal of these measures in the 
post-World War II era . 
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Chapter III will examine a modern attempt by those affected by the Chinese head tax 
and exclusion laws to seek a remedy in the courts. It will be seen that that attempt 
failed, and that that failure was attributable to how long ago it was that the 
discrimination occurred, and particularly the fact that it predated positive law 
guarantees of human rights. This outcome, while perhaps reflecting a reasonable 
judicial response to the arguments that were actually made in that case, will be argued 
in a later section of this paper to have reflected a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
ability of the courts to provide remedies for long-past human rights violations. 
Chapter III will also look at attempts to obtain non-legal remedies in response to the 
Chinese head tax and exclusion laws, including their ultimate success. 
Since judicial decisions should not be completely divorced from non-legal 
considerations, Chapter IV will consider policy arguments for and against providing 
judicial remedies for long-past violations of human rights, as well as considering 
those legal principles that could either be mustered in support for or in opposition to 
any proposal for such judicial remedies. It will be argued that in both policy and law, 
arguments in favour of judicial remedies for long-past human rights violations 
outweigh any arguments that might be made against them. That conclusion naturally 
leads to the question of how past failures by the courts to provide such remedies can 
be avoided in future. Chapter V will make several recommendations in that regard. 
Finally, Chapter VI summarizes certain conclusions arising from this study. 
It is hoped that this discussion will succeed in demonstrating that legal remedies for 
long-past human rights violations can and should be provided, and that any judicial 
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approach that would deny such remedies on an across-the-board basis would be both 
wrong in law and contrary to the public interest. 
37 
Chapter 11:. Legal History of the Chinese Head Tax and Exclusionary Laws 
In considering the history of Canada's anti-Chinese legislation, it will be convenient 
to divide that history into two parts. The first part, which will be covered in this 
chapter, includes the arrival of the first Chinese immigrants in Canada, agitation 
against their presence, and the six decades from the adoption of the original head tax 
in 1885 to the repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act in 194 7. The second part, which 
will be covered in the next chapter, includes attempts by the Chinese-Canadian 
community to obtain redress for those who suffered from the effects of Canada's anti-
Chinese legislation. 
While a comprehensive history of Canada's anti-Chinese legislation might include a 
broad consideration of the personal stories of the more than eighty thousand head tax 
payers as well as the social consequences of the legislation, the focus in this chapter 
will be principally upon the legal history.73 That will include the legislation itself, the 
Royal Commissions that resulted in its introduction and its various amendments, and 
the court challenges of the legislation that arose while the legislation was still in 
effect. 
73 Many books and other materials are now available that chronicle the social history of the Chinese in 
Canada, including the following selection: Peter S. Li, The Chinese in Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: 
Oxford University Press, 1998); PaulY ee, Struggle and Hope: The Story of Chinese Canadians 
(Toronto: Umbrella Press, 1996); Wai-man Lee, Portraits of a Challenge: An Illustrated History of 
the Chinese Canadians (Toronto: Council of Chinese Canadians in Ontario, 1984). 
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A. Chinese Workers and Immigrants in Canada and Elsewhere 
Although it is often assumed that a Chinese presence in what is now Canada began in 
the 1880s, the first Chinese workers had already been in what would become British 
Columbia for a~most a century by that time. In the 1780s, fifty Chinese artisans were 
brought to Nootka on the west coast of what is now called Vancouver Island by 
Captain John Meares to assist in various aspects of the trade in sea otter pelts, 
including construction of a trading post and schooner.74 Some may have stayed on 
after the fur trading ended.75 Meares' account of his reason for importing Chinese 
labourers foreshadows their later employment in other industries and a major cause of 
resentment toward them by white workers: 
The Chinese were, on this occasion, shipped as an experiment: - they 
have been generally esteemed a hardy, and industrious, as well as an 
ingenious race of people; they live on fish and rice, and, requiring but 
low wages, it was a matter also of economic consideration to employ 
them; .. 76 
A more significant influx of Chinese immigrants occurred with the Fraser River Gold 
Rush of 1858 and Cariboo Gold Rush of 1860-1863, which attracted tens of thousands 
of miners from the United States and elsewhere. The latter event prompted the 
establishment of the first Chinese community in British Columbia, after an 1862 gold 
strike led to the founding of Barkerville. 
By this time, conditions in both China and elsewhere had become ripe for the large-
scale emigration of Chinese workers. In North America, the abolition of slavery in 
74 Re Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1903 (1904), 10 B.C.R. 408 (Full Ct.) at 430. 
75 E.B. Wickberg & Anthony B. Chan, "Chinese", online: The Canadian Encyclopedia < 
http:/ /thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=A IART AOOO 15 88>. 
76 Quoted in Lee, Portraits of a Challenge, supra, note 73, p. 22. 
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the United States in 1865 led to a search for a new source of cheap labour in that 
country. In China, the economic intrusion of western nations caused a breakdown of 
the village economy, as domestic industries were unable to compete with the dumping 
of foreign products, and heavy taxation was imposed by the Qing government to pay 
for tribute and war indemnity. Political persecution after the suppression of the Tai-
ping Rebellion also spurred emigration. 77 
Between 1880 and 1885, approximately fifteen thousand Chinese labourers completed 
the westernmost portion of the Canadian Pacific Railway. While it is doubtful 
whether the railways in Canada and the United States could have been completed 
without Chinese labour, the willingness of Chinese labourers to work for less than 
their white counterparts was a major factor in the anti-Chinese agitation that persisted 
through the following decades.78 
B. Anti-Chinese Opinion and Agitation 
If the anti-Chinese legislation enacted by the Government of Canada in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is judged to be a violation of the human rights 
of those Chinese immigrants and would-be immigrants that it affected, then it would 
be easy to affix the blame for it to the Government itself. While even democratically 
elected governments may sometimes take actions that are at odds with the prevailing 
77 Jbid.,p.17. 
78 Although this paper examines Canadian discrimination against Chinese immigrants between the 
1880s and the 1940s, it should not be presumed that either the factors that led to that discrimination or 
the governmental response that resulted were unique. Castles and Davidson note, for example, the 
restrictions on labour, residence, benefits and political participation that were faced by workers who 
emigrated to Western Europe from Southern Europe, North Africa and Turkey in the 1960s and 70s: 
Stephen Castles & Alistair Davidson, Citizenship and Migration (London: Macmillan Press, 2000), p. 
70. 
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views of their times and the wishes of their citizens, however, this was not the case 
with regard to the Chinese head tax and exclusion laws. Instead, these laws were 
created after long and vociferous periods of domestic anti-Chinese agitation and also 
reflect anti-Chinese attitudes and legislation in other countries that had received 
significant numbers of Chinese immigrants. 
In California, for example, attitudes toward Chinese immigration were succinctly 
stated by one commentator: 
In 1852 the Chinamen were allowed to tum out and celebrate the 
fourth of July, and it was considered a happy thing; in 1862 they would 
have been mobbed; in 1872 they would have been burned at the 
stake.79 
In Australia, the first Chinese labourers arrived in order to remedy a labour shortage 
that occurred after the transportation of convicts to New South Wales ended in 1840. 
Large numbers began to ~rrive in 1852 as part of the gold rush, and peaked in 1858 at 
40,000, when they represented 3.3% of the total Australian population. The 
incitement of anti-Chinese mob violence in the goldfields began as early as 1854 at 
· Bendigo, with other incidents of mob violence taking place at Buckland River in 
1857, Ararat in 1858, and Lambing Flat in 1861.80 Eventually, this anti-Chinese 
sentiment led to a series of exclusionary laws that were emulated in other 
jurisdictions. 
79 Testimony of Jonathan F. Swift, Report of the Royal Commission on Chinese Immigration, Ottawa, 
1885, at 339. 
80 Victorian Cultural Collaboration, "Gold!", online: <http://www.sbs.eom.au/gold/#> 
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New Zealand also attracted Chinese workers to its gold fields in Otago beginning in 
1865. They remained a relatively small minority, constituting approximately 1% of 
the non-Maori population in the 1881 census, and appear not to have suffered 
violence and hatred on the scale that occurred in Australia and North America. 
Despite that, New Zealand did also adopt legislation aimed at excluding Chinese 
immigrants, beginning with the Chinese Immigrants Act in 1881.81 
In British Columbia, the anti-Chinese sentiment seems to have grown gradually. In 
1860, a Victoria newspaper argued that Chinese immigrants would help to remedy a 
"lack of consumers" in the colonies,82 and thus that a "poll-tax on Chinamen is clearly 
opposed to the interests of Victoria, as a commercial depot and starting point for the 
mines."83 The prevailing opinion would seem to have changed, however, so that by 
as early as May 9, 1876 the Legislative Assembly had adopted a report advocating 
legislation to prevent Chinese immigration. Because the Constitution Act, 1867 
generally allocates matters of an interprovincial or international nature - such as 
immigration - to the federal government rather than to provincial governments, 
however, the Government of British Columbia was limited in its legal ability to 
obstruct Chinese immigration directly, and was therefore obliged to resort to 
attempting to influence the federal government.84 Another resolution of the 
Legislative Assembly was passed on July 31, 1878 against the employment of 
Chinese labourers on public works. On April21, 1880, the Legislature passed a 
resolution asking that the anti-Chinese legislation in Queensland be made the basis of 
81 Amity Centre Publishing Project, "Chinese in New Zealand", online: 
<http://www.stevenyoung.co.nz/chinesevoice/history/chinesesettlement.htm> 
82 Vancouver Island and British Columbia were separate colonies until1866. 
83 The Colonist, quoted in The Globe (Toronto, Canada West), Saturday, April14, 1860, Vol. XVII, 
No. 90, p. 1 
84 For further discussion of the constitutional relationship between the federal and provinciaf 
governments, see infra, page 56, under "D. Provincial Legislation." 
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legislation by the Government of Canada. On February 26, 1882, the Legislature 
passed another resolution, and a Minute of the Executive Council dated March 7, 
1882 was sent to the Government of Canada requesting that Chinese labour not be 
employed on the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway and asking that it assist 
with white immigration. On August 19, 1882, a Minute of Council was transmitted to 
the Government of Canada asking it to promote the necessary legislation to prevent 
Chinese immigration to the Province, to prevent the employment of Chinese workers 
on public works, and to prevent their employment on any railway that might be given 
a charter. On February 28, 1883, the Legislature passed another resolution making a 
similar request. In 1884, the Legislaturesent a petition to the Government of Canada 
asking that legislation be introduced "restricting and regulating the immigration of 
Chinese. "85 
The Government of Canada was not immediately receptive to the anti-Chinese 
agitation. As Secretary of State Joseph Adolphe Chapleau later remarked: 
.. .I was rather struck with a feeling of surprise, which I am sure has 
been shared by many bon. Members of this House, that a demand was 
made for legislation to provide that one of the first principles which 
have always guided the English people in the enactment of their laws 
and regulations for the maintenance of the peace and prosperity of the 
country, should be violated in excluding from the shores of this great 
country, which is a part of the British Empire, members of the human 
family. 86 
In addition to whatever principled concerns may have motivated the Government of 
Canada, there were also worries that any measures to discourage or prevent Asian 
85 Official Report of the Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada, Third Session-
Fifth Parliament, 48-49 Victoria:, 1885, (2 July 1885) at 3004-3006 (Mr. Chapleau). 
86 Ibid., at 3003 (Mr. Chapleau). 
43 
immigration could negatively affect international trade, might interfere with a 
proposed trans-Pacific steamship line, and might conflict with British Imperial foreign 
policy. 87 The 1860 Convention of Beijing had included provisions designed to 
facilitate the emigration of Chinese labourers to British colonies, 88 and the extent to 
which Canada was to be permitted to pursue an independent foreign policy was not 
clear. 
It should also be noted that immigration to Canada had been virtually unregulated up 
until that time. Although this was soon to change, with an aggressive program to 
attract new immigrants instituted by Minister of the Interior Clifford Sifton in the 
1890s and the first decade of the twentieth century, that program would be aimed at 
prospective white immigrants in the United Kingdom and the United States, and at 
Ukrainians and Doukhobors in the Austrian Empire. In the 1880s, however, the 
Government of Canada was not yet in the business of attempting to attract 
immigrants, let alone Chinese immigrants. 89 The situation was, in fact, similar to that 
advocated by those liberal theorists discussed in Chapter I of this paper. 
87 Official Report of the Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada, Second Session 
-Fifth Parliament, 47 Victorice, 1885, (2 Aprill884) at 1287 (Sir John A. Macdonald). 
88 Article V stated, "As soon as the Ratifications of the Treaty of one thousand eight hundred and fifty- · 
eight shall have been exchanged, His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of China, will, by decree, 
command the high authorities of every province to proclaim throughout their jurisdictions, that 
Chinese, choosing to take service in the British Colonies or other parts beyond sea, are at perfect liberty 
to enter into engagements with British Subjects for that purpose, and to ship themselves and their 
families on board any British vessel at any of the open ports of China. Also that the high authorities 
aforesaid, shall, in concert with Her Britannic Majesty's Representative in China, frame such . 
regulations for the protection of Chinese emigrating as above, as the circumstances of the different 
open ports may demand." "Convention of Beijing", online: 
<http://www .koreanhistoryproject.org/Ket/C 19/FN 1907b.htrn> 
89 Regarding Canadian encouragement of immigrants generally, see Library and Archives Canada, 
"Contact: Making the West Canadian", < 
http:// canadaonline.about.cornl gil dynamic/ offsi te.htrn ?zi= 1/XJ &sdn=canadaonline&zu=http%3 A %2F 
%2Fwww.collectionscanada.ca%2F05%2F0529%2F052902%2F05290203 e.html >. 
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Pressure continued to be exerted upon the Government in the House of Commons 
throughout 1885,90 however, and eventually the Government gave in. When Chapleau 
finally introduced legislation to restrict Chinese immigration, another member of 
Parliament said of his remarks "one would almost imagine [they] were in opposition 
to the Bill rather than in favour of it", and that "nine-tenths of his remarks were 
leaning towards what he was pleased to term pro-Chinese rather than anti-Chinese."91 
Indeed, after considering and dismissing all of the various charges that had been 
levelled against Chinese immigrants- that they were "degraded," "mischievous," 
"uncivilised," "barbarians"- and considering possible reasons for the antipathy 
against them, such as their colour, their clothing, their hair, their diet, their religion, 
their habitations, and their health,92 Chapleau concluded that the only real basis for 
the proposed legislation was to support white labourers who would otherwise be 
undercut by Chinese labourers willing to work for lower wages: 
Why is there such an antipathy? That antipathy exists, and the only 
reason, or the great reason for it, is in the antagonism between the 
Chinese and the other laborers. It is not to be found really in any other 
cause than the competition of c.heap labor with laborers who want to 
exact a higher price. Is the object of the white laborer, in trying to 
force himself into the building of works and the carrying on of 
industries at higher wages tha:U the cheap labor which is offered by the 
Chinese- is that a laudable object, and is Parliament going to come to 
the rescue?93 
In a remarkably frank concession to political pragmatism, Chapleau acknowledged 
that the Government was, in fact, going to "come to the rescue" despite the dubious 
grounds for its support: 
90 Supra, note 85, (2 February 1885) at 29 (Mr. Shakespeare); (24 February 1885) at 211 (Mr. 
Shakespeare); (12 March 1885), at 505 (Mr. Blake); (19 March 1885) at 632 (Mr. Blake). 
91 Ibid., at 3013 (Mr. Baker). 
92 Ibid., at 3006 (Mr. Chapleau). 
93 Ibid., at 3008. 
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I have indicated the real, fundamental reason why opposition is given 
to Chinese immigration. I am satisfied that my statement will not be 
contradicted when I say that prejudice and rivalry are the main sources 
of opposition to their presence amongst us. But are we for that reason 
not to take into consideration the social and moral condition of the 
country where they are living? Are we to ignore feelings and 
antipathies? Is it not necessary for a Government dealing with 
questions on its responsibility, to respect even prejudices? Are we not 
obliged very often to respect prejudices? Do we not respect them very 
often in our legislation?94 · 
C. Response of the Government of Canada 
When faced with difficult problems involving significant political risk and 
unpalatable policy choices, parliamentary governments will sometimes resort to 
appointing royal commissions prior to taking any action. This was the case with 
regard to immigration from China and other Asian countries, an issue which spawned 
three royal commissions, which in tum led to the adoption of a series of statutes 
aimed at controlling or preventing such immigration. 
1. The Royal Commission of 1885 and The Chinese Immigration Act, 1885 
Repeated attempts by British Columbia members of Parliament to propose a 
prohibition on Chinese immigration to that province in the House of Commons95 
eventually led to the Royal Commission on Chinese Immigration of 1885. In 
establishing the Royal Commission, Canada was following the lead of the United 
94 Ibid., at 3009. 
95 See, for example, Official Report of the Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of 
Canada, Second Session- Fourth Parliament, 43 Victoric.e, 1880, (21 April1880) at 1640 (Mr. 
DeCosmos) and Official Report of the Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada, 
First Session- Fifth Parliament, 46 Victoric.e, 1883, (29 March 1883) at 323 (Mr. Shakespeare). 
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States Congress, which had established a joint committee of the Senate and House of 
Representatives to consider Chinese immigration in 1876. 
The Royal Commission consisted of two men, Secretary of State Chapleau and B.C. 
Supreme Court Judge and former New Brunswick Premier John Hamilton Gray. The 
volume they produced contained their separately written reports plus almost five 
hundred pages of evidence, detailing their hearings in British Columbia, 
investigations in California, and information concerning Chinese immigration to the 
Sandwich [Hawai'ian] Islands,96· Jamaica and Peru,97 Australia,98 the Philippines and 
Singapore.99 Although the report is extremely wide-ranging, its most striking content 
is evidence of the societal division in both British Columbia and California between 
those large employers who favoured Chinese immigration becaus~ of its utility to 
their enterprises - coal mining, railway building, fruit and vegetable farming, among 
others - and those who opposed it because of the competition it posed to white 
labourers or on various other grounds. 
The division in public opinion in British Col.umbia was summed up by Commissioner 
Gray: 
1st. Of a well meaning, but strongly prejudiced minority, whom 
nothing but absolute exclusion will satisfy. 
2°d. An intelligent minority, who conceive that no legislation is 
necessary- that, as in all business transactions, the rule of supply and 
demand will apply and the matter regulate itself in the ordinary course 
of events. 
3rd. Of a large majority, who think there should be a moderate 
restriction, based upon police, financial and sanitary principles, 
96 Report of the Royal Commission on Chinese Immigration, Ottawa, 1885, at 411-412. 
97 Ibid., at cxxix (Chapleau). 
98 Ibid., at cxxii-cxxix (Chapleau). 
99 Ibid., at cx-cxxi (Chapleau). 
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sustained and enforced by stringent local regulations for cleanliness 
and the preservation ofhealth. 100 
Gray declared himself as concurring in the majority view, and made recommendations 
to Parliament consistent with that view. 
Chapleau's report gives the impression that he would have preferred no restriction on 
Chinese immigration at all, but in the end he did give his equivocal support to some 
form of restriction: 
... if restrictive legislation were considered opportune it should aim at 
gradually-achieved results, and the history of the question, as well as 
the evidence, shows that by legislation regulating, not excluding 
Chinese laborers, every purpose can be effected which those who 
apprehend evils from Chinese immigration could, and actually do 
desire. 101 
As will be seen, it was this notion of gradually restricting Chinese immigration that 
was subsequently given statutory expression. This occurred with the passage of The 
Chinese Immigration Act, 1885. 102 The rationale for the statute was set out in its 
preamble, namely that it was "expedient to make provision for restricting the number 
of Chinese immigrants coming into the Dominion and to regulate such immigration", 
and that it was "expedient to provide a system of registration and control over Chinese 
immigrants residing in Canada". 
The restriction of the number of Chinese immigrants was effected principally through 
the imposition of a fifty dollar duty (more commonly referred to as a "head tax" or 
100 Ibid., at cii (Gray). 
101 Ibid., at cxxxiii (Chapleau). 
102 An Act to restrict and regulate Chinese immigration into Canada, S.C. 1885 (48-49 Viet.), c. 71. 
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"capitation tax") on every person of Chinese origin upon entering Canada. 103 
Exception was made for diplomats and their servants, tourists, merchants (with the 
exception of hucksters, peddlers or persons trading in dried fish), men of science and 
students. 104 Persons of Chinese origin already resident in Canada were exempted 
from the duty. 105 The onus for ensuring that all Chinese immigrants were registered 
and paid for was largely placed upon the masters of vessels carrying Chinese 
immigrants, who faced minimum fines of five hundred dollars or twelve months 
imprisonment if they allowed any Chinese immigrants to land without payment of the 
duty.I06 
This initiative to restrict Chinese immigration was at odds with the more general 
immigration law, represented by the Immigration Act, 1869107 as amended by the 
Immigration Act, 1872.108 Section 2 of the former statute had imposed a one dollar 
duty on each immigrant arriving in Canada by vessel. Section 1 of the latter statute, 
however, replaced this duty with a two dollar per immigrant duty imposed only on 
vessels which did not carry a surgeon and which did not take proper measures for the 
preservation of the health of the passengers and crew during the voyage. This 
provision specified that the two dollar duty would "thereafter be the only duty payable 
in respect of immigrants," a clause which the much higher duties on Chinese 
immigrants would eventually belie. 
103 Ibid., s. 4. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid., s. 13 
106 Ibid., s. 7. 
107 S.C. 1869 (32-33 Viet.), c. 10. 
108 S.C. 1872 (35 Viet.), c. 28. 
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A further restriction on the flow of Chinese immigrants was ensured by limiting the 
vessels carrying Chinese immigrants to Canadian ports to carrying no more than one 
such immigrant for every fifty tons of their tonnage. 109 By comparison, the legislative 
provision for non-Chinese immigrants was one person for every two tons ofthe 
tonnage of vessels bringing them to Canada. 110 An earlier version of the statute, Bill 
124, would have allowed one Chinese passenger per every ten tons ·of a vessel's 
tonnage. 111 On the other hand, the limit would have been one Chinese passenger per 
every hundred tons of a vessel's tonnage, if some British Columbia members of 
Parliament had had their way. 112 
The "registration and control" referred to in the preamble was effected through a 
certificate system. Every Chinese immigrant upon paying the fifty dollar duty, plus 
every person of Chinese origin already resident in Canada who chose to pay a fee of 
fifty cents, 113 was issued with a certificate containing their description, date and port 
of arrival, and acknowledgement of payment of the duty. This certificate constituted 
prima facie evidence of their right to enter or resid~ in Canada. 114 Anyone wishing to 
leave Canada with the intention of returning was required to give notice at their port 
of departure, surrender their certificate, and receive, upon payment of a one dollar fee, 
a certificate of leave to depart and return; this was then exchanged for their certificate 
upon their return to Canada. 
109 Ibid., s. 5. 
110 Immigration and Immigrants Act, R.S.C. 1886, c. 65. 
111 Debates of the House of Commons, supra, note 87, (13 Apri11885) at 1037. 
112 Ibid., (2 July 1885) at 3023 (Mr. Baker). 
113 Chinese Immigration Act, s. 13. 
114 Ibid., s. 10. 
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A comprehensive register of all certificates was maintained by a controller appointed 
under the statute. This controller was also required to send an annual list of all new 
Chinese immigrants to the Provincial Secretary of the Province in which certificates 
of entry had been granted. 115 One quarter of all of the revenues collected each year -
were also sent to the Province in which the revenues had been collected. 116 Most of 
the additional provisions of the statute dealt with the logistics of the implementation 
of the head tax and registration scheme, though there was also one completely 
unrelated section which made it an offence to participate in or assist with a system of 
criminal courts set up within the Chinese community that were outside of the official 
• . 117 JUStice system. 
It should be noted that restrictions on immigration were not the only impediments to 
full Chinese participation in Canadian society introduced by the federal Government 
in 1885. The Electoral Franchise Act set out the right of"persons" to vote, but with 
"person" meaning "a male person, including an Indian and excluding a person of 
Mongolian or Chinese race."118 
2. The Royal Commission of 1902 and the Chinese Immigration Act, 1903 
To the extent that the $50 per person duty on Chinese immigrants introduced in 1885 
was intended to discourage or prevent Chinese immigration, it did not succeed. While 
the 1880-81 census had counted 4,350 Chinese people in British Columbia, and an 
1884 estimate indicated an increase to 9,629, by 1901 a conservative estimate was 
115 Ibid., s. 15. 
116 Ibid., s. 20. 
117 Ibid., s. 17. 
118 Electoral Franchise Act, S.C. 1885 (48-49 Viet.), c. 40. 
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14,376, with a total population in Canada of 16,792. 119 In comparison, the estimated 
total populations of British Columbia and Canada in 1901 were 179,000120 and 
5,371,00012I respectively. 
The reaction from those opposed to Chinese immigration to these growing numbers 
was predictable. In 1891, for example, trade unions and labour organizations 
presented over 70 petitions to the Canadian Parliament, with an even larger number 
presented in 1892, all declaring that "the importation into Canada of Chinese labour is 
not in the best interests of the country and should be prohibited, and praying for such 
legislation as will have the effect of totally prohibiting the importation of Chinese 
labour into the Dominion". 122 Reluctant to take that step, the Government of Canada 
did increase the amount of the duty from $50 to $100 in 1900.123 That step left the 
Government of British Columbia unsatisfied, as noted by the Minister of State: 
The minister observes that at a recent sitting of the Legislative 
Assembly of the province, a resolution was adopted declaring that the 
Chinese Immigration Act passed at the last session of the parliament of 
Canada, increasing the capitation tax from $50 to $100 is ineffective 
and inadequate to prevent Chinese immigration into Canada, and 
expressing the opinion that the only effective mode of dealing with the 
question of restricting Mongolian immigration into Canada would be 
by ·either increasing the amount of per capita tax to the sum of $500, or 
by the passing of an Act based on the lines of the Natal Act, known as 
the 'Immigration Restriction Act of 1897.' 124 
119 Report of the Royal Commission on Chinese and Japanese Immigration, (Ottawa: Kings Printer, 
1902), pp. 7-8. The report stated that a more realistic estimate for the number of Chinese people in 
British Columbia in 1901 was 16,000. 
120 Government of British Columbia, "BC Stats" < 
http://www. bcstats .gov. bc.ca/ data!pop/pop/BCPop.asp>. 
121 Statistics Canada, "Estimated Population of Canada, 1605 to present", 
<http:/ /www.statcan.ca/english!freepub/98-187-XIE/pop.htm>. 
122 Ibiq., p. 1. 
123 Chinese Immigration Act, S.C. 1900 (63-64 Viet.), c. 32, s. 6. 
124 Report ofthe Royal Commission on Chinese and Japanese Immigration, p. xii. 
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The "Natal Act" referred to was South African legislation restricting Indian 
immigration, and served as the basis for statutes restricting Chinese immigration that 
were adopted in Western Australia in 1897, New South Wales in 1898, Tasmania in 
1899, and the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901. Since a Chinese Exclusion Act125 
had also been passed in the United States in 1882 banning Chinese immigration - a 
ban that was to remain in place in that country until 1943 - those who advocated for 
such legislation in Canada had no shortage of international models to draw on in 
support of their proposals. 
Rather than respond directly to demands for greater restriction on Chinese 
immigration, the Government of Canada once again resorted to referring the issue to a 
Royal Commission. This time, it was the Royal Commission on Chinese and 
Japanese Immigration, reflecting the increasing ethnic diversity of immigrants to 
Canada. The Royal Commission found, however, that Japanese immigration had 
become a non-issue by the time of their report, due to instructions by the Government 
of Japan to the Governors of the Japanese Prefectures to entirely prohibit the 
emigration of Japanese labourers to Canada, in order "to avoid any friction that might 
occur by allowing them to come into British Columbia where their immigration was 
not desired by a certain element of that province" .126 
In its inquiry into Chinese immigration, the Commission was much more systematic 
than its predecessor, taking detailed evidence on sanitary conditions, crime statistics, 
morality and religion, 127 taxes paid, land clearing, market gardening, coal mining, 
125 22 St. p. 59, c. 126 
126 Ibid., p. 399. 
127 Interestingly, there was virtual unanimity among the clergy who testified before the Royal 
Commission that Chinese people should be excluded altogether. Ibid., pp. 22-40. 
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placer mining, lode mining, the lumber industry, the shingle industry, canning, 
domestic servants, laundries, tailors, unskilled labour and the effect on youth. This 
Commission was also much less equivocal than its predecessor, reaching a conclusion 
that was much more in keeping with the anti-immigration sentiment that had spawned 
it: 
Your Commissioners are of opinion that the further immigration of 
Chinese labourers into Canada ought to be prohibited; 
That the most desirable and effective means of achieving this end is by 
treaty supported by suitable legislation; 
That in the meantime and until this can be obtained the capitation tax 
should be raised to $500. 
This recommendation was implemented by the Chinese Immigration Act, 1903,128 s. 6 
of which provided for the new $500 tax. As an additional concession to the Province 
of British Columbia, the percentage of the tax remitted to the Province where the tax 
was collected was increased from one-fourth to one-half. 129 
The new $500 tax was an enormous sum for the time, estimated as the equivalent of 
two year's wages for a Chinese labourer. 130 The imposition of the new tax did not, 
however, completely halt Chinese immigration. It did cause a sharp but temporary 
decline in immigration numbers, which went from 5,329 in 1903 to 77 in 1905. 131 
128 Chinese Immigration Act, 1903, S.C. 1903 (3 Edw. VII), c. 8. 
129 Ibid., s. 24. 
130 Shack Jang Mack v. Canada (2001), 55 O.R. (3d) 113, [200 1] O.J. No. 2794 (Sup. Ct. Jus.), at~ 4. 
131 Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canada Year Book 1934-35 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 
1935), p. 224. As the following table shows, there was considerable variation on a year-to-year basis in 
the early twentieth century, prior to the outright prohibition of Chinese immigration in 1923: 
1901 2544 1906 168 1911 . 5320 1916 89 1921 2435 
1902 3587 1907 291 1912 6581 1917 393 1922 1746 
1903 5329 1908 2234 1913 7445 1918 769 1923 711 
1904 4847 1909 2106 1914 5512 1919 4333 1924 674 
1905 77 1910 2302 1915 1258 1920 544 1925 0 
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After that, however, Chinese immigration gradually began to increase again and was 
supplemented by immigration from other non-white ethnic groups. The result was 
continued tension, which when combined with economic recession, acute housing 
shortages, and rumours of a deal by which the Grand Trunk Railway would import 
tens of thousands of Japanese workers, eventually sparked "Anti-Asiatic Riots" in 
Vancouver in September of 1907.132 Deputy Minister of Labour (and future Prime 
Minister) W.L. MacKenzie King was appointed as a Royal Commissioner to 
investigate losses sustained by the Chinese population, losses which were "almost 
exclusively incurred on account of broken windows, signs and glass". 133 The 
Government of Canada accepted King's recommendation that it allocate $26,990 to 
fully compensate members of the Chinese community who had suffered these losses. 
At the same time as he was serving as a Royal Commissioner investigating 
compensating victims of the anti-Oriental riots, how~ver, King received notice that he 
was also being appointed to investigate how it was that "a largely increased influx of 
Oriental labourers" had been induced to come to Canada, their immigration being 
seen as the cause of the riots. 134 
132 Ninette Kelley and Michael Trebilcock, The Making of the Mosaic: A History of Canadian 
Immigration Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), p. 145. 
133 Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Investigate into the Losses Sustained by the Chinese 
Population of Vancouver, B.C. on the Occasion of the Riots in that City in September, 1907 (Ottawa: 
S.E. Dawson, King's Printer, 1908),·P· 11. 
134 Canada, Report of W.L. MacKenzie King, C.M G, Commissioner Appointed to Enquire into the 
Methods by Which Oriental Labourers, Have Been Induced to Come to Canada (Government Printing 
Bureau, 1908), p. 7 .. 
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3. The Royal Commission of 1908 and Amendments to the Chinese Immigration Act 
If anything, King's 1908 Royal Commission report might have diminished anti-
Chinese sentiments, at least in comparison to those concerning other Asian 
immigrants; the report indicated that during the first ten months of 1907, the ports of 
Vancouver and Victoria had received 8,125 Japanese and 2,047 "Hindus", compared 
to only 1,266 Chinese. 135 
On the other hand, however, King's report revealed that the $500 head tax which had 
initially served to reduce Chinese immigration to virtually nil had become less 
effective over time. His explanation was basic supply and demand economics: when 
the influx of new Chinese labourers was effectively cut offby the tax, a shortage 
resulted in those fields where Chinese labourers were normally employed, allowing 
Chinese labourers who were already in the country to successfully demand increased 
wages. Those increased wages not only enabled them to send more money back to 
China to pay for their friends' and relatives' passages to Canada, but they also meant 
that new immigrants who had to borrow money to pay the $500 head tax could count 
on paying off their debts that much more quickly. 136 
King must have construed his responsibilities as being confined to fact-finding, since 
the only recommendation he made was that Canadian representatives should be 
posted to Asian countries. 137 The 1908 Royal Commission therefore did not result in 
immediate, significant legislative changes, and only relatively minor amendments to 
135 Ibid., p. 3. Note that there is a considerable discrepancy between this number and that subsequently 
reported by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics; see note 131, supra. 
136 Ibid., pp. 70-71. 
137 Ibid., p. 81. 
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the Chinese Immigration Act occurred in the following years. Amendments in 1908, 
for example, clarified that it was only "minor children" of merchants and clergymen 
who were excused from paying the head tax, not "children,"138 tightened restrictions 
on students, 139 imd made it easier to deport persons in violation of the Act.140 
Amendments in 1917 made students and clergymen exempt from the tax141 and 
provided for ·reverse onus summary deportation trials of anyone of Chinese origin 
believed to be in Canada illegally. 142 Amendments in 1921 allowed registered 
Chinese persons to be absent from Canada for two years without penalty rather than 
just one, 143 and made evasion of the Act a summary conviction offence rather than an 
indictable offence.144 
This legislatively quiescent phase lasted through years of low Chinese immigration 
(just 89 people in 1916) and high Chinese immigration (7,445 in 1913),145 so it might 
have been expected that the situation had stabilized and would continue indefinitely. 
The tension concerning the issue of Chinese immigration had not disappeared, 
however, and was actually exacerbated by post-war recession and high 
unemployment. By 1919, in fact, the situation had reached the point that the Chinese 
Consul in Vancouver called upon the Government of Canada to take action to ensure 
that "no more Chinese laborers be allowed to come at present, unless they are 
returning Chinese or bona fide exempted class."146 It was in this climate that the 
138 An Act to Amend the Chinese Immigration Act, S.C. 1908 (7-8 Edward VII), c. 14, s. 2. 
139 Ibid., s. 3. 
140 Ibid., s. 6. 
141 An Act to Amend the Chinese Immigration Act, S.C. 1917 (7-8 George V), c. 7, s. 1. 
142 Ibid., s. 2. 
143 An Act to Amend the Chinese Immigration Act, S.C. 1921 (11-12 GeorgeV), c. 21, s. 4. 
144 Ibid., s. 7. 
145 Supra, note'l31. 
146 Quoted in Portraits of a Challenge, supra, note 73 at 131. 
57 
Government of Canada moved to pursue the course that some people had urged upon 
it decades earlier: the complete exclusion of Chinese immigrants. 
4. The Chinese Immigration Act, 1923 and Its Aftermath 
After almost four decades of trying to discourage Chinese immigration, the 
Government of Canada finally moved to ban it outright following the 1921 election of 
W.L. Mackenzie King as Prime Minister. King, it will be remembered, had 
conducted the 1908 Royal Commission into Asian immigration. In 1923, legislation 
confined the entry into Canada of persons of Chinese origin or descent "irrespective 
of allegiance or citizenship" to just four classes: members of the diplomatic corps and 
those accompanying them; children born in Canada; merchants; and students 
attending university or college. 147 For greater certainty, an additional fifteen 
categories of Chinese people were expressly prohibited, ranging from illiterates to 
those of "constitutional psychopathic inferiority" .148 Those who legally resided in 
Canada faced additional restrictions, including loss of their rights if they were absent 
from Canada for more than .two years. 149 The new legislation came into effect on July 
. 1st, Canada's national holiday. 
The effect of the exclusion law on the Chinese community in Canada was very harsh. 
The ratio of males to females in the community in the early 1920s had been about 
fifteen to one. 150 Although most of the men had wives and families in China, the 
exclusion law meant that they could not bring them to Canada. Some did not see their 
147 Chinese Immigration Act, 1923, S.C. 1923 (13-14 George V), c. 38, s. 5. 
148 Ibid., s. 8. 
149 Ibid., s. 24. 
150 PeterS. Li, Chinese in Canada, Second Edition (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 67. 
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families for decades. While the Great Depression of the 1930s encouraged some to 
return to China, those who remained were doomed to grow old in a constrained and 
gradually diminishing society of "married bachelors". 
The legislation remained in place for almost a quarter of a century until its repeal 
shortly after World War II. 151 By that time, the cessation of Chinese immigration and 
the aging of the remaining population had made it more difficult to inflame 
xenophobic fears. In addition, the relatively small number of second-generation 
Chinese who had grown up in Canada had begun to integrate into white society, 
eroding the foreignness that had made their parents easy targets for racism. Finally, 
China's fight against Japan in World War II generated considerable sympathy, 
augmented by the participation of Chinese-Canadians in the Canadian military effort. 
By the time the war ended, many barriers to Chinese participation in Canadian society 
had fallen, and by 194 7 they had become fully eligible for the electoral franchise, 
even in British Columbia. 152 In that year, sixty years of anti-Chinese legislation 
finally carne to an end with the repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act. 
D. Provincial Legislation 
Although the legally effective bars against Chinese immigration were statutes enacted 
by the Government of Canada, mention should be made of the repeated attempts made 
151 An Act to Amend the Immigration Act and to Repeal the Chinese Immigration Act, S.C. 1947, c. 19 
152 Jin Tan and Patricia E. Roy, The Chinese in Canada (Saint John: Canadian Historical Association, 
1985), p. 14 . . 
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by the Government of British Columbia to enact its own legislation, even once it had 
become clear that it largely lacked the constitutional ability to do so. 153 
British Columbia legislation discriminating on the basis of race targeted both Chinese 
and Japanese immigrants. It included nine "Immigration Acts" as well. as statutes 
discriminating in other ways, such as restrictions on employing Asians in some 
industries, 154 statutes incorporating private companies with clauses prohibiting the 
hiring of Asian labour, 155 legislation denying Asians the right to vote or hold public 
office, 156 and legislation imposing discriminatory taxation, licensing or regulatory 
requirements on Asians. 157 Some of these laws faced court challenges, and six were 
declared ultra vires the provincial government, in that they came within the exclusive 
legislative jurisdiction of the federal government. 
153 While the provinces were accorded concurrent jurisdiction with regard to immigration by the 
Consitution Act, 1867, their jurisdiction is subordinate to that of the federal government. Section 95 
provides that: 
In each Province the Legislature may make Laws in relation to Agriculture in the 
Province, and to Immigration into the Province; and it is hereby declared that the 
Parliament of Canada may from Time to Time make Laws in relation to Agriculture 
in all or any of the Provinces, and to Immigration into all or any of the Provinces; and 
any Law of the Legislature of a Province relative to Agriculture or to Immigration 
shall have effect in and for the Province as long and as far only as it is not repugnant 
to any Act of the Parliament of Canada. 
Other sections that buttress federal authority on this subject ares. 91(11), which allows Parliament to 
legislate health and medical standards for immigrants and aliens, and s. 91(25), which allows 
Parliament to legislate with regard to "naturalization and aliens." Further restrictions on the ability to 
legislate with regard to immigration now flow from the Constitution Act, 1982, most notably s. 6 
(mobility rights) and s. 15 (equality rights). Although this chapter highlights federal-provincial 
disagreements concerning immigration, such disputes have actually been rare, since the provinces have 
seldom been interested in the topic of immigration. For a general overview, see Davies Bagambiire, 
Canadian Immigration and Refugee Law (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 1996), pp. 9-14. 
154 See, for example, Labour Regulation Act, 1898, S.B.C. 1898, chap. 28 (61 Viet.). 
155 See, for example, Cariboo-Omineca Chartered Company (Incorporation) Act, S.B.C. 1898, chap. 
10 (61 Viet.), s. 30. 
156 See, for example, Electorates, Electors and Elections Act, R.S.B.C. 1897 (61 Viet.), chap. 67, s. 8: 
"No Chinaman, Japanese or Indian shall have his name placed on the Register of Voters for any 
Electoral District, or be entitled to vote at any election. Any Collector of Voters who shall insert the 
name of any Chinaman, Japanese, or Indian in any such register, shall, upon summary conviction 
thereofbefon:i any Justice of the Peace, be liable to a penalty not exceeding fifty dollars." 
157 For a comprehensive list of such provisions in the pre-1904 period, see the decision of Martin J. in 
Re Coal Mines Regulation, supra note 74, at 425-426. 
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In addition to court challenges, other means of dealing with objectionable legislation 
were possible under the Constitution Act, 1867, and these were also used. 158 The 
Lieutenant-Governor, the Queen's representative at the provincial level, has the power 
to reserve provincial bills "for the signification of pleasure" of the Governor-General, 
the Queen's representative at the federallevel. 159 This power was used three times to 
prevent provincial anti-Chinese bills from becoming law. In addition, the 
Government of Canada has the power to disallow provincial legislation within 
approximately two years after it has received Royal assent. 160 Between 1878 and 
1921, the Government of Canada used this power to disallow anti-Chinese legislation 
passed by the B.C. Legislatur~ twenty-two times. 161 
The British Columbia Legislature first considered the issue of Chinese immigration in 
1876, when it considered "the expediency of taking some steps towards preventing the 
country from being flooded with a Mongolian population, ruinous to the best interests 
of British Columbia, particularly her labouriilg classes" and resolved to do so "at as 
early a day as possible" .162 The earliest attempt was the passage of the Chinese Tax 
Act, 1878,163 which would have required that every Chinese person over twelve pay 
ten dollars every quarter for a licence.164 Anyone not having such a licence would 
158 These provisions remain part of the constitution, and could, in theory, still be exercised today. Note, 
however, that they have not been exercised in many years, and that some argue that modem ideas of 
judicial review and democratic responsibility have left no room for the exercise of these powers: Peter 
Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, Looseleaf Edition (Toronto: Carswell), at 5.3(e). 
159 Section 90, in conjunction with s. 55, Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5. 
160 Ibid., s. 90 in conjunction with s. 56. 
161 Bruce Ryder, "Racism and the Constitution: The Constitutional Fate of British Columbia Anti-
Asian Immigration Legislation, 1884-1909", Osgoode Hall Law Journal29 ( 1991) 619~ Ryder notes 
that there were more than one hundred anti-Asian statutes in British Columbia in total, more than can 
be considered in this paper. 
162 British Columbia, Legislative Journals (1876) at 46.] 
163 S.B.C. 1878, c. 35 
164 Ibid., s. 2. 
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have been required to work on the public roads, with the cost of wear and tear on their 
tools and a portion oftheir overseer's salary being added to their licence fee! 165 The 
statute was disallowed by the Government of Canada. 166 
In 1883, the B.C. Legislature appointed a Select Committee on Chinese Labour and 
Immigration, which made recommendations that led to the passage in 1884 of three 
anti-Chinese statutes, one of which- An Act to Prevent the Immigration of Chinese 167 
- was the first of nine attempts to prohibit Asian immigration. This was disallowed by 
the Government of Canada two months after its passage. 168 Eleven months later, 
B.C. re-enacted a virtually unchanged version of the statute.169 This version was 
disallowed by the Government of Canada within a week of receiving a copy of it. 170 
British Columbia's next attempt to prohibit Asian immigration was n_ot until August 
1900, though it did forward numerous resolutions to Ottawa asking for action in the 
meantime. The Immigration Act 171 made it unlawful for anyone to immigrate to 
British Columbia who failed to write out and sign "in the characters of some language 
of Europe" an application for an exemption from the statute. 172 This statute would 
seem to have been aimed solely at Japanese immigrants, however, since s. 2(f) 
provided that it did not apply to anyone whose terms of entry into Canada had been 
fixed by any Act of the Parliament of Canada (e.g. the federal Chinese Immigration 
Act). This statute was disallowed by the Government of Canada in September, 
165 Ibid., s. 12. 
166 Supra, note 161, p. 646. 
167 S.B.C. 1884, c.3. 
168 Supra, note 161, p. 651. 
169 S.B.C. 1885, c. 13. 
170 Supra, note 161, p. 655 
171 S.B.C. 1900, c. 11. 
172 Ibid., s. 3. 
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1901.173 When a virtually identical Immigration Act was passed by the B. C. 
Legislature in June 1902,174 the Government of Canada disallowed that version too. 
Similar versions were introduced in May 1903,175 April1904176 and early in 1905177 
all of which were also disallowed. The Lieutenant-Governor reserved assent for a 
1907 version. 178 A final attempt to pass legislation rendering Asian immigration 
unlawful was made in February 1908179 with a version that removed the exemption 
for persons whose right of entry was regulated by Dominion legislation, thus 
purporting to make it effective against Chinese immigrants. This was held by the 
courts to be unenforceable first against Japanese subjects and later in its entirety180 
because of inconsistency with paramount federal legislation, and was finally 
disallowed in 1909.181 
E. Judicial Decisions 
The following chapter will consider modern attempts to seek redress for the Chinese 
head tax and exclusionary laws, including an attempt to pursue this aim through the 
courts. Before looking at that modern case law, however, it will be useful to consider 
some of the cases that were actually contemporaneous with the head tax and 
exclusionary laws, and in particular whether the courts were in any way sensitive to 
the human rights dimension of those laws. If so, it may be that the courts' judgments 
would be consistent with the theory of an "implied bill of rights" that originally was 
173 Supra, note 161, p. 660. 
174 S.B.C. 1902, c. 34. 
175 British Columbia Immigration Act, 1903, S.B.C. 1903, c. 12 
176 S.B.C. 1904, c. 26. 
177 British Columbia Immigration Act, 1905, S.B.C. 1905, s. 28. 
178 British Columbia Immigration Act, 1907, S.B.C. 1907, c. 21A. 
179 British Columbia Immigration Act, 1908, S.B.C. 1908, c. 23. 
180 Re Nakane and Okazake (1908), 13 B.C.R. 370 (S.C.) andRe Narain Singh eta/. (1908), 13 B.C.R. 
477 (S.C.). See below. 
181 Supra, note 161, p. 667 
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recognized by legal scholars and more recently has received recognition from the 
courts themselves. 
Briefly, this theory stands in opposition to the conventional belief in the supremacy of 
Parliament, which would hold that in a federal state such as Canada (at least as it was 
prior to the adoption of the Charter), the only issue is which level of government has 
the constitutional authority to abridge an established right, not whether or not the right 
can be abridged at all. Those who professed to find an "implied bill of rights" in the 
Constitution Act, 1867 suggested that even prior to the adoption of the Charter, 
however, there were some rights that could not be abridged by either level of 
government. Some early judicial decisions cmitained explicit statements supporting 
this view, 182 while others seemed to embrace what might be termed a "surreptitious 
bill of rights", purporting to recognize that any given piece oflegislation adopted by 
one level of government is actually within the jurisdiction of the other level of 
government in order to invalidate laws that the courts believed should not have been 
enacted at al1. 183 
The notion of the implied bill of rights has been extremely controversial, with 
Canada's most eminent constitutional scholars divided on the question of its existence 
182 While not explicitly taking this position, the judgment of Duff C.J. respecting the The Alberta 
Accurate News and Information Act does suggest that the democratic system of government established 
by the Constitution Act, 1867 requires the existence of free public debate, which leads to speculation 
about whether the institutions that foster that debate can legally be constrained by either level of 
government: Re Alberta Statutes, [1938] S.C.R. 100. For a more detailed explication of Duffs 
dictum, see Gibson, "Constitutional Amendment and the Implied Bill ofRights" (1967) 12 McGill L.J. 
497 at 497. In Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.R. 285, another case which considered restrictions on 
freedom of expression, Rand J. said " I am unable to agree that in our federal organization power 
absolute in such a sense resides in either legislature." Abbott J. went further, saying that not only could 
the provincial legislature not abrogate the expression right as the impugned law purported to do, but 
" ... the Canadian constitution being declared to be similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom, I 
am also of opinion that as our constitutional Act now stands, Parliament itself could not abrogate this 
right of discussion and debate." 
183 Paul Weiler, "The Supreme Court and the Law of Canadian Federalism" (1973) 23 U. Toronto L.J. 
307 at 349 !f. 
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and appropriateness, with F.R. Scott and Dale Gibson, for example, in the "pro" camp. 
and Bora Laskin, Paul Weiler and Peter Hogg in the "anti" camp. 184 Those who 
denied the existence of an implied bill of rights found support in the decision of Beetz 
.J. in Attorney General ofCanada v. Dupond, 185 to the effect that fundamental 
freedoms (a term to which Beetz J. objected as the sort of "loose language" that 
modem parlance had fostered) such as freedom of expression, were not guaranteed by 
the Canadian Constitution to the point of being beyond the reach of all legislation. 
More recently; however, the implied bill of rights seems to have received the blessing 
of the Supreme Court of Canada as an important aid to understanding the written 
elements of the constitution, which may also, in certain circumstances, give rise to 
substantive obligations. The Court has in particular affirmed the existence of certain 
"foundational principles" that constitute limitations on governments and the courts, 
with those foundational principles including federalism, democracy, constitutionalism 
and the rule of law, respect for minority rights, judicial independence, and respect for 
human rights and freedoms. 186 The possible existence of constitutional rights that 
exist independently of their inclusion in the Charter will be discussed further in 
subsequent chapters, in the context of considering how the courts can provide 
remedies for human rights violations that took place prior to the Charter's enactment. 
The jurisprudence concerning the Asian exclusion laws contains at least hints of 
judicial awareness that what made such laws objectionable was something more than 
184 For judicial summaries of the academic debate, see, for example, Reference re Remuneration of 
Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 at~ 317 and R. v. Demers, 
supra, note 20 at ~ 80-86 
185 [1978] 2 S.C.R. 770 at 796-797. 
186 R. v. Demers, supra, note 20, at~ 83. For a discussion of the related topics of the rule of law and the 
"Ancient Constitution" in the context of the Chinese head tax, see John McLaren, "The Head Tax Case 
and the Rule of Law: The Historical Thread of Judicial Resistance to 'Legalized' Discrimination," in 
David Dyzenhaus and Mayo Moran, Calling Power to Account (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2005), pp. 92-112. 
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their possible infringements of the federal-provincial division of powers. Nakane, for 
example, was a case in which a writ of habeas corpus was sought by Japanese 
individuals who had been detained under the British Columbia Immigration Act, 
1908.187 Hunter C.J. in the first instance and a three judge panel on appeal fom:id that 
because the B.C. statute was inconsistent with the Japanese Treaty Act 188 passed by 
the federal government, it was invalid due to federal paramountcy in the field of 
immigration. Hunter C.J. was obviously sympathetic to the detained individuals, 
concluding his judgment by saying that: 
They are peaceable and law-abiding subjects of the Japanese Empire, 
and as far I can see they have a good right of action against someone, 
but of course that is not before me now. 189 
Morrison J. on appeal was cutting in his reasons for judgment, saying that the lawyer 
for the Province of British Columbia had "taken much higher ground than the nature 
and circumstances of this case justify."190 Posing the question of whether the British 
Columbia Immigration Act was "repugnant" to the federal legislation, he answered: 
"In my opinion, it is in every sense of the term."191 
Clement J. was equally blunt: 
To my mind the case for the appellant Attorney-General is hopeless; so 
hopeless that I feel constrained to express my regret that it should ever 
have been thought proper to attempt to enforce the British Columbia 
Immigration Act, 1908, as against these respondents. 192 
187 Supra, note 180. 
188 (6 & 7 Edw. VII), c. 50. 
189 Supra, note 180, at 373. 
190 Ibid., at 375. 
191 Ibid., at 376. 
192 Ibid. 
66 
In Re Narain Singh et al., 193 the case in which the British Columbia Immigration Act 
was held to be completely inoperative in the face of the federal legislation, neither the 
judge in the first instance nor the full Court on appeal were overtly critical of the 
provincial statute as had been the case in Nakane. The Court did, however, depart 
from the usual.rule of that time of not awarding costs against the Crown, despite the 
vigorous objections of counsel for the provincial Attorney-General, which would 
seem indicative of judicial disapprova1. 194 
In Woon v. Victoria, Crease J. ruled on a case that he characterized as "test action to 
try whether China men have the same rights as other foreigners in landing here on 
their advent from China." 195 He described the treatment that the plaintiff had· 
received, supposedly on medical grounds, despite having already been examined and 
passed by both federal and provincial medical officers: 
Disregarding the white men, who had come at .the same time from the 
same place and in the same ship and presumably subject to some of the 
same unsanitary influences, though not to the same extent as the 
Chinese, without any reason for special suspicion, without inspecting 
or attempting to inspect a single man, (that had already been done 
individually by the Dominion Quarantine Officers) he orders them into 
the custody of his constables to be taken out to the suspect station at 
Ross Bay, there to be washed and disinfected and scrubbed. They, with 
their goods and chattels, were bundled into a common truck like so 
many cattle. 
The court found in favour of the plaintiff and awarded nominal damages and costs. 
193 Supra, note 180. 
194 Ibid., at481. 
195 Woon v. Victoria (City) (Medical Health Officer), (1894) 3 B.C.R. 318 (S.C.) at~ 1. 
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The case of R. v. Chong, which involved a conviction and $20 fine imposed by a 
police magistrate pursuant to legislation, was also heard by Crease J. In finding the 
legislation ultra vires and overturning the conviction, the judge pointed out that a 
·threat to the rights of one group also threatens the rights of all other groups: 196 
In every prosecution under the Act the legal presumption of innocence 
until conviction is reversed; in every case the onus probandi, though in 
a Statute highly penal, is shifted from the informant on to the shoulders 
of the accused, and he a foreigner not knowing one word of the law, or 
even the language of the accuser. In other words, every Chinese is 
guilty until proved innocent -- a provision which fills one conversant 
with subjects with alarm; for if such a law can be tolerated as against 
Chinese, the precedent is set, and in time of any popular outcry can 
easily be acted on for putting any other foreigners or even special 
classes among ourselves, as coloured people, or French, Italians, 
Americans, or Germans, under equally the same law. That certainly is 
interfering with aliens. 
In R. v. Wah, 197 Begbie J. set aside the conviction of the appellant for operating a 
laundry without a license and payment of the license fee purportedly authorized by a 
municipal by-law of the City ofVictoria, which itself was claimed to be authorized by 
a provincial statute granting the municipality the power of "licensing and regulating 
washhouses and laundries." Despite the fact that the by-law did not actually refer to 
Chinese people, Begbie held that discriminating against them was its intention. And 
although in referring to American cases on point, Begbie J. had conceded that they 
were not binding since they depended in part on the protections afforded by the 
American constitution, the following passage seems to suggest that in his view, 
similar protection was intended to be contained within the Canadian Constitution:198 
196 R. v. Chong (1885), 1 B.C.R. (Pt. 2) 150 (S.C.) at~ 67. 
197 (1886), 3 B.C.R. 403 (Co. Ct.). 
198 Ibid. at~ 21. Note that the Constitution Act, 1867 was fonnerly known as the British North America 
["BNA"] Act. 
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I, for my part, cannot arrive at any other conclusion than that it is 
specially directed against Chinamen because they are Chinamen and 
for no other reason; to compel them to remove certain industries from 
the city or themselves from the Province. But the authorities already 
cited show that this effect cannot be attained directly, and what cannot 
be done directly will not be permitted to be done by a side wind. 
Tiburcio Parrott's Case, pp. 1634; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall325. · 
"If we hold otherwise," said the learned Judge, in that case "no kind of 
oppression can be named against which the framers of(the B.N.A. 
Act) intended to guard which may not be effected." 
Begbie J. could have relied solely upon the ultra vires nature of a by-law preventing 
Chinese people from being licensed as pawnbrokers to declare an impugned by-law 
void in R. v. Victoria (City). He went further, however, to imply that English people 
could find themselves subject to discrimination on the same grounds as Chinese 
people, and that in either case it would be equally objectionable as infringing personal 
liberty, equality and international rights: 199 
It is not uninteresting to note the uniformity with which the same 
events result from the same principles, although in very different parts 
of the world. Victoria does not possess a monopoly ofrace jealousy. 
In the French colony of Cayenne, the Town Council recently 
handicapped the superior capacities of the Chinaman by imposing on 
merchants of that empire an extra tax of $300 per annum, deeming it 
also expedient to handicap English and German traders by a surtax of 
$200 on them. But on the appeal to the courts at Paris, all these 
impositions were declared null on the very same principles as those on 
which the Courts here insisted when they decided the cases above 
referred to, viz., as being infringements at once of personal liberty, and 
of the equality ofallmen before the law, and also negation of 
international rights. · 
There are other cases. in which the hint of judicial disapproval is more ambiguous. 
How much, for example, can be read into the following passage from the decision of 
Irving J. in Re Coal Mines Regulation Act, where, despite saying he did not wish to 
discuss the "policy or impolicy" of the impugned provisions, he noted: 
199 R. v. Victoria (City) (1888), I B.C.R. (Pt. 2) 331 (S.C.) at~ 5. 
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In the paragraph quoted, I can see no rule or regulation, established or 
sought to be established, by which the fitness of a Chinaman to 
properly perform the work of an underground miner can be tested. He 
may speak the English language perfectly, he may be a skilled mining 
engineer; but these points are immaterial. He is disbarred by reason of 
the fact that he is a Chinaman. 200 
In other anti-Chinese cases, it was only the dissenting minority that seemed to take 
issue with the underlying purpose of the impugned statutes. In R. v. Quang-Wing, for 
example, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada were comforted by the fact 
that a Saskatchewan statute that forbade the employment or patronage of any Chinese-
owned restaurant, laundry or other business was not aimed at those of Chinese 
nationality, but was aimed at those of Chinese race regardless of their citizenship. It 
was only Idington J. in dissent who mused that: 
It may well be argued that the highly prized gifts of equal freedom and 
equal opportunity before the law, are so characteristic of the tendency 
of all British modes of thinking and acting in relation thereto, that they 
are not to be impaired by the whims of a legislature; and that equality 
taken away unless and until forfeited for causes which civilized men 
recognize as valid.201 
He also said: 
This legislation is but a piece of the product of the mode of thought 
that begot and maintained slavery; not so long ago fiercely claimed to 
be a laudable system of governing those incapable of governing 
themselves. 202 
200 Supra, note 74, at416-417. 
201 (1914), 49 S.C.R. 440 at 452. 
202 Ibid. 
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There are, of course, other cases in which the courts refrained from giving any 
indication of their views of the merits of anti-Chinese legislation whatsoever. Most 
notable in this regard were cases where appeals were taken from Canadian judgments 
to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. In Bryden v. Union Colliery Co. of 
British Columbia,203 for example, a case in which the provision of the Coal Mines·. 
Regulation Act forbidding the employment of Chinese was declared ultra vires, Lord 
Watson noted: 
In so far as they possess legislative jurisdiction, the discretion 
committed to the Parliaments, whether of the Dominion or of the 
Provinces, is unfettered. It is the proper function of a Court of law to 
determine, what are the limits of the jurisdiction committed to them; 
but, when that point has been settled, Courts of law have no right 
whatever to enquire whether their jurisdiction has been exercised 
wisely or not. 204 
The Lord Chancellor's judgment was to the same effect in Cunningham v. Tomey 
Homma, a case in which the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council overruled the 
lower courts and held that the provisions of the British Columbia Provincial Elections 
AcP05 excluding Chinese, Japanese and Indians from the electoral franchise were 
valid: 
... the policy or impolicy of such an enactment as that which excludes a 
particular race from the franchise is not a topic which their Lordships 
are entitled to consider.206 
203 [1899] A.C. 580 (J.C.P.C.). 
204 Ibid., at 585. 
205 R.S.B.C. 1897, chap. 97. 
206 Cunningham v. Tomey Hortima, [1903] A.C. 151 at 155-1'56. 
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Generally, the courts did, in fact, refrain from commenting on the merits of anti-
Chinese legislation. In Brooks-Bidlake & Whittall v. B. C. (Attorney General), for 
example, the Judicial Committee of th.e Privy Council gave only a brief and closely-
worded judgment upholding legislation prohibiting the employment of ChiQ.ese or 
Japanese in the forest industry, despite having struck down very similar provisions 
concerning the coal industry in Bryden. That body also made no criticism of British 
Columbia's attempt to validate a number of discriminatory provisions that must 
otherwise have seemed to be invalid by the passage of the Oriental Orders in Council 
Validation Act.207 Instead, it simply found that the statute could not stand in the face 
of the federal government's valid exercise of its power to enter into a treaty with 
Japan that allowed the citizens of each country full liberties in the territories of the 
other.208 
Finally, there are some judgments that seem positively approving of anti-Chinese 
legislation. The dissenting judgment of Martin J., for example, in Re Coal Mines 
Regulation Act makes it clear that he would have upheld the legislation just as readily 
if it had applied to French-Canadians, Indians or Negroes.209 
At most, then, what can be said is that while the majority of judges did not comment 
on the human rights aspect of the anti-Asian legislation upon which they ruled, some 
judges do appear to have disapproved of such legislation and to have made little effort 
to hide that disapproval while striking the legislation down. The exact grounds of 
such judicial disapproval are not always possible to discern. In some cases, it may 
have reflected a worldly distaste for the parochialism of their fellow colonialists. 
207 S.B.C. 1921 (11 Geo. 5), chap. 49. 
208 Attorney General of British Columbia v. Attorney General of Canada, [ 1924] A. C. 203 (J.C.P .C.). 
209 Supra, note 74 at 419-422. 
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Alternatively, it may have been an indication that the judges' principal identification 
was with the Empire and Dominion governments rather than the provincial 
government. It might even be a product of public school notions of"fair play" that 
conflicted with the treatment that judges saw being accorded to Chinese immigrants. 
It is at least possible, however, to discern some judicial awareness of the existence of 
rights to which Chinese immigrants had some entitlement. 
F. Conclusions 
The preceding overview of the history of the legislative treatment of Chinese 
immigrants to Canada in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries can leave little 
doubt that they were the victims of what in current times we would consider a human . 
rights violation. They were subject to discrimination on the basis of race which was 
all the more extraordinary for the fact that they were the only one of all of the world's 
peoples to be singled out in this way. The fact that Canada was not the only country 
to discriminate against them may illustrate how widespread racism was at that time, 
but some of the remarks of judges and politicians quoted above indicate that even at 
that time, there were those who recognized the wrongness of what was being done. 
That the Government of Canada chose not to heed their views may, as will be 
discussed in Chapters V and VI, be one factor that could have been relevant in 
determining whether Canada should have later been held legally liable for the harm 
suffered by Chinese-Canadians. The next chapter, however, will reveal what was 
actually decided when the courts were given the opportunity to consider this issue in 
the 1990s. 
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Chapter III. Recent Attempts to Seek Redress 
For decades after the repeal of the Chinese head tax and exclusion laws, the fact of 
having been the only ethnic group singled out for such discrimination continued to 
rankle within the Chinese-Canadian community. The sense of injustice which some 
Chinese-Canadians felt was, if anything, aggravated by the fact that another Asian 
ethnic group which was singled out for discrimination in the past- Japanese-
Canadians - received recognition and a remedy from the Government of Canada in the 
1980s, but that no such relief was forthcoming for Chinese-Canadians. Until recently, 
however, efforts to seek a remedy arising from the Chinese head tax and exclusion 
laws were unsuccessful. The difficulties faced during this period illuminate some of 
the problems that can be expected to arise in any similar situation. 
This chapter will look at the unsuccessful attempts to pursue a remedy through both 
the courts and Parliament, as well as at the unexpected tum of events that put the issue 
on top of the political agenda and led to a remedy finally being provided in 2006. It 
will also look briefly at the few other cases in which the Government of Canada has 
provided some form of remedy arising from past human rights violations directed at 
other minorities, and recent signs of further progress. The principal focus, however, 
will be on an attempt to seek redress for Chinese-Canadians through the courts. 
A. A Modem Legal Challenge: Shack lang Mack v. Attorney General of Canada 
Half-a-century after the Chinese Immigration Act was repealed, an attempt was made 
by a small group of Chinese-Canadians to seek legal redress through the courts in the 
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Province of Ontario. The decisions of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice210 and the 
Court of Appeal for Ontario211 provide textbook illustrations of_the shortcomings of 
the legal system as a vehicle for dealing with human rights violations, particularly 
those which have occurred in the distant past. As such, they also indicate the extent to 
which the courts would have to be prepared to adopt a flexible and innovative 
approach if they were to accept the responsibility for resolving outstanding human 
rights cases. 
1 .. The Facts 
Shack Jang Mack was born in China in 1907 and immigrated to China in 1922. He 
was required to pay the $500 head tax. He returned to China in 1928 to marry, but 
because of the Chinese Immigration Act, he could not bring his wife, Gat Nuy N a, to 
Canada. Instead, he would make periodic trips to China to visit. Each time that he 
left Canada, he would sell his cafe and open another one upon his return. His wife 
and children were finally able to join him in Canada in 1950. 
Quen Ying Lee and Yew Lee were the wife and son, respectively, of Guang Foo Lee. 
Guang Foo Lee had been born in China in 1892 and immigrated to Canada in 1913, 
paying the $500 head tax. He married Quen Ying Lee in 1930, but was prevented 
from bringing her to Canada by the Chinese Immigration Act. Their third son Yew 
Lee was born in China in 1949. One result of the inability of Guang F oo Lee to bring 
his family to Canada was that they were forced to endure great privation in China 
because of the Second World War and the civil war. 
210 Mack, supra, note 130. 
211 Mack v. Canada (Attorney General) (2002), 217 D.L.R. (41h) 583 (Ont. C.A.). 
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Shack Jang Mack, Quen Ying Lee and Yew Lee initiated litigation against the 
Attorney General of Canada on their own behalf and on behalf of a class comprising 
the surviving payers of the Head Tax and their surviving spouses and descendants. 
The remedies sought included a public apology and damages. 
Prior to the litigation proceeding to trial, the defendant Attorney General of Canada 
brought a motion to strike out the statement of claim on the ground that it disclosed no 
reasonable cause of action or, in the alternative, that it was frivolous, vexatious or an 
abuse of process. In addition, the defendant raised defences of laches and that the 
statement of claim was statute-barred by reason of s. 32 of the Crown Liability and 
Proceedings AcP 12 and the Limitations Act, 213 though those defences were only to be 
considered if the matter proceeded to tria1.214 
2. The Plaintiffs' Legal Arguments 
The Plaintiffs' claim was based upon two grounds. The first of these grounds arose 
from international law and the Charter. The Plaintiffs relied upon sections 15 and 24 
of the Charter, and on various international documents, including the Charter of the 
United Nations,215 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 216 the International 
212 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-50. 
213 R.S.O. 1990, c. L. 15. 
214 Had the matter proceeded to trial, these defences would have been significant impediments to the 
Plaintiffs' success. The Crown pointed out, for example, that it was only the introduction of the Crown 
Liability Act in 1954 which overcame the Crown's immunity at common law, and that statute explicitly 
provided that no proceeding could be taken against the Crown for anything that occurred before the Act 
received Royal assent: "Factum of the Moving Party, the Attorney General of Canada",~ 41-42. 
215 Can. T.S. 1945 No.7, 59 Stat. 1031, UKTS 1946 No. 67, Cm 7015 (not published in the U.N.T.S.). 
216 G.A. Res. 217 A(III). 
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 217 the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, 218 the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, 219 and the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 220 They argued that the Charter 
should be applied while taking into account the norms found in those international 
covenants as an aid to interpretation, and that doing so would allow them to 
successfully.claim redress. 
The Plaintiffs relied upon two Charter provisions. Section 15(1) states that "Every 
individual is equal before and under the law and.has the right to the equal protection 
and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without 
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or 
mental or physical disability." Section 24(1) states that "Anyone whose rights or 
freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a 
court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers 
appropriate and just in the circumstances." 
The relevant provisions of the international documents relied upon and the 
propositions for which they were adduced were noted and summarized by the 
chambers judge approximately as follows. 
The Charter of the United Nations sets out the signatory countries' reaffirmation of 
faith in fundamental human rights and in the dignity and worth of the individual. 
217 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
218 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966). 
219 G.A. Res. 1904 (XVIII) 
220 660 U.N.T.S. 195. 
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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights generally recognizes that human rights 
must be protected by the rule of law, and includes a number of specifically relevant 
provlSlons: 
o The preamble provides that recognition of the inherent dignity and the equal 
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of 
freedom, justice and peace in the world; 
• Article 1 states that all human beings are born _free and equal in dignity and 
rights; 
• Article 2 provides that every person is entitled to all the rights and freedoms 
set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 
• Article 7 states that all are equal before the law and entitled without 
discrimination to equal protection of the law; 
• Article 16 recognizes the family as the natural and fundamental group unit of 
society and that the family is entitled to protection by the state; 
• Article 29 states that individuals exercising their rights and freedoms shall be 
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the 
purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of 
others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the 
general welfare in a democratic society. 
Article 10 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
recognizes that the widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the 
family, the natural and fundamental group unit in society, in particular, while it is 
responsible for the care and education of dependent children. 
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The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contains the following 
prov1s1ons: 
• Article 2 states that each country will respect and ensure to all individuals 
within its territory the rights recognized in the Covenant itself without 
distinction based on race or national or social origin; 
• Article 20 provides that any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred 
that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be 
prohibited by law; 
• Article 23 affirms that the family is entitled to protection by the state; 
• Article 26 states that all persons are equal before the law and are entitled to 
equal protection of the law. 
The Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination contains 
the following provisions: 
• Article 1 states that discrimination on the ground of race, colour or ethnic 
origin is an offence to human dignity; 
• Articles 2, 3 and 4 state that there shall not be any discrimination in matters of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms because of race, colour or ethnic 
origin and that efforts shall be made to prevent such discrimination, especially 
in respect of civil rights and access to citizenship. 
Article 6 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
-~--
Discrimination requires that parties to the Convention provide effective protection and 
remedies against acts of racial discrimination and the right to seek just and adequate 
~---
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reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered as a result of such discrimination 
before competent tribunals or other state bodies. 
In addition to the international covenants and declarations referred to above, the 
Plaintiffs also cited a report for the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities that asserted that as a proposed basic 
principle of international law that the violation of any human right should give rise to 
a right of compensation for the victim or the victim's immediate family and that there 
should be no limitation period for reparations for gross violations of human rights, 
. 1 d" . . 1 d 221 me u mg mass persecution on racta groun s. 
The second main ground of argument was a claim of unjust enrichment. "Unjust 
enrichment" is a principle which the Supreme Court of Canada has said "lies at the 
heart of the constructive trust", stating that it has "played a role in Anglo-American 
legal writing for centuries". 222 The gist ofthis type of action is that a defendant has 
been enriched at the expense of a plaintiff in circumstances in which it would be 
unjust to permit the defendant to retain the benefit. The test for unjust enrichment has 
three elements: (1) an enrichment of the defendant; (2) a corresponding deprivation of 
the plaintiff; and, (3) an absence of juristic reason for the enrichment. 
221 Final Report of Special Rapporteur Theo van Boven in respect of the Study Concerning the Right to 
Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, for the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, United Nations Commission on Human Rights, (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8). 
222 Pettkus v. Becker, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834, at 847. 
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3. Disposition by the Chambers Judge 
The judge applied the following test in considering the defendant's motion to strike 
out the pleadings as disclosing no reasonable cause of action: 
1. All material facts pleaded were taken to be true, unless patently ridiculous or 
incapable of proof; 
2. The claim should not be struck out unless it was "plain and obvious" that it 
could not succeed; and 
3. Novelty should be irrelevant to the determination of the daim. 
Even given this relatively lax standard, the Judge found that the claim had to be struck 
out. 
On the Plaintiffs' first ground of argument, that which relied upon the Charter and 
international documents and treaties, the reasons for finding against the Plaintiffs 
essentially rested upon three points. First, the judge noted that the Charter cannot 
apply retroactively or retrospectively, citing the decision of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Benner for that proposition:223 
Section 15 cannot be used to attack a discrete act which took place 
before the Charter came into effect. It cannot, for example, be 
invoked to challenge a pre-Charter conviction: R. v. Edwards Books 
and Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713; Gamble, supra. Where the effect of 
a law is simply to impose an on-going discriminatory status or 
disability on an individual, however, then it will not be insulated from 
Charter review simply because it happened to be passed before April 
17, 1985. If it continues to impose its effects on new applicants today, 
- -then"it,iscsusceptiblecto"eharter-'scrutiny~today-:~ Andrews v."Law -
Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143. 
223 Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358 at~ 44-46. See further discussion of 
this case in Chapter V, circa note 317. 
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The question, then, is one of characterization: is the situation really one 
of going back to redress an old event which took place before the 
Charter created the right sought to be vindicated, or is it simply one of 
assessing the contemporary application of a law which happened to be 
passed before the Charter came into effect? 
I realize that this distinction will not always be as clear as one might 
like, since many situations may be reasonably seen to involve both past 
discrete events and on-going conditions. A status or on-going 
condition will often, for example, stem from some past discrete 
event. A criminal conviction is a single discrete event, but it gives rise 
to the on-going condition of being detained, the status of 
"detainee". Similar observations could be made about a marriage or 
divorce. Successfully determining whether a particular case involves 
applying the Charter to a past event or simply to a current condition or 
status will involve determining whether, in all the circumstances, the 
most significant or relevant feature of the case is the past event or the 
current condition resulting from it. This is, as I already stated, a 
question of characterization, and will vary with the 
circumstances. Making this determination will depend on the facts of 
the case, on the law in question, and on the Charter right which the 
applicant seeks to apply. 
No doubt anticipating this obstacle, the Plaintiffs had argued that they were not asking 
the court to apply the Charter either retroactively or retrospectively, but were seeking 
a remedy for the violation of their current Charter rights arising from the 
government's continuing refusal to provide redress; that is, that by repealing the 
Chinese Immigration Act without remedying any of its resulting discriminatory 
effects, the government created an ongoing violation of their s. 15 equality right. In 
the words of the passage quoted above, they claimed that the continuing effect of the 
head tax and exclusionary laws was "to impose an on-going discriminatory status or 
disability" almost half a century after the legislation had been repealed. The 
Defendant Government of Canada pointed out the length of time that had passed since 
the repeal ofthe legislation and'arguedthat "'Fherecan be no contemporary 
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application of a repealed law," 224 an argument that the Court accepted and repeated 
verbatim in its judgment. The Court found that the proposed application of the 
Charter was indeed retrospective, and therefore could not succeed. 
The second main point in the judgment on the Plaintiffs' argument based upon the 
Charter and international documents issue was with regard to their argument 
concerning the Japanese Canadian Redress Agreement, 225 namely that "Failure to 
extend redress to the Chinese-Canadian community, and to persons in the position of 
the plaintiffs herein, is, moreover, a violation of Section 15 of the Charter of 
Rights."226 The Court found that the fact that the government gave redress through a 
voluntary agreement to one group of Canadians that had been subject to 
discrimination did not in itself provide a legal basis for the claim of another unrelated 
group. In doing so, it was able to cite judicial precedent on exactly the same point, 
namely Mayrhofer v. Canada, 227 a case in which a German who had been interned in 
World War II unsuccessfully litigated a claim seeking, inter alia, compensation of 
$21,000 on the basis that that amount had been awarded to similarly-interned 
Japanese. 
The third main point in the judgment on the Plaintiffs' argument based upon the 
Charter and international documents was that treaties and international conventions 
do not form part of Canadian law unless they have been expressly implemented by 
statute. The Court took note of Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence on this point, 
while noting that that jurisprudence also established that international law norms can 
224 Attorney General of Canada, "Factum of the Moving Party, the Attorney General of Canada", at~ 
25. 
225 P.C. Order 1988-9/2552, October 31, 1988. 
226 Shack Jang Mack eta/., "Statement of Claim", at~ 36, quoted supra., note 224 at~ 27. 
227 Mayrhoferv. Canada, [1993] 2 F.C. 157 (T.D.) atp. 175. 
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act as an aid to interpreting domestic law.228 In Baker, for example, the Court had 
quoted Driedger on the Interpretation of Statutei29 for the point that: 
[T]he legislature is presumed to respect the values and principles 
enshrined in international law, both customary and 
conventional. These constitute a part of the legal context in which 
legislation is enacted and read. In so far as possible, therefore, 
interpretations that reflect these values and principles are preferred. 
The only domestic law to which the Plaintiffs could point that was relevant to their 
claim, however, was the Charter, and since the Court had held that the Charter could 
not apply, there was no domestic statute to which the international documents and 
conventions could serve as an aid to interpretation. Furthermore, the judge found that 
even if the international instruments cited by the Plaintiffs could apply domestically, 
it was not clear that there existed an accepted principle of international law that 
governments owe a positive legal duty to provide redress for wrongs involving 
violation of international norms respecting human rights. 
On the argument concerning unjust enrichment, the Court found that the first two 
parts of the three-part test for unjust enrichment had been met, in that the Defendant 
had been enriched and the Plaintiffs had suffered a corresponding deprivation. In 
addition, the Court specifically noted Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence 
establishing that the principles of unjust enrichment can operate against a government 
to ground restitutionary recovery, and that situations involving "the element of 
228 Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999) 2 S.C.R. 817 at p. 861, National 
Corn Growers Association v. Canadian Import Tribunal, [1990) 2 S.C.R. 1324 at p. 1371. 
229 R. Sullivan, Drier;lger on the Construction of Statutes (3rd ed. 1994), at p. 330, cited in Baker, ibid., 
at p. 861. 
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discrimination, oppression or abuse of authority" might well warrant recovery.230 The 
Court found, however, that with respect to the third part of the test- namely, the 
absence of juristic reason for the enrichment- the Plaintiffs could not succeed, since 
it was not disputed that throughout the time period that they were in force, the statutes 
providing for the Chinese head tax and exclusion were valid statutes. While the 
Plaintiffs argued that racist or discriminatory laws could not constitute a juristic 
reason, the Court found that that argument could not succeed in the absence of a 
finding that the legislation was unconstitutional, and that once again this was not 
possible without a retroactive application of the Charter. 
4. Disposition by the Appellate Courts 
On appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, the Appellants had to establish that the 
Chambers judge was "clearly wrong" in his decision to strike out their pleadings.231 
In making their arguments at the Court of Appeal, they framed them slightly 
differently than in the court below, saying that they rested upon three causes of action: 
(1) that the impugned legislation had violated their equality rights under s. 15 of the 
Charter, by (a) deeming them to be less worthy than other people generally through 
the imposition of the head tax and exclusion laws and the failure to provide redress, 
and (b) by deeming them less worthy of recognition than Japanese Canadians through 
the failure to provide redress similar to that given to Japanese Canadians; 
(2) that the impugned legislation was at all times invalid and of no force or effect 
because it contravened customary international law, by which Canada was legally 
bound, that prohibited racial discrimination; 
230 Air Canada v. British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1161, at pp. 1203 and 1207, cited in Mack at~ 44. 
231 Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Competition Act) v. Southam Inc., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 
748, cited at "Factum of the Respondent, Attorney General of Canada", at~ 15-17. 
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(3) that the government had been unjustly enriched at their expense. 
On the Charter argument, the· Court of Appeal closely followed the reasoning of the 
Chambers judge, both with regard to finding that the Appellants were impermissibly 
attempting to apply the Charter retroactively, and also with regard to fmding that they 
could not use the redress provided to Japanese Canadians as a "springboard" from 
which to launch their claim. 
With regard to the unjust enrichment claim, the Court of Appeal went somewhat 
further than the lower court in weighing the Appellants' argument, in that it explicitly 
acknowledged that there are exceptions to the rule that a statute can provide a juristic 
reason for retention of a benefit, and that in an appropriate case a court may give 
effect to the principle of unjust enrichment despite the terms of a statute. The Court 
appeared to agree with the view of the Chambers judge, however, that it would only 
be where legislation was unconstitutional or ultra vires that it would not constitute a 
juristic reason. 
It was the Appellants' argument concerning international law that was most 
significantly different from their argument in the lower court, in its reliance upon 
what was asserted to be customary international law. The Appellants argued that the 
Chambers judge had failed to consider their customary international law argument 
and its impact on the viability of their claim, an argument that caused the Court of 
Appeal to dryly note: 
To the extent that Cumming J. may have neglected the appellants' 
customary international law argument, his oversight is understandable 
as the term "customary international law" is not mentioned in the claim 
86 
and it is questionable whether the pleadings even raise it as supporting 
a cause of action. 
The Court of Appeal accepted a definition of customary international law as 
requiring: ( 1) a practice among states of sufficient duration, uniformity and generality; 
and (2) that states consider themselves legally bound by the practice.232 In order to 
establish that there was pre-1947 customary international law prohibiting racial 
discrimination, the Appellants relied upon a number of sources, including: 
• national and international judicial decisions; 
• individual opinions expressed by some members of Parliament; 
• Canada's membership in the League ofNations and its participation as a 
signatory to the Treaty ofVersailles; 
• Canada's participation as a signatory to various treaties regarding the abolition 
of slavery; 
• the constitution of the International Labour Organization and declarations 
emanating from it; and 
• writings of international law scholars.233 
The Court of Appeal, however, cited with approval the writings of Francesco 
Capotorti as establishing that pre-1945 antecedents of the protection of the human 
person were pockets of enlightenment that should not be confused with a worldwide 
perspective on human rights, which was still totally absent at that time. 234 According 
232 -tsro~Iie, P;incipi;/~J Pu~blic-1nie~-ti~nalL;;w~51hea~ (Oxford: Oxford Universit:yPress, 
1998), at 4 - 7, quoted in Mack, supra, note 211, at, 22. 
233 Supra, note 211, at 11J 24. Note that the judgment refers to ILO declarations, but does not say which 
declaration were relied upon, or whether any ILO conventions were also relied upon. 
234 F. Capotorti, "Human Rights, the Hard Road Towards Universality", in R. St. J. MacDonald and 
Douglas M. Johnston, eds., The Structure and Process of International Law Essays in Legal 
87 
to Capotorti, it was the creation of the United Nations in 1945 that resulted in the 
breakthrough in the field of human rights from a fragmentary perspective to a global 
aim. The Court of Appeal also cited John Humphrey for the proposition that human 
rights law as it emerged from the creation of the United Nations was "revolutionary". 
235 Scholarly opinion as cited by the Court of Appeal therefore did not support the 
Appellants' claim that there existed a pre-194 7 international custom prohibiting racial 
discrimination. 
The Appellants' attempt to establish the existence of such a custom by reference to 
case law was also unsuccessful, in that the domestic cases they cited in support of 
their argument were held not to be directly on point, while the decisions of foreign 
courts were held to be examples of foreign domestic law rather than customary 
international law. In addition, the Court held that the Canadian domestic cases must 
be read in light of Cunningham v. Homma,236 with that case standing for the 
proposition that a restricted entitlement to vote on the basis of race was both intra 
vires and a valid exercise of provincial power. The Court concluded that the 
Appellants were unable to prove the existence of a pre-194 7 customary international 
law prohibiting racial discrimination. The Court went on to add, however, that even 
if it had decided that the Appellants could prove the existence of a pre-194 7 
customary international law prohibiting racism, it would have ruled that that 
customary international law had been ousted for domestic purposes by the Chinese 
head tax and exclusion legislation. 
Philosophy, Doctrine and Theory (Dordrecht; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983) 977 at 978-79. Note 
the Court's misspelling as "Capatorti." 
235 John Humphrey, "The Implementation oflntemational Human Rights Law" (1978), 24 New York 
Law School Law Review 31 at 32-33. 
236 Supra, note 206. 
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Following their defeat in the Court of Appeal for Ontario, the Plaintiffs sought leave 
to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. Their application for leave was dismissed 
without reasons, however, apparently bringing to an end the quest for a judicial 
remedy for the victims of the Chinese head tax and exclusion laws?37 While it would 
be possible for another action to be instituted in a different Canadian jurisdiction, 
there is no indication that this was ever considered. 
It must be noted that the failure to achieve any remedy through the courts did not 
indicate a lack of sympathy on the part of the judges who heard the cases. On the 
contrary, the judges in both the Ontario Superior Court of Justice and the Ontario 
Court of Appeal were explicit in their condemnation of the legislation that had 
spawned the litigation. Cumming J. stated that "the legislation in its various forms 
was patently discriminatory against persons of Chinese origin" and that it was 
"repugnant and reprehensible". He urged that "all Canadians take on the challenge of 
eradicating racism and other forms of intolerance" and suggested that Parliament 
should consider providing redress for Chinese Canadians who paid the head tax or 
were adversely affected by the exclusion laws.238 Moldaver and MacPherson JJ.A. 
referred to Canada's treatment of Chinese immigrants during the period 1885 to 1947 
as "one of the more notable stains on our minority rights tapestry".239 
The inability of the judges to translate their sympathy into a legal remedy is indicative 
of just how serious are the obstacles that face anyone attempting to use the courts to 
provide remedies for long-past human rights violations. If an attempt were to be 
made to list the lessons that can be drawn from Mack, this should undoubtedly be the 
237 Mack v. Canada, [2002] S.C.C.A. No 476. 
238 Mack, supra note 130, at Cjj 52-54. 
239 Mack, supra, note 211, at~ 1. 
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first one, that even sympathetic judges who are certain that alleged human rights 
violations did in fact take place and were morally wrong may consider themselves 
unable to provide a legal remedy. And if one were to summarize the specific points 
arising in Mack that may lead judges to that conclusion, one would be that while 
international law prohibits racial discrimination and other types of human rights 
violations, it may not have legal force in domestic litigation. A second would be that 
neither international nor domestic instruments that guarantee human rights may be 
understood by the courts to apply to human rights violations that predate the creation 
of those instruments. A third is that a statute properly enacted by an elected 
legislature is likely to be accorded significant deference by the courts, even if they 
consider the effects of that statute to be repugnant, as was the case with the courts' 
·finding that the Government of Canada could not have been unjustly enriched by the 
Chinese head tax when the tax was the product of the Chinese Immigration Act. A 
fourth is that judicial decisions that incorporate the values of earlier eras, such as the 
1896 decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Homma, may 
continue to have lasting and unfortunate legal effect long after the social milieu that 
spawned them has disappeared. 
Despite these obstacles, it will be argued in the following chapters that, contrary to 
what the decisions in Mack might seem to suggest, it is possible for courts to provide 
remedies for long-past human rights violations. This does not mean that Mack was 
wrongly decided; judges are generally limited to accepting or rejecting the arguments 
that are made to them, and weaknesses in those particular arguments that the plaintiffs 
--~ 
chose to make resulted in their loss. Other arguments are possible, however, as will 
be set out in Chapter V. First, however, it will be useful to consider the other means 
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by which a remedy might be provided to groups that have suffered past human rights 
violations, namely through legislative or governmental action. 
B. Attempts At Governmental Redress 
It is understandable that considerable time passed between the repeal of the Chinese 
exclusion law and any attempt to seek redress. After all, the fact that societal attitudes 
had changed sufficiently to result in the repeal of the law did not mean that they 
would have changed so much that there would be a willingness to acknowledge that 
what had been done was wrong, that it should result in any remedy, or even that its 
provisions might not be reimposed at a later date. Not only would it be unlikely that 
the views of government or the societal majority would have changed overnight, it 
would also be surprising if the Chinese minority that had been subject to legislated 
discrimination for sixty years were to immediately think that they might be entitled to 
some redress. Attitudes toward race and equality continued to evolve in the decades 
after World War II, however, and those years witnessed a number of governmental 
initiatives intended to reflect and promote racial equality, such as the Bill of Rights, 
federal and provincial human rights codes, and the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. 
· The passage of the latter instrument in 1982 led an elderly head tax payer, Leon 
Mark, 240 to take his head tax receipt to his Member of Parliament, Margaret Mitchell, 
in 1984 and ask whether she could help him obtain repayment of the head tax monies. 
240 Some accounts give his last name as "Mack" instead of"Mark", but he should not be confused with 
the plaintiff in the litigation discussed in this chapter. See A vvy Go, "Litigating Injustice", David 
Dyzenhaus and Mayo Moran, editors, Calling Power to Account (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2005), pp. 20-23, at 20. 
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Mitchell contacted the Chinese Canadian National Council, which began a national 
campaign for redress in 1984, registering over 4,000 affected individuals, including 
over 2,000 head tax payers, plus spouses and descendants of head tax payers. At that 
time, however, the Government of Canada refused to provide any redress. 
The campaign to obtain redress continued sporadically during the succeeding decades. 
It was only in the latter part of that period, however, that it was manifested in any sort 
of legislative initiatives, and at first these were limited to unsuccessful bills and 
motions by opposition members. The first such attempt was the introduction of Bill 
C-333, "An Act to recognize the injustices done to Chinese immigrants by head taxes 
and exclusion legislation, to provide for recognition of the extraordinary contribution 
they made to Canada, and to provide for restitution which is to be applied to education 
on Chinese Canadian history and the promotion of racial harmony" on December 10, 
2002. By this bill as originally drafted, the Parliament of Canada would have 
recognized and honoured the contribution of Chinese immigrants, particularly in the 
construction of Canadian railways, and would have acknowledged and apologized for 
their unjust treatment as a result of the head tax and exclusion laws. The bill would 
also have required the Ministers of Finance and Canadian Heritage to negotiate with 
the National Congress of Chinese Canadians a "suitable payment" in restitution for 
the head tax, with that money being applied to the establishment of an educational 
foundation that would develop materials on Chinese Canadian history and on racial 
harmony for use in schools and post-secondary institutions. 
~- ~ . -- -·- - -·-
A later version of Bill C-333 was introduced in 2005. This version, "An Act to 
acknowledge that immigrants of Chinese origin were subject to head taxes and other 
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exclusionary measures and to provide for recognition of these actions", took what 
might have been seen as a less ambitious and more achievable approach than the 
earlier version. It would not, for example, have constituted an apology for the head 
tax and exclusion legislation. It still provided for negotiation between the 
Government of Canada and the National Congress of Chinese Canadians, but 
measures resulting from those negotiations would explicitly "not be interpreted as 
constituting an admission by Her Majesty in right of Canada of the existence of any 
legal obligation of Her Majesty in right of Canada to any person." The only specific 
measures mentioned in the bill were the installation of commemorative plaques at 
places where exclusionary acts had occurred, educational materials respecting the 
contributions of Chinese immigrants to the development of Canada, and a request to 
Canada Post Corporation to issue a set of commemorative postage stamps. 
Response to Bill C-333 was sharply divided, both within Parliament and within 
Canada's Chinese community. In Parliament, members of the Conservative Party and 
the Bloc Quebecois spoke in its favour, while members of the New Democratic Party 
and the governing Liberal party spoke against it, one of the latter saying that it "asks 
the Parliament of Canada to focus on actions taken by a previous government as 
opposed to looking toward the future."241 A New Democratic Party Member of 
Parliament, Libby Davies, introduced Motion M-102, which provided that "in the 
opinion of this House, the government should negotiate with the individuals affected 
by the Chinese Head Tax and the Chinese Immigration (Exclusion) Act, as well as 
with their families and their representatives, a just and honourable resolution which 
::,: __ _ 
includes the following framework: (a) a parliamentary acknowledgment of the 
241 Hansard, 38th Parliament, 1st Session, Number 061, Monday, February 21, 2005, p. 1200. 
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injustice of these measures; (b) an official apology by the government to the 
individuals and their families for the suffering and hardship caused; (c) individual 
financial compensation; and (d) a community-driven anti-racism advocacy and 
educational trust fund for initiatives to ensure that these and other historic injustices 
are not repeated. "242 
The opposition of the New Democratic Party to the Conservative-sponsored Bill C-
333 reflected the division within Chinese-Canadian communities on the bill, which 
turned principally upon the bill's lack of any provision for individual compensation. 
The Member of Parliament who originally introduced Bill C-3 3 3, Inky Mark, justified 
the absence of any provisions for apology or financial compensation in the latter 
version of the bill on the ground that the removal of such provisions made it more 
likely that the bill might pass, stating, "If it's a money bill, forget it; it ain't going to 
happen. "243 The lack of a proposal for individual compensation was agreeable to the 
National Congress of Chinese Canadians, which had sought funding for Chinese-
Canadian ethnic groups as part of a settlement package but had not favoured 
individual compensation.244 The Chinese Canadian National Council, on the other 
hand, insisted that individual compensation must be part of any settlement package, 
and a spokesperson dismissedBill C-333 as a "stinker" for failing to provide for such 
compensation.245 Other groups, such as the Edmonton Chinese Canadian Head Tax & 
Exclusion Act Redress Committee, stated that neither the NCCC nor the CCNC were 
242 Private Members' Business: Items Outside the Order of Precedence, Monday, November 14,2005 
----~~-""1492-'-"--'"-"~~-- ~ 00---"' -'- -- - ~~~------- --
243 Cassandra Szklarski, "Federal apology, redress not in store for Chinese immigrants, group 
complains", October 25, 2005, online <http://www.recorder.ca/cp/nationaV051025/nl02599A.html> 




entitled to speak on behalf of Chinese Canadian communities or head tax payers, and 
claimed that the legitimate right to do so rested with itself and other groups centred in 
Canadian cities that were more directly connected with Chinese Canadian 
individuals. 246 
The bickering among Chinese-Canadian organizations illuminates a dilemma that 
may arise in any attempt to seek redress for long-past human rights violations and that 
will be discussed in a subsequent chapter of this paper: who, if anyone, other than the 
individual victims of the human rights violations themselves, can legitimately 
represent the interests of those whose human rights were violated? In the case of 
proposals for redress arising from the Chinese head tax and exclusion laws, the 
disagreement among competing organizations may have prevented Bill C-333 from 
moving ahead more expeditiously. As a result, proposals for legislative redress for a 
time seemed to have stalled, and the possibility of any sort of remedy whatsoever 
being provided appeared unlikely. 
In November of2005, however, Canada's thirty-eighth Parliament was dissolved, and 
an election date was set for January 23, 2006. The Liberal Party under Prime Minister 
Paul Martin had been in a minority government situation prior to that time, and by the 
first week of January in 2006, the Liberals were trailing the Conservative Party in the 
polls. In early December, Conservative Party leader Stephen Harper had reversed his 
own party's position and announced that he supported an apology for the Chinese 
head tax. With the Liberal Party in need of votes and seeing its traditional support 
among immigrants in danger of being eroded, the stage was set for an abrupt reversal 
246 Kenda D. Gee, "Head-Tax Apology Isn't Good Enough", Georgia Straight, November 25,2004. 
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of government policy. In a radio interview broadcast on January 4, 2006, Prime 
Minister Martin unexpectedly apologized for the Chinese head tax, despite his 
Multiculturalism Minister, Raymond Chan, having said as recently as that same 
morning that the government believed that an apology would be ill-advised because it 
would expose Canadian taxpayers to costly lawsuits.247 One month of a closely-
fought election campaign had therefore resulted in gains that years of campaigning 
had previously failed to achieve; not only did the leaders of the two parties that were 
competing to form the next government suddenly perceive the necessity for an 
apology, one of them- the Prime Minister- had actually provided one, albeit in an 
impromptu and unofficial fashion. 
With the dam broken on the provision of an apology and two weeks still to go in the 
election campaign, the issue of head tax redress had a new impetus and had become a 
major campaign issue. By the time the new government was formed under Prime 
Minister Harper, it therefore seemed likely that the government might go beyond 
simply the provision of an apology. On April4, 2006, the throne speech included a 
statement that "Government will act in Parliament to offer an apology for the Chinese 
Head Tax."248 One week later, news reports indicated that representatives of the 
Chinese Canadian National Council had been given assurances that the government 
would make a formal apology by July 1st - the date upon which Chinese immigration 
to Canada had been banned eighty-three years earlier- and that there would be 
247 
"PM apologizes for head tax in campaign trail reversal," Vancouver Sun, Thursday, January 5, 2006, 
p. Al. 
248 Government of Canada, "Speech From the Throne", online <http://www.sft-
ddt.gc.ca/default_ e.htm#>. · 
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financial compensation to surviving head tax payers or their surviving spouses.249 
Finally, on June 22, 2006 in the House of Commons, the Prime Minister stated that: 250 
... on behalf of all Canadians and the Government of Canada, we offer 
a full apology to Chinese Canadians for the head tax and express our 
deepest sorrow for the subsequent exclusion of Chinese immigrants. 
In addition, he announced that there would be "symbolic payments" to living head tax 
payers and their spouses, as well as the financing of community projects aimed at 
acknowledging the impact of past wartime measures andimmigration restrictions on 
the Chinese Canadian community and other ethnocultural communities. 
While there were some complaints that the scope of compensation did not extend to 
the descendants of non-surviving head tax payers,251 and also that the application 
process for compensation payments was too bureaucratic for the elderly Chinese 
people at whom it was targeted, the general response to the apology and compensation 
announcement was overwhelmingly positive. On October 20, 2006, Heritage 
Minister Bev Oda personally distributed the first three $20,000 cheques.Z52 One 
hundred and twenty-one years after the head tax had first been imposed, a remedy had 
finally been provided to those who suffered its effects. 
C. Japanese-Canadian Redress and Other Redress Measures 
~-·'H~Jt<L-t~Jlm-Yivors willg~t(:o~pensat~d", V,anfouver Sun, Monday, Apri110, 2006, p. Bl. 
25° Canada, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, Hansard, No. 046; Thursday-, June 22, 2006, p-. 1515, online 
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251 Charlie Smith, "Head-tax redress incomplete," Georgia Straight, Volume 40, Number 2033, 
December 7-14, 2006, p. 15. 
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"Cabinet minister delivers head tax paybacks," Vancouver Sun, Saturday, October 21,2006, p. B8. 
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The apology and compensation to Chinese-Canadians was not without precedent. On 
February 12, 2002, in conjunction with the celebration of the lunar New Year, Prime 
Minister Helen Clark apologized for New Zealand's poll tax and other past 
restrictions, apparently on the basis of a need for reconciliation between New 
Zealand's Chinese community and the rest ofNew Zealand society:253 
While the governments which passed these discriminatory laws acted in a 
manner which was lawful at the time, their actions are seen by us today as 
unacceptable. We believe an act of reconciliation is required to ensure that 
full closure can be reached on this chapter in our nation's history. 
In Canada, there had been previous redress measures for other long-past violations of 
the rights of Canadian ethnic groups. This occurred most notably in 1988, when the 
Government of Canada and the National Association of Japanese Canadians reached 
an agreement for redress in recognition of the internment of Japanese Canadians 
during World War Two for the stated purpose of reaffirming and ensuring the 
principles of equality and justice.254 By the terms of the agreement, the Government 
of Canada committed to: 255 
1. acknowledge that the treatment of Japanese Canadians during and after World 
War II was unjust and violated principles of human rights as they are 
understood today; 
2. pledge to ensure, to the full extent that its powers allow, that such events will 
not happen again; and 
3. recognize, with great respect, the fortitude and determination of Japanese 
Canadians who, despite great stress and hardship, retain their commitment and 
2.5f~'~~~'·~~~-''"'~~ ~-~~,~~~·~'""'~cc""--~ ~~~.·~"'"--~ ~--~~~·-~~~'-'-·~ .. c.~~·'-' 
"NZ government apologises to Chinese community", on-line< 
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254 Government of Canada, "Redress Agreement--Terms of Agreement between the Government of 
Canada and the National Association of Japanese Canadians", online< 




loyalty to Canada and contribute so richly to the development of the Canadian 
nation. 
It might seem surprising that in the debate on redress for Chinese Canadians, the issue 
of whether or not there should be individual compensation was so contentious, given 
that the agreement between the Government of Canada and the National Association 
of Japanese Canadians had set the precedent for providing both individual 
compensation and a variety of other compensation measures. These eventually cost 
$422 million to implement, 256 divided among the following categories:257 
a. $21,000 individual redress, subject to application by eligible persons of 
Japanese ancestry who, during this period, were subjected to internment, 
relocation, deportation, loss of property or otherwise deprived of the full 
enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms based solely on the fact that 
they were of Japanese ancestry; each payment would be. made in a tax-free 
lump sum, as expeditiously as possible; 
b. $12 million to the Japanese-Canadian community, through the National 
Association of Japanese Canadians, to undertake educational, social and 
cultural activities or programmes that contribute to the well-being of the 
community or that promote human rights; 
c. $12 million, on behalf of Japanese Canadians and in commemoration of those 
who suffered these injustices, and matched by a further $12 million from the 
Government of Canada, for the creation of a Canadian Race Relations 
Foundation that will foster racial harmony and cross-cultural understanding 
and help to eliminate racism. 
d. subject to application by eligible persons, to clear the names of persons of 
Japanese ancestry who were convicted of violations under the War Measures 
Act and the National Emergency Transitional Powers Act. 
e. subject to application by eligible persons, to grant Canadian citizenship to 
persons of Japanese ancestry still living who were expelled from Canada or 
had their citizenship revoked during the period 1941 to 1949, and to their 
living descendants; 
f. to provide, through contractual arrangements, up to $3 million to the National 
Association of Japanese Canadians for their assistance, including community 
- -liaison,-in administration of-redress-over -the period ofimplementation. 
256 Hansard, supra, note 241. 
257 Supra, note 254. 
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Commemoration, and Education (ACE) Program", to be administered in turn by the 
Multiculturalism Program of the Department of Canadian Heritage. 
The ACE Program resulted in agreements-in-principle between the Government of 
Canada and the representatives of two ethnic groups that were intended to 
acknowledge - though explicitly neither apologizing for or compensating for- past 
human rights violations. On August 24, 2005, the first of these was signed in 
recognition of Ukrainian internment during the Great War with the Ukrainian 
Canadian Community, as represented by the Ukrainian Canadian Foundation of Taras 
Shevchenko ("Shevchenko Foundation"), the Ukrainian Canadian Congress and the 
Ukrainian Canadian Civil Liberties Association. By its terms, the Government agreed 
to provide an initial amount of $2.5 million for programs to commemorate 
Ukrainians' historical experience and educate Canadians about these experiences, 
highlight and commemorate the contributions that the Ukrainian Canadian 
Community has made to Canada, and promote cross-cultural understanding and a 
shared sense of Canadian identity. 260 
On November 12, 2005, a second agreement-in-principle was signed with 
representatives of the National Congress ofltalian Canadians, the National Federation 
of Canadian Italian Business and Professional Associations, the Order Sons of Italy of 
Canada, and La Fondation communautaire canadienne italienne for the 
acknowledgement, commemoration, and education of Canadians on the experiences 
of Italian Canadians impacted by the War Measures Act in Canada during the Second 
World War- and in highlighting the-contributions-that Italian Canadians have made to 
260 Government of Canada, "Agreement-in-Principle between the Government of Canada and the 
Ukrainian Canadian Community",< http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/multi/pubs/ukr/index_e.cfm >. 
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the building ofCanada.261 News reports on this agreement in principle indicated that 
the Government expected to announce similar agreements-in-principle at later dates to 
commemorate the internment of Croatian Canadians during the Great War, the turning 
back of the St. Louis, the turning back of the Komagata Maru, and the Chinese head 
tax and exclusion laws.262 
D. Conclusions 
If nothing else, the chronology of contemporary attempts to obtain redress for 
Canada's anti-Chinese legislation illustrates the unpredictability of politics. After the 
failure of attempts to use the courts and Parliament to compel the Government of 
Canada to provide some remedy in respect of the Chinese head tax and exclusion 
laws, it would have been reasonable to conclude that no remedy would be 
forthcoming. Despite that, Canada finally chose to provide a remedy anyway. That 
politicians dependent upon the popular will to govern concluded that popular will 
would support or require some form of remediation for a long-past violation of human 
rights is, of course, a good thing. And since the commitment to provide a remedy was 
made in the middle of an election campaign by a party which then went on to form the 
government, it may even be suggested that that party had been correct in its 
assessment of the public will, and that remediation of outstanding human rights 
violations is supported by the general populace. 
261 Government of Canada, "Agreement-in-Principle to Highlight Italian Canadians' Contribution to 
Building Canada", < http://www .pch.gc.ca/newsroom/news _ e.cfm? Action=Display&code=5N0307E 
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What remains questionable, howev€r, is whether remedies for past human rights 
violations should depend upon government largesse and the vagaries of public 
opinion rather than being compellable through the court system. The fact that 
Canadian governments have eventually provided redress in recognition of the Chinese 
head tax and exclusion laws, the Japanese-Canadian internment, the Italian-Canadian 
internment, the Ukrainian-Canadian internment, and other human rights violations 
that occurred decades previously cannot be attributed to mere whimsy on the part of 
governmental decision-makers. Instead, their recognition of the need to deal with 
these issues must be perceived as reflecting the persistence and power ofunremedied 
injustices on the political agenda. This in turn provides support for the argument that 
effective and accessible mechanisms must be made available by which those who 
have suffered human rights violations in the past can pursue meaningful remedies. 
Given the demonstrated ability of governments to ignore such issues for many 
decades, this underlines the importance of empowering the judiciary to effectively 
address long-past human rights violations. 
The next two chapters will therefore consider whether the courts are as powerless to 
provide a remedy in such situations as they believed themselves to be in Mack, or 
whether there are legal mechanisms that might support a more activist judiciary in the 
imposition of legal remedies for long-past human rights violations. 
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CHAPTER IV: OVERVIEW OF JUDICIAL REMEDIES FOR LONG-PAST 
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
The litigation ofthe claim in Mack was an important event in the history of Canada's 
anti-Chinese litigation and its aftermath. Despite the fact that the lawsuit was 
ultimately unsuccessful, it at least served to keep the head tax issue on the political 
agenda and to maintain the momentum that eventually led to governmental redress. 
The importance of the case goes beyond its impact on the Chinese-Canadian 
community, however, in that it illustrates the serious impediments that any group can 
encounter if it attempts to use the courts to obtain remedies for long-past violations of 
human rights. Not only will the same sorts of rules and principles that prevented 
recovery in Mack operate in similar cases, there are also additional obstacles which 
were not even canvassed in that case. Some of these are based in concerns about 
policy or fairness, others are rooted in substantive legal principles, and others are 
procedural. These obstacles are all undoubtedly rooted in legitimate notions of 
fairness, justice, and economy. Should they, however, prevent judges from providing 
remedies for acknowledged violations of human rights? That is, is it appropriate that 
a judge can, as happened in Mack, characterize a past human rights violation as 
"repugnant and reprehensible" but do nothing about it? 
In some respects, these are not altogether new questions. It is hardly unknown for 
judges to "wash their hands" of the consequences of unjust but legally correct 
decisions?63 Neither is it new to suggest that it will not always be appropriate for 
them to do this. Thoreau, for example,- writing about-judges who didcnot find slavery 
to be unlawful, said that they were "merely the inspectors of a pick-lock and 
263 Matthew 27:24. 
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murderer's tools, to tell him whether they are in working order or not, and there they 
think that their responsibility ends."264 There are, of course, others who would argue 
vehemently against ''judicial activism," saying that unelected judges have no 
legitimate grounds for overruling the policy choices of duly elected governments. In 
this respect, Jefferson was just as given to colourful metaphor as Thoreau, referring to 
the judiciary as a "subtle corps of sappers and miners constantly working under 
ground to undermine the foundations of our confederated fabric."265 
It must be suggested, however, that arguments about judicial activism versus judicial 
restraint as comprehensive and abstract phenomena are not particularly useful, and 
often indicate merely the extent to which the ideological choices espoused by one 
commentator or another are currently being reflected by particular courts. Since very 
few would argue that courts should never provide remedies in cases where the 
executive or legislative branches of government have failed to do so, the proper 
question must be under what circumstances the courts can legitimately intervene. A 
later section of this paper answers that question in a very specific way with regard to 
long-past human rights violations in the Canadian legal environment, showing how a 
constitutional interpretation that is consistent with existing jurisprudence would 
permit judges to provide remedies in such cases, and suggesting criteria that could 
guide the courts in determining which cases merit their consideration. Before turning 
to the specific legal means by which remedies could be provided, however, it will be 
useful to first consider a more general rationale for their provision, and to anticipate 
264 Henry David Thoreau, "Slavery in Massachusetts," in The Writings of Henry David Thoreau, vol. 4 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1906), pp. 395-396. 
265 Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Thomas Ritchie, Dec.25, 1820. Jefferson's Works, Second Edition, 
Thomas Jefferson Randolph, editor, Vol. IV (Boston: Gray & Bowen, 1830), letter CL VI 
<http://www.gutenberg.org/files/16784/16784-h/16784-h.htrn#2H_ 4_0156>. 
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and respond to objections which might be raised in opposition to their proposed 
provision. 
This chapter will therefore attempt to provide a broad overview of some of the factors 
that would inform any attempt at obtaining judicial remedies for long-past human 
rights violations. It will begin by considering why those whose rights have been 
violated are likely to wish to tum to the courts for redress. It will then attempt to 
anticipate objections which might be raised to the provision of judicial remedies for 
long-past human rights violations, both on broad grounds of principle or policy, as 
well as technical or legal issues, and respond to those objections. 
A. Why Judicial Remedies? 
Chapter I of this paper set out the historical antecedents of the modem concept of 
human rights and the post-World War II manifestation and guarantee of human rights, 
including the right to be free from racial discrimination, in both domestic statutes and 
international instruments. The fact that our current conception of human rights is 
relatively modem does not mean that those rights are new. If we accept that it is 
wrong to discriminate on the basis of race, then it can be confidently stated that it was 
just as wrong one hundred years ago - a time when Wilberforce in England, Douglas 
in the United States, and many others had already condemned it- as it is today. That 
is, if there is a "human right" to not be subject to racial discrimination, then racial 
discrimination must not be something that only became wrong because of the creation 
of some statutory obligation by government. This distinguishes it from, for example, 
exceeding a posted speed limit or failing to file an income tax return, in that it would 
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be nonsensical to claim that there was any legal or rrioral reason to comply with speed 
limit laws or tax laws before those laws were created. Racial discrimination, on the 
other hand, was and is wrong because of its moral or ethical unacceptability and its 
violation of what we now call "human rights,' and did not become wrong only when 
governments formally recognized its wrongness and identified it as a human rights 
violation. Despite that, the Government of Canada chose to provide a statutory 
vehicle for racial discrimination. To the extent that Canada and other states chose to 
give such legal manifestation to racial discrimination in statutes such as the head tax 
and exclusion laws, it is not unreasonable for those who seek a remedy for such 
treatment to also expect that that remedy will have a legal manifestation. 
This expectation is a legitimate factor to take into consideration. That is, in any state 
in which the legitimacy of the institutions of government rests upon the consent of the 
governed, there must at least be some broad correspondence between public demand 
for services and government provision of those services, including dispute resolution 
services. In western industrialized democracies, and considering in particular the 
common law jurisdictions, there are a variety of different institutions that might be 
considered to compose a system for providing remedies for legal grievances, 
including grievances arising from human rights violations. Reflecting, perhaps, the 
nature of the common law systems, these comprise a mixture of statutes, 
administrative bodies, tribunals, and legal concepts. 
With respect to human rights complaints in particular, there are existing and 
accessible structures of elected representatives and specialized bureaucracies that 
citizens may tum to before resorting to the courts, particularly since these can usually 
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be accessed at little or no cost. In Canada, for example, the federal government and 
every province and territory except Yukon have their own human rights codes, 
generally accompanied by commissions that promote human rights and tribunals that 
adjudicate disputes over alleged human rights violations. These legislated human 
right codes are buttressed by other legislative instruments, such as the Bill of Rights 
and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, plus British statutes such as the 
Magna Carta and the English Bill of Rights that were received with the common law, 
some or all of which are likely to apply to at least recent human rights violations. In 
addition to domestic legislation, there also exists a large body of international human 
rights instruments, including those instruments mentioned in the discussion of the 
Mack case above. All of these bodies and instruments will give even the most 
uninformed layperson some knowledge that they possess "rights" and some 
expectation that those rights can be given legal effect. 
With regard to the last-mentioned of these, international human rights instruments, it 
might be presumed from the outcome in Mack that anyone hoping to rely upon the 
existence of such instruments would be disappointed, even in countries such as 
Canada which have ratified them, but this would not necessarily be correct. Such 
instruments can at least serve as guides to judicial interpretation, although the result of 
relying upon them in this way may be difficult to predict. An example of litigants 
attempting to rely upon international human rights instruments as in Mack but with a 
different outcome is Lazarescu v. Canada.266 In that case, the Appellants did not rely 
upon the Charter, instead m~king an argument that the requirement under the Income 
Tax Act that women must include in income the maintenance payments they receive 
266 [1995] 1 C.T.C. 2313 (T.C.C.). Also see supra, note 228. 
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for the support of their children discriminates against women in contravention of the 
Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the United 
Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child. The Appellants were successful in the 
event, though admittedly this was only because the judge considered himself bound 
by another case under which a higher court had already struck down the impugned 
provision of the Income Tax Act on Charter grounds. With regard to the purported 
reliance upon international instruments, however, the judge acknowledged that 
although they do not have the force of law in Canada unless implemented by statute, 
they may be useful guides to interpretation. 
Note that just as international human rights instruments can be used in judicial 
interpretation, so can the Charter itself also serve as a guide to interpretation in 
situations where it does not apply directly. The common law, for example, must be 
interpreted in light of the Charter, as noted by Cory J. in Hill v. Church of 
Scientology ofToronto:267 
Historically, the common law evolved as a result of the courts making 
those incremental changes which were necessary in order to make the law 
comply with current societal values. The Charter represents a restatement 
of the fundamental values which guide and shape our democratic society 
and our legal system. It follows that it is appropriate for the courts to make 
such incremental revisions to the common law as may be necessary to have 
it comply with the values enunciated in the Charter. 
The Bill of Rights also purports to guide the proper interpretation of every "law of 
Canada." The scope of its application in this respect is narrower than that of the 
267 [1995) 2 S.C.R. 1130, at~ 92. 
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Charter, since s. 5 of the Bill of Rights defines "law of Canada" to mean "an Act of 
the Parliament of Canada enacted before or after the coming of force of this Act. "268 
And while it may be that legislated human rights codes, international instruments, the 
})ill of Rights and the Charter may all be too recent to be used in the interpretation of 
long-past human rights violations, let alone having direct application, they will 
certainly contribute to a public expectation that those who human rights have been 
violated must have recourse to some sort of mechanisms or remedies. 
When these systems fail to provide assistance, however, then those who are still 
seeking remedies will naturally contemplate whether there are any steps they can take 
themselves to obtain such remedies directly. Fortunately, they will find that a 
mechanism by which aggrieved members of the public can seek remedies for wrongs 
that have been done to them not only exists in common law jurisdictions, it has a 
pedigree which makes its legitimacy unquestionable. This is, of course, the tort 
system. 
The tort system has been described as "a form of legalised self-help."269 Victims of 
human rights violations are as likely as people victimized in any other matter to 
consider themselves victims of a "tort" in its literal meaning of a "wrong". And if it is 
correct that "judgment that a particular loss deserves redress necessarily implies a 
finding of a breach of an obligation owed to the plaintiff by the tortfeasor,'mo then it 
will certainly be tempting to reason in reverse that since there can be no doubt that 
268 Authorson (Litigation Guardian of) v. Canada 2003 SCC 39. 
269 Mark Lunney and Ken Oliphant, Tort Law: Text and Materials, Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), p. 1. 
27° Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, Seventeenth Edition (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1995), p. 3. 
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everyone is obliged not to violate the human rights of others, then a breach of that 
obligation deserves redress. 
While there is no recognized tort of breaching human rights, this need not discourage 
potential litigants, if they recognize both that the categories of tort liability remain 
open271 and that the harmful consequences suffered as a result of a human rights 
violation should - if the cloak of legitimacy provided by statutory authorization can 
be removed - ground recovery in well-established causes of action, such as the 
various forms of trespass to the person or wrongful interference with goods. While at 
one time, the Crown could not be held liable in tort, that immunity has been taken 
away in most jurisdictions by statute.272 Linden, in fact, comments that it is "odd" 
that the use of tort law as a technique for reviewing government action is 
controversial. 273 
Furthermore, not only can litigants base their quest for judicial redress in a branch of 
the law that exists for the purpose of providing it, they can also rely upon fundamental 
legal principles that also aim at ensuring that those who are wronged are able to 
obtain remedies through the courts. Two of the best-known of these are embodied in 
the Latin maxims ubi jus, ibi remedium andjiatjustitia ruat coelum. 
271 Ibid., at pp. 2-3. 
272 :W"~ti.mm. f<!~ exjl~Jlpl~. th.e)~r.itish Crown froc;(!ed!ng~,4.cJ, I Q-U Geo. VI, c_._~4 )v.as pas11e.d in -.. _ 
f947, m.·iikl.ng the Crownilabie miOrt as if it were a person of full age and capacity, for torts committed 
by its agents or servants. In Canada, s. 3 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 
C-50 states in part: "3. The Crown is liable for the damages for which, if it were a person, it would be 
liable ... in respect of a tort committed by a servant of the Crown, or. .. a breach of duty attaching to the 
ownership, occupation, possession or control of property." 
273 Allen M. Linden, Canadian Tort Law, Seventh Edition (Markham: Butterworths, 2001), p. 612. 
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The maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium - where there is a right, there is a remedl74 - has 
survived from ancient times and been cited by courts and tribunals in various 
jurisdictions. It may most often be quoted in connection with tort law, since tort law 
is sometimes said to owe its existence to this principle,275 but it is not limited to that 
field. In Doucet-Boudreau, for example, the Supreme Court of Canada considered the 
case of a Francophone who was not given adequate access to services in French when 
he was stopped by an Anglophone police officer. The Court said:276 
Purposive interpretation means that remedies provisions must be 
interpreted in a way that provides "a full, effective and meaningful remedy 
for Charter violations" since "a right, no matter how expansive in theory, is 
only as meaningful as the remedy provided for its breach" (Dunedin, supra, 
at paras. 19-20). A purposive approach to remedies in a Charter context 
gives modem vitality to the ancient maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium: where 
there is a right, there must be a remedy. More specifically, a purposive 
approach to remedies requires at least two things. First, the purpose of the 
right being protected must be promoted: courts must craft responsive 
remedies. Second, the purpose of the remedies provision must be 
promoted: courts must craft effective remedies. 
Although Doucet was a Charter case, the maxim obviously predates the Charter and 
therefore cannot be limited to cases that involve it. Arguably, then, it should be 
equally applicable to a full range of human rights cases, assuming that the term 
"human right" is not a misnomer, and that human rights are, indeed, rights. This 
belief underpins academic debate about, for example, the legacy of Brown v. Board of 
Education and its endorsement of affirmative remedial action to protect constitutional 
rights. In this context, Thomas argues that: 
27~~l!!!QI,lgh 1~1!' are 1!_ n\!]ll};)er of commQnJra~lations jor the mllJ{il!I, this one appears on the website 
of the Department of Justice of the Government of Canada, 
http://canada.justice.gc.ca/enldept/pub/trib/SCofC.html, as well as in Jowitt's Dictionary of English 
Law, Second Edition, Vol. 2 (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1977), p. 1823. 
275 See, for example, Sir Arthur Underhill, A Summary of the Law ofTorts or Wrongs Independent of 
Contract, Sixteenth Edition, (London: Butterworth, 1949), pp. 6 and 8. 
276 Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3 at~ 25. 
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... a remedy is more than a legal maxim. Rather, ... the right to a meaningful 
remedy is a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Stated simply: Ubi jus, ibi remedium. Where 
there's a right, there must be a remedy. 277 
The importance of providing a remedy in cases where constitutional rights have been 
infringed was stated by LeBel J. in R. v. Demers:278 
... public law actions share a necessary commonality with private 
litigation: an individual or group is seeking to redress a wrong done to 
them. The larger public dimensions of a constitutional challenge piggyback 
on the claimant's pursuit of his or her own interests, particularly in criminal 
law cases. Courts should not lose sight of this symbiosis; they should not 
forget to provide a remedy to the party who brought the challenge. This is 
not a reward so much as a vindication of the particularized claim brought 
by this person in assertion of his or her rights. Corrective justice suggests 
that the successful applicant has a right to a remedy. [underlining in 
original] 
Is the maxim literally true? While it is closer to the truth than the similar but less 
quoted lex simper debit remedium- the law will always give a remedy- it is still 
overbroad. If the Mack case was not wrongly decided, for example, the maxim could 
only have been true if one accepts the circular reasoning implicit in asserting that 
because the Plaintiffs did not succeed in obtaining a remedy that they must not have 
had a right, or by accepting that the Plaintiff had no right not to be discriminated 
against on racial grounds. Stated another way, the court in Mack would probably not 
have taken issue with the maxim, but would have stated that the Plaintiffs had no right 
and therefore had no remedy, since their "human rights" were created by positive law 
and therefore could not have predated the passage of the relevant statutory and 
277 Tracy A. Thomas, "Ubi Jus, lbi Remedium: The Fundamental Right to a Remedy Under Due 
Process", 41 San Diego L. Rev. 1633-1645, at 1636. 
278 Supra, note 20, at~ 101. 
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constitutional provisions. Despite that, the maxim is at least intended to be true, even 
if it is not always applied. 
The second of the two maxims quoted above would serve as a retort to anyone who 
might suppose that practical difficulties or undesirable consequences should mitigate 
against providing remedies for long-past human rights violations. The maxim fiat 
justitia, ruat coelum highlights the principle that courts are not supposed to care about 
the effects of their judgments, only about ensuring that justice is done. The principle 
has been applied by many Canadian courts, including the Manitoba Court of 
Appeal:279 
But, it may be argued, the consequences of the court's decision are entirely 
irrelevant. The court must decide the issue according to law and merit, no 
matter what the consequences might be. Dureault Co. Ct. J. was certainly 
of that view, and in support ofhis position he cited the classical words of 
Lord Mansfield in Rex v. Wilkes (1770), 4 Burr. 2527 at 2561, 98 E.R. 327 
: "Fiat justitia, ruat coelum" (Let justice be done even though the heavens 
fall). 
The maxim is sufficiently well-established that it has survived both a more colloquial 
translation by the Prince Edward Island Supreme Cou«80 - "Let the chips fall where 
they may"- and are-translation into French by the New Brunswick Court of Appeal, 
which has stated "Les consequences d'une decision ne sont pas necessairement 
pertinentes".281 The British Columbia Court of Appeal has referred to it as a "legal 
principle", despite simultaneously acknowledging that it is what "some might call a 
279 Forest v. Manitoba (Regi~trar of Court of Appeal) (1977), 77 D.L.R. (3d) 445 (Man. C.A.) at tt[27. 
280 Honkoop v. Prince Edward Island (Tobacco Commodity Marketing Board) (1984), 153 A.P.R. 156 
at tt[14. 
281 Robichaud c. Nouveau-Brunswick Commission scolaire no 39 (1989), 99 N.B.R. 2d 341 (C.A.) at 
tt[21. 
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mere pious sentiment."282 It may be that the difference between pious sentiment and 
legal principle in human rights cases rests upon the existence of judges who are, in 
fact, prepared to arrive at rulings without balancing the rights of wronged minorities 
against the inconvenience or cost of their judgements to societal majorities; to the 
extent that such judges might exist, their ability to ground their decisions on this 
principle would be a considerable advantage. 
The disparate elements listed above - human rights codes, commissions and tribunals, 
the tort system, legal principles supporting the provision of remedies for those who 
have suffered wrongs - all of these combine in a legal system that is certainly capable 
of providing remedies for those who have suffered human rights violations, and is 
likely to do so for those whose human rights have been violated in the recent past. As 
was seen in Mack, however, the system has not proved to be so successful a vehicle in 
cases where human rights were violated in the more distant past. If legitimate legal 
systems should fulfill the legitimate expectations of those who fall under their 
jurisdiction, then this leads to the question of whether there is anything less legitimate 
in the demands for redress of those who complain about rights violations that took 
place in the more distant past rather than the more recent past. The answer must be 
no, that the policy grounds in favour of having formal and effective dispute resolution 
mechanisms will apply to past human rights violations as much as to more recent 
ones. Furthermore, anyone whose human rights have been violated will expect that 
remedies should be available through the legal system and every citizen supporting 
that system could legitimately expect such remedies to be available. 
282 Mayer v. Mayer Estate (1993), 106 D.L.R. (41h) 353 (B.C.C.A.) at Cj[37, per Southin J.A., dissenting. 
115 
If it can be seen that the principles and institutions that comprise the legal system 
should favour the provision of remedies for long-past human rights, then the denial of 
such remedies should only occur if there exist countervailing objections to the 
provision of such remedies. This was a question that the judges in Mack did not 
really have to address, since specific legal flaws in the case as presented- e.g. that the 
plaintiffs could not rely upon rights that were thought to be created by the Charter for 
a case that predated the Charter, and that there could be no unjust enrichment that was 
specifically authorized by statute - meant that they did not have to consider the 
broader questions surrounding the plaintiff's case. 
Given that, it will be prudent to attempt to identify whether there are any grounds for 
objecting to the proposed provision of remedies that might outweigh the presumption 
in favour of providing them, and to attempt to assess the validity of any such 
objections. 
B. Objections to Judicial Remedies 
Objections which might be anticipated to be raised to the provision of remedies for 
long-past human rights violations include both broad reasons of policy or fairness as 
well as narrow legal objections. As will be seen below, none ofthese objections can 




1. Policy Issues: Should Remedies Be Available for Human Rights Violations That 
Occurred in the Distant Past? 
A letter to the editor prompted by the Government of Canada's settlement package in 
respect of the Chinese head tax and exclusion laws drew attention to one of the policy 
problems raised by any attempt at settlement: 
I have one question: As someone who is half Chinese and half WASP, 
do I have to pay reparations to myself?283 
Even if the question was intended to be tongue-in-cheek, it nevertheless makes the 
point that attempting to provide remedies for past wrongs will undoubtedly involve 
difficulties and complexities. The following seven hypothetical objections, while 
perhaps not an exhaustive list, at least indicate some of the objections that might be 
raised to attempts to remedy past human rights violations, as well as demonstrating 
that none of these potential objections are overwhelming. Some of them could be 
raised against any remedy, whether judicial or legislative, while others would be 
specific to judicial remedies. And while it might be thought that courts would not be 
influenced by some of the objections that are more policy-related, it must be 
suggested that judges are not unaware of the political and cultural milieus within 
which they perform their functions, and that such factors may well enter into those 
calculations that result in their decisions. 
283 Dan Scarrow, "Redress This", Globe and Mail, Thursday, November 17, 2005, p. A22. 
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a) Is It Unfair to Judge Past Events By Contemporary Standards? 
The biblical query, "why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but 
perceivest not the beam that is in thine own eye"284 is one that should be kept in mind 
by anyone who might unthinkingly apply contemporary human rights standards to 
past eras. There is no shortage of examples of human rights violations in the modem 
era, and those of us who live in this era are often inured to them, or even blind to their 
existence. If few of us actively consider how we can promote the rights of those 
whose rights are invalidated by oppressive regimes or crushing poverty in other 
countries, it seems probable that even fewer pause to consider whether the 
fundamental rights of the most marginalized members of our own societies are being 
subverted. Fewer still seem likely to consider whether a drive to the store infringes 
the rights of citizens of Tuvalu, for example, by speeding the date when that country 
and other island states will disappear below the ocean because of anthropogenic 
climate change, or even if it infringes the rights of our own as-yet-unborn descendants 
by condemning them to a world of diminished environmental quality. 
Although we can be slow to consider our own human rights records, we show little 
reluctance to judge the human rights records of individuals and societies of past eras. 
A striking example ofthis is offered by Thomas Jefferson and the issue of slavery. 
Despite being one of the most revered of American historical figures and an 
embodiment of Enlightenment virtues, Jefferson has been criticized as a hypocrite for 
having been a slave owner his entire life, having bought and sold slaves, having failed 
to provide for the manumission of his slaves upon his death, and having neglected to 
284 See Luke 6:41 and Matthew 7:3. 
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attempt to achieve the abolition of slavery during his years in government, all while 
proclaiming the self-evident truths that all men are created equal with an unalienable 
right to liberty. His defenders are equally willing to judge him on this issue, despite 
reaching different conclusions, and point to his representation of slaves while still a 
practici~g lawyer, his personal opposition to slavery, anti-slavery passages in the 
original draft of the Declaration of Independence, the achievement of at least limited 
reforms in Virginia and at the national level, and the considerable obstacles that 
prevented Jefferson from achieving more.285 Some defend him not only by judging 
that he achieved as much as he could, but by allowing that he and his Virginia 
contemporaries were successors to an era when "it was not yet clear to either 
merchants or pla!lters that the traffic in human flesh violated the norms of civilized 
society," and when a "primitive state of moral development" prevented perception of 
the evils of slavery.286 
Jefferson is not the only historical personage to be fourid wanting when judged by 
contemporary standards, despite an otherwise laudatory record. Emily Murphy in 
Canada and Margaret Sanger in the United States, for example, are revered as early 
feminists but reviled by some as racists and advocates of eugenics. 287 While their 
views on race and eugenics were not uncommon during their lifetimes and they had 
285 See, for example, John Chester Miller, The Wolf by the Ears: Thomas Jefferson and Slavery (New 
York: The Free Press, 1977). 
286 Ari Helo and Peter Onuf, "Jefferson, Morality, and the Problem of Slavery", The William and Mary 
Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 3, July 2003, 
<B_ttp:/ lwww,J:!istorycooperative.org.ezphos~.cjur.ac. u,k/journals/wm/60.3/helo.htn1}> (December 2_8, 2005f - - - - - - .. - -.-- --- - - - - - - -
287 For overviews respecting Sanger and Murphy respectively, see: "Margaret Sanger", Wikipedia 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Margaret_Sanger> (January 5, 2006); and "Murphy, Emily", The 
Canadian Encyclopedia 
<http://www. thecanadianencyclopedia.com/PrinterFriendly .cfm?Params=A 1 ART A0005529> (January 
5, 2006). 
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little chance of seeing their views translated into government policy, this has not 
prevented them from being judged by modem standards and found wanting. 
Is it unfair to judge Jefferson, Murphy, Sanger and others by modem standards? In a 
word, no. Admittedly, we should not succumb to the "historian's fallacy" of judging 
historical actors on the basis of information that is available to us and was not 
available to them.Z88 In the cases listed above, however, as well as in the case of those 
legislators who passed Canada's anti-Chinese legislation, the problem was not a lack 
of information, but an informed decision to sacrifice the human rights of others in 
favour of some preferred goal. This is, of course, typical not merely of historical 
figures but of contemporary ones as well. When an employer, for example, violates 
the human rights of an actual or prospective employee, they are likely to have grounds 
that seem to them very reasonable for doing so. Just as we judge such modem 
individuals against standards of what is or is not societally acceptable, so should we 
do with decision-makers of an earlier era. 
b) Is It Unfair to Compel Contemporary Taxpayers to Pay for Wrongs Committed by 
Past Governments? 
A well-know zen koan states that you cannot step into the same stream twice. The 
analogous argument that could be made against imposing any judicial remedy for past 
human rights violations is that the state that committed the human rights violation is 
not the same as the one that would be required to provide the remedy. In the case of 
the Chinese head tax and exclusion laws, for example, the "Canada" that eventually 
288 David Hackett Fischer, Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought (New York: 
Harper Collins, 1970). 
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paid to provide redress to head-tax payers is not made up of the same citizens that 
constituted "Canada" in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Some might 
suggest that this makes it ~fair to require contemporary taxpayers to provide 
recompense for wrongful acts committed by their great-grandparents' generation. 
To lawyers, however, such an argument would be unpersuasive. Lawyers are 
accustomed to the concept of non-corporeal, non-human legal entities, whether they 
be governments, corporations or incorporated societies. The idea that a government 
should be able to evade liability because there has been a change in the composition 
of its citizens would seem as strange as the idea that a corporation should be able to 
evade liability on the ground that its shareholders have changed. Were it otherwise, 
then given that births and deaths change the composition of most states on a minute-
by-minute basis, governments could never be held accountable for any of their 
actions. 
c) Does Providing Benefits to One Group Undermine Societal Unity? 
Where the victims of a human rights violation were members of a particular group 
defined by ethnicity, race, religion, or some other characteristic, it will obviously be 
the case that any remedy will be directed at that same group. Certain types of remedy, 
such as a monetary payment, may appear to non-recipients to simply be a benefit that 
is not being equitably distributed. This might particularly be expected to be the case 
if the remedy is targeted at family members or group representatives rather than at the 
individuals who directly suffered the original human rights violation. If this is so, 
some might argue that it would undermine societal unity. 
121 
It is already the case, however, that many governmental programs are targeted at 
specific groups and individuals, such as immigrants, corporations, farmers, the poor, 
arts organizations, and children. It would seem odd if the victims of human rights 
violations were the one special interest group that could not be targeted for special 
benefits. 
d) Is the Impossibility of Righting All Past Wrongs Problematic? 
The in terrorem argument - often expressed as a "floodgates" argument - is a popular 
courtroom device, and is not difficult to anticipate with regard to any proposed 
remedies for human rights violations of the distant past. If modem humans have 
existed for 130,000 years and "civilizations" for 5,000 years, then the number of past 
human rights violations that must have taken place is undoubtedly very large. 
Throughout the passage of the millennia, the descendants of those whose human 
rights have been violated in these many incidents will have undoubtedly interbred 
with the descendants of those who violated their rights, and the states within which 
those violations took place will themselves have been destroyed and reconstituted 
under different names and with different boundaries and forms of government. 
Trying to provide remedies for all human rights violations that ever took place would 
require an impossible attempt at unravelling this skein. Should this serve as an 
impediment to attempting to remedy any human rights violations of the distant past? 
While it must, of course, be acknowledged that righting every wrong in history would 
be impossible, this is not what is proposed here. Rather than a dualistic "all or 
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nothing" approach, it is suggested that the reasoned application of a set of criteria set 
out later in this paper would make it possible and desirable to identify some human 
rights violations that took place in the distant past for which courts might justifiably 
be able to provide remedies. 
e) Would it be Preferable to Consider the Future Rather than the Past? 
The quote in the previous chapter from a Member of Parliament indicating that the 
Government of Canada preferred to "look to the future" rather than "focus on actions 
taken by a previous government" is easy to dismiss as a self-serving attempt at 
justification at a time when the Government was still opposed to any form of remedy 
for the Chinese head tax and exclusion laws. Is a more generous interpretation 
possible? Might it, for example, be argued in opposition to the provision of remedies 
for long-past human rights violations that governments have limited resources, that it 
is necessary to make choices in the allocation of those resources, and that other 
societal problems should be dealt with in preference to the remediation of outstanding 
human rights violations? 
In fairness, it must be admitted that the first part of the hypothetical objection is true: 
governments do have limited resources and they do have to make choices in the 
allocation of those resources. This is a fact of which the courts are not unaware; if 
governments faced no budget constraints, then judges might never have to take 
overcrowding of prisons into account in making their sentencing decisions. It also 
cannot be denied that some anticipated future problems - the end of oil, pandemics, 
and global climate change, for example - are so momentous that governments could 
2t-_ 
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certainly justify ignoring other issues to focus on them. In reality, however, 
governments do not focus on future problems to the exclusion of current and past 
problems. Instead, all issues compete for government attention and spending. The 
real issue, then, is whether outstanding human rights violations of the past should be 
handicapped in this competitive process, such as by virtue of courts finding that there 
are legal grounds that excuse governments from dealing with issues that might 
otherwise give rise to legal obligations. Put in this way, it can be perceived that it 
would be unfair and inappropriate for such issues to be accorded such differential 
treatment. 
f) Are the Practical Difficulties Overwhelming? 
The demand for monetary compensation for payers of the Chinese head tax provides 
an illustration of the practical difficulties that can arise even once a decision has been 
made to provide a remedy for a long-past human rights violation. No one knows 
exactly how many head tax payers are still alive, 289 but since the tax was eliminated 
more than eighty years ago, it is clear that they are few in number. It might be 
thought, then, that repaying such a small group for the head tax collected from them 
would be relatively simple, and the formula actually adopted by the Government of 
Canada for compensating head tax payers and their spouses was, in fact, relatively 
simple. The questions that would have been considered by those responsible for 
deciding on the parameters of the compensation program, however, would have been 
complex. Should the compensation payment be a token amount, or a repayment of 
the actual amount paid? Should the repayment include interest? If so, calculated at 
289 Supra, note 35. 
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what rate? Simple or compound? Should the spouses of deceased head tax payers 
receive compensation? How about their children? Grandchildren? Would 
concubines and their children by head tax payers be eligible, or only those linked by 
marriage?290 Since the provinces received half of the money collected pursuant to the 
head tax after 1903, should compensation be contingent upon a federal-provincial 
agreement? 
Admittedly, providing an appropriate remedy for a human rights violation may not be 
simple; see, for example, Thomas' discussion of the many cases that followed after 
Brown v. Board of Education in an iterative process of seeking a judicial solution to 
racial segregation?91 The situation is likely to be even more complicated if the rights 
of many people were violated and if a significant period of time has passed since that 
occurred. And it may also be true that the more difficult or complicated it is to 
provide a remedy for a human rights violation, the easier it will be to do nothing. In 
the case of surviving head tax payers, however, the Government of Canada was able 
to overcome the practical difficulties and arrive at a solution which, while not 
acceptable to everyone, was nevertheless widely perceived to be a good-faith attempt 
to resolve the issue. There is no reason to expect that such difficulties could not be 
similarly overcome in other cases, and neither is there any reason to presume that 
such difficulties provide a legitimate excuse for doing nothing. 
290 Evidence that such issues are not fanciful emerged eight months after the Government's apology to 
Chinese-Canadians, when reporters obtained secret briefmg notes to cabinet concerning the effect on 
the proposed settlement of polygamy in the Chinese-Canadian community: Peter O'Neil, "Polygamy 
Warning Issued on Head Tax," Vancouver Sun, Monday, February 12,2007, p. Al. 
291 Supra, note 277. 
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g) Is the Court System the Right Body to Provide Redress? 
While all of the preceding objections may be raised to any proposal to provide 
remedies for long-past human rights violations, in the final analysis they can be 
overcome by recognizing that human rights are important enough that societies should 
choose to enforce them and also that it is important to resolve lingering societal 
fractures caused by discontent over outstanding human rights violations. Even if the 
choice is made to seek to remediate outstanding human rights violations, however, 
there could be those who would say that this would not necessarily mean accepting 
that providing that remedy is an appropriate judicial function. 292 
This is because the healing of stresses within the polity may be less of a "legal" 
function than a political one. In western democratic societies, there is usually a 
division of responsibilities between the legislative, administrative and legal branches 
of government, with overtly "political" choices supposedly allocated to the legislative 
and administrative branches. Hogg suggests that judges are not, in fact, even 
qualified to deal with difficult political issues:293 
[Judges] are not well suited to ... policy-making .... Their mandate to make 
decisions differs from that of other public officials in that judges are not 
accountable to any electorate or to any government for their decisions; on 
the contrary, they occupy a uniquely protected place in the system of 
government, which is designed to guarantee their independence from 
political or other influences. Their background is not broadly 
representative of the population; they are recruited exclusively from the 
small class of successful, middle-aged lawyers; they do not necessarily 
have much knowle<!ge of or experience in public affairs, and after 
292A~Ii~~i on"~ny~con~lusion itltiils rega~d is the~~bservatlon that "The judici~l function is the hardest 
to distinguish of the three basic output functions of the political system." Richard J. Van Loon and 
Michael S. Whittington, The Canadian Political System: Environment, Structure and Process 
(Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1987), p. 183, citing W.R. Lederman, "The Independence of the 
· Judiciary," Canadian Bar Review, 1956, p. 769 ff. 
293 Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, looseleaf edition (Toronto: Carswell), p. 5-27. 
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appointment they are expected to remain aloof from most public issues. 
The resources available to the judges are limited by the practice and 
procedure of an Anglo-Canadian court: they are obliged to decide cases on 
the basis of the limited information presented to them in court; they have 
no power to initiate inquiries or research, no staff of investigators or 
researchers, and of course no power to enact a law in substitution for one 
declared invalid. 
Or, as Manfredi more pithily put it with specific reference to the Supreme Court of 
Canada, "Elevation to a nation's highest court does not transform any individual into 
a moral philosopher."294 
Even defenders of the courts may argue for limitations on judicial activism. Kelly, for 
example, says that the Supreme Court of Canada cannot function as the sole guardian 
of the constitution, but must participate in collective action with the legislatures and 
other institutions and individuals to protect fundamental rights.295 
There is, in fact, a lively and voluminous academic debate in Canada about the extent 
and appropriateness of judicial intervention in "political" matters. One thread of this 
debate occurs between, on the one hand, those such as Morton who say that the courts 
intervene frequently in political decisions296 and those such as Manfredi who say that 
judicial activism has increased over time,297 and, on the other hand, those such as 
Choudhry and Hunter who provide statistical refutation of such claims.298 An 
294 Christopher P. Manfredi, Judicial Power and the Charter, Second Edition (Don Mills: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), p. 195. 
295 James B. Kelly, "Guarding the Constitution: Parliamentary and Judicial Roles Under the Charter", 
in J. Peter Meekison, Hamish Telford, and Harvey Lazar, Reconsidering the Institutions of Canadian 
Fef!erali,Y!1l,(l(Jl:lgstorr: McGilbQueen's ,Uoiversity Press, 20Q2)"pp_._I7_-l!O <!tl014. __ _ _ 
296 F.L. MOrton and Ramer Knopff, eds., The-Cha~ter Revolution and the Court Party (Peterborough: 
Broadview Press, 2000), at p. 13. 
297 Supra, note 294, at p. 5. 
298 Sujit Choudhry & Claire Hunter, "Measuring Judicial Activism on the Supreme Court of Canada: A 
Comment on Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. NAPE", (2003) 48 McGill L.J. 525. See also the 
subsequent exchanges in Christopher P. Manfredi & James B. Kelly, "Misrepresenting the Supreme 
:::.:.: 
127 
interwoven thread of the debate is between the many authors who support judicial 
activism to protect minority rights and those, such as Morton, who condemn it.299 
While this debate currently revolves around the courts' interpretation of the Charter 
so as to determine the legality of contemporary government legislation, the policy 
grounds that make "judicial activism" objectionable to some might also support an 
argument that the judiciary is not the right body to provide redress for long-past 
human rights violations. 
Such an argument, however, would ignore both the traditional role of the courts and 
the reality of their current existence. As pointed out earlier in this chapter, members 
of the public are accustomed to bring their disputes and grievances to the courts, and 
the courts have always been obliged to consider their cases. While the nature of the 
cases may in some instances have changed over time, this does not mean that the 
courts are performing anything other than their accustomed role of adjudicating -
rather than initiating - disputes. Furthermore, the fact that the courts are able to 
exercise their role in modem democratic states must ultimately be attributable to the 
consent of governments and the electorates that choose them. In Canada, it must be 
remembered in particular that the courts' responsibility to consider whether 
government actions comply with Charter standards is not one that the courts sought 
or even voluntarily accepted, but is one that was thrust upon them as a result of the 
decision by federal and provincial governments to introduce the Charter. Moreover, 
any government that asserts that courts are acting illegitimately is free to attempt to 
interfere with the courts' exercise of their mandate, and to discover whether the 
Court's Record? A Comment on Sujit Choudhry and Claire E. Hunter, 'Measuring Judicial Activism 
on the Supreme Court of Canada"' (2004) 49 McGill L.J. 741 and Sujit Choudhry & Claire Hunter, 
"Continuing the Conversation: A Reply to Manfredi and Kelly" (2004) 49 McGill L.J. 765. 
299 Supra, note 296. 
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electorate supports it in doing so. It is also, of course, open to governments to pre-
empt any judicial consideration of long-past human rights violations by dealing with 
them first; since by doing so, however, they expose their own decisions and handling 
of the matters to criticism, it may be that governments might actually prefer to let the 
courts be the ones to wrestle with the difficult issues these unresolved human rights 
complaints present. 
2. Legal Issues: the Legal Obstacles to Remedies for Long-Past Human Rights 
Violations 
While the preceding section attempts to elucidate objections to judicial remedies for 
long-past violations of human rights that are rooted in philosophical or policy 
grounds, there are also specific legal obstacles to the provision of such remedies. 
Their existence raises the question of whether or not the courts will actually be able to 
provide the remedies sought. That is, are prospective plaintiffs likely to be as 
' 
disappointed as the plaintiffs in Mack? The answer must be ambiguous; if courts 
choose to find a way to ensure that long-past human rights violations do not go 
unaddressed, then such obstacles can undoubtedly be circumvented. If the courts 
remain diffident about dealing with such cases, however, then these legal objections 
may continue to present serious difficulties. For present purposes, it will be sufficient 
to identify the principal obstacles. 
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a) Laches and Limitation Periods 
A fundamental obstacle to any attempt to seek redress for long-past human rights 
violations is what has been referred to as "the common law system's abhorrence of 
delay. "300 This is manifested in statutory limitation periods, such as the two-year 
period within which civil claims must normally be brought in British Columbia/01 
and also in the common law doctrine of laches, defined as unreasonable delay or 
negligence in pursuing a right or claim - almost always an equitable one - in a way 
that prejudices the party against whom relief is sought. 302 The importance the legal 
system attaches to avoiding delay was summed up by the Supreme Court of Canada 
in Blencoe:303 
The notion that justice delayed is justice denied reaches back to the mists of 
time. In Magna Carta in 1215, King John promised: "To none will we sell, 
to none will we deny, or delay, right or justice" (emphasis added). As La 
Forest J. put it, the right to a speedy trial has been "a right known to the 
common law ... for more than 750 years" (R. v. Rahey, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588 
(S.C.C.), at p. 636). In criminal law cases, this Court had no difficulty 
determining in R. v. Askov, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199 (S.C.C.), at p. 1227, that 
"the right to be tried within a reasonable time is an aspect of fundamental 
justice protected by s. 7 of the Charter". Outside the criminal law context, 
legislators have devised limitation periods, and courts have developed 
equitable doctrines such as that of laches. For centuries, those working with 
our legal system have recognized that unnecessary delay strikes against its 
core values and have done everything within their powers to combat it, 
albeit not always with complete success. 
Clearly, the value the legal system attaches to the speedy resolution of disputes and 
the bars it raises to those who have-not proceeded expeditiously pose a serious 
300 Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission) 2000 SCC 44 at ~145. 
301 Limitation Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 266, s. 3(2). 
302 Black's Law Dictionary (71h edition), cited in Singh v. Kingsway General Insurance (2003) 
CarswellOnt 5411 (F.S.T.). 
303 Supra, note 300 at ~146. 
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impediment to any attempt to seek remedies for human rights violations that occurred 
in the distant past. This bar is not, however, insurmountable in all cases. In some 
jurisdictions, neither criminal prosecutions nor actions for breach of a fiduciary duty 
are statute barred.304 Even for those actions for which statutory limitation periods 
exist, courts have sometimes found a way around them when fairness demanded it. In 
cases of childhood sexual abuse, for example, courts have held that limitation periods 
began to run not when a plaintiff was aware ofhaving been wronged or even upon 
reaching the age of majority, but rather when the plaintiff discovered the nexus 
between the wrongful acts committed and the injuries suffered; that is, when through 
therapy or some other process the plaintiff has come to terms with the nature of the 
abuse, often many years later.305 The grounds that underlie common law and 
statutory limitations - granting repose to potential defendants, the problem of 
evidence becoming "stale", and encouraging plaintiffs to act diligently- have been 
found unpersuasive in such cases, since there is no public interest in granting repose 
to abusers, evidence becoming stale is not a practical problem in such cases, and there 
are legitimate reasons why plaintiffs are unable to commence their actions more 
quickly.306 
Could similar arguments be made in the case of human rights violations from the 
distant past? A parallel certainly exists, in that the victims in these cases are 
304 While the Roman law-based jurisdictions of continental Europe and Latin America have always 
accepted time limits for bringing prosecutions, the common law jurisdictions of England and the 
common law have generally not recognized any time limit on commencing criminal prosecutions. 
Despite ifs common law background, however, the United States began applying limitations-in criminal 
,PJQ§~~l1tiQ}l!l.a_~ early_ as .. 1&~7~~"'-M-~s_!l~!l!!!le~, "':W.ypmigg~._n_Qw,tb_e~_l!ly,stat~--"w.ith.no.limitatio_n 
period whatsoever on criminal prosecutions, while a handful of states lack limitation periods for felony 
prosecutions. See Daniel W. Shurman and Alexander McCall Smith, Justice and the Prosecution of 
Old Crimes: Balancing Legal, Psychological, and Moral Concerns (Washington, D.C.: American 
Psychological Association, 2000), p. 56. 
305 M(K.) v. M(H), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 6, at -,rl4, 30. 
306 Ibid., at -,r22-24. 
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prevented from commencing their actions not because of the need for their own 
comprehension of the wrongs that were done to them to develop, but because of the 
need to wait for societal understanding to develop of the nature of those wrongs . 
. Another parallel could be drawn to the treatment of war criminals. Large scale 
immigration to Canada after World War II resulted in the admission of many 
individuals suspected of war crimes. A 1985 Commission oflnquiry on War 
Criminals led by Justice Jules Deschenes resulted in the names of 883 suspected war 
criminals living in Canada, and a recommendation that the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police and the Department of Justice be given a mandate to investigate them. In 
1987, more than twenty years after the end ofWorld War II, the Government of 
Canada announced that those alleged to have been involved in the commission of war 
crimes or crimes against humanity would be subject to criminal prosecution or 
revocation of citizenship and deportation. The Crimes Against Humanity and War 
Crimes AcP07 was eventually passed, and war criminals from World War II- as well 
as those from more recent conflicts - continue to be pursued, in some cases more than 
four decades after their crimes were committed.308 
If concerns about laches and limitation periods can be overcome in cases involving 
sexual abuse and war crimes, there is no apparent reason why a similar approach 
could not be taken in cases of human rights violations. 
307 S.C. 2000, c. 24. 
308 Eight WWII citizenship revocation cases were reported as ongoing in the Eighth Annual Report 
2004-2005 of Canada's Program on Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes 
-~ 
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b) Presumption Against Retroactivity 
One of the weightiese09 tools of statutory interpretation is the presumption against 
retroactivity. Unless a provision is explicitly declared by statute to operate 
retroactively, it is presumed that it cannot do so.310 The rationale and ambit for the 
rule was recently described in Grand Rapids v. Graham:311 
Retroactive legislation reaches into the past and declares that the law or the 
rights of parties as of an earlier date shall be taken to be something other 
than they were as of the earlier date. Its effect has been described as "a 
serious violation of rule oflaw,'' and for that reason, a statute will not be 
construed to have a retroactive application unless such a construction is 
expressly or by necessary implication required by the wording of the statute 
(the presumption against retroactivity). And when an enactment has 
retroactive operation, the extent of the retroactivity will be limited, 
although the presumption against interference with antecedent rights is not 
nearly as weighty as the presumption against retroactivity. 
Inherent in Mack is the judicial presumption that to give effect to human rights 
instruments prior to the date when those instruments were enacted would be to accord 
them retroactive application. This would obviously be correct if the rights only came 
into existence upon the passage of such instruments. Admittedly, this seems to be at 
odds with both the very notion of human rights - that is, that they are rights that 
accrue to all human beings simply by virtue of their humanity- and with the explicit 
wording of some of those human rights instruments. 
The Royal Proclamation that brought the Charter into effect, for example, refers to 
"the recognition of certain fundamental rights and freedoms", and s. 2 of the Charter 
309 In Cieciersky v. Fenning (2005), 258 D.L.R. (4th) 103 (Man. C.A.), for example, it was held that the 
~resumption against retroactivity outweighed the presumption against interference with vested rights. 
10 See, for example, Bell Canada v. Canada (Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications 
Commission) [ 1989] 1 S.C.R. 1722 at ~26. 
311 2004 MBCA 138 at ~14. 
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says that "everyone has" certain rights and freedoms (underlining added), whiles. 1 
says that the Charter "guarantees" the rights and freedoms set out in it. Now here is 
there any suggestion that the Charter creates those rights, unless it is implicit in the 
fact that certain dates were set for the Charter provisions to come into effect. Despite 
that, the judicial approach to date seems to be consistent with that taken in Mack, 
namely to treat those rights guaranteed in the Charter as not having existed prior to 
the enactment of the Charter, rather than to consider Parliament to have being 
signalling to the courts by that enactment its intention to recognize and codify certain 
pre-existing rights. 312 
If this approach were to persist, then combined with the strength of the presumption 
against retroactivity, it would be difficult for the courts to provide remedies for any 
human rights violations that predate the end of World War II and the era of human 
rights enactments that began at that time. Fortunately, however, this need not be the 
case. As will be discussed in the next chapter, Canadian case law permits an 
interpretation of the Charter as incorporating certain pre-existing rights. Such an 
interpretation obviates any need for further consideration of the difficulties posed by 
the presumption of retroactivity in such matters. 
Despite that, two points may be raised in passing respecting whether it might not be 
the case that the presumption against retroactivity should not apply in such cases in 
any event. First, case law indicates that where the purpose of a statute is not to add to 
312 No~th~ the interpretation of the Canadiari iiili a/Rights gave rise to a similar issue, but with a 
particularly peculiar twist. Because s. 1 said that the rights and freedoms declared in the Bill "have 
existed and shall continue to exist," it was held that only those rights that could be shown to have 
existed in 1960 were protected. Capital punishment, for example, could not be forbidden by the Bill of 
Rights since it was lawful in 1960. For a critique, see Walter Tarnopo1sky, "The Constitution and the 
Future of Canada," [1978] LSUC Special Lectures 161 at 181-191. 
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the punishment of past misconduct, but to protect the public in the future, then the 
presumption against retroactivity should not apply.313 This is consistent with the 
frequently-stated policy justification for the presumption against retroactivity, namely 
that existing rights should not be prejudicially affected.314 Clearly, this suggests that 
legislated human rights instruments, including the Charter, should be permitted a 
retroactive interpretation. Second, although there appear to be no judicial decisions 
on this point, quaere whether the presumption against retroactivity should be less 
forceful in cases where the defendant is a state, given the obligation of states to 
implement human rights. 
c) Personal Nature of Human Rights 
As discussed in the introductory chapter, the theory and political history of human 
rights supports the notion that those rights attach to individuals rather than to groups. 
This largely holds true for legal practice as well, with the courts holding that 
individual rights generally take precedence over group rights, and noting that the 
Canadian constitution is specific in those exceptional instances where group rights 
take precedence, such as with education rights and language rights.315 
This poses a serious obstacle to the quest for redress in any case where those who 
directly suffered a human rights violation have died, and it is their descendants or 
community that seeks to commence litigation.316 A recent case illustrating this is 
313 Brosseau v. A1oerla Securities Commission (1989), 57 D.L.R. (4th) 458 at 412 (SCC). See also R. v. 
Maxwell, [1996] O.J. No. 4832 at CIJ 99 (Ont. Prov. Ct.). 
314 See, e.g., Upper Canada College v. Smith (1920) 57 D.L.R. 648 (SCC). 
315 See Boyer v. R. , [1986] 2 F.C. 393 (F.C.A.), per MacGuigan J. at~ 35. 
316 Note, however, that the Ontario Court of Appeal refused to allow the claims of"secondary" litigants 
- the children of those whose rights had been violated- to be struck out in Bonaparte v. Canada 
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British Columbia v. Gregoire, in which the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal 
had ruled that it could proceed to hear a complaint despite the complainant having 
died, because - inter alia - the complaint raised systemic issues and there were strong 
public policy reasons for continuing.317 The British Columbia Supreme Court set 
aside the Tribunal's decision on the ground that human rights established by the 
British Columbia Human Rights Code are "personal" and abate on the death of the 
person whose human rights have been breached.318 In arriving at that finding, the 
Court noted earlier jurisprudence establishing that Charter rights - including s. 15 
specifically - are also personal rights and terminate upon the death of the 
individual.319 
It may be, then, that while the passage of time alone may not prevent the remediation 
of outstanding human rights violations, that the death of the victims of those rights 
violations may make it much more difficult to successfully advance a claim for a 
remedy. A proposal is made in the next chapter for a change to the judicial 
perspective regarding human rights complaints that would aim at addressing this 
problem. 
d) Judicial Deference to Parliamentary Supremacy 
In cases such as Mack, in which human rights violations took place as a result of 
apparently valid legislation at a time preceding any binding enactments guaranteeing 
those rights, courts are apt to defer to the concept of Parliamentary supremacy. 
(Attorney General) (2003), 64 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont.C.A.). In that case, however, the claim was based upon 
the alleged fiduciary duty of the Government of Canada toward Aboriginal peoples, rather than tort. 
317 2005 BCSC 154 at '1!14. 
318 Ibid., at 'IJ32. 
319 Stinson Estate v. British Columbia 1999 BCCA 761 at '1!11-13. 
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Perhaps most pithily encapsulated in Henry Herbert's sixteenth-century statement that 
"Parliament cando anything but make a man a woman and a woman a man", the 
concept was summed up by Dicey in stating that Parliament has: 
... the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and further, that no 
person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to 
override or set aside the legislation ofParliament.320 
Judicial recognition of the doctrine is implicit in many cases and explicit in 
some, such as Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke:321 
It is often said that it would be unconstitutional for the United Kingdom 
Parliament to do certain things, meaning that the moral, political and other 
reasons against doing them are so strong that most people would regard it 
as highly improper if Parliament did these things. But that does not mean 
that it is beyond the power of Parliament to do such things. If Parliament 
chose to do any of them the courts would not hold the Act of Parliament 
invalid. 
If Parliament is supreme and courts cling to the notion that they do not make law but 
only interpret the laws that Parliament has created, then it is understandable that the 
courts might be unwilling to provide remedies for human rights violations that predate 
legislation that would have made them contrary to statute. When those human rights 
violations were the deliberate and inevitable product of Parliament passing apparently 
valid legislation, then it is easy to understand how courts that embrace the notion of 
Parliamentary supremacy might be reluctant to go against the Parliamentary will. 
320 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution Tenth Edition (London: 
MacMillan, 1959), pp. 39-40. 
321 [1969] 1 A.C. 645 at 723. 
_J,_ 
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Even where human rights violations have been the result of policy rather than 
legislation, courts have generally been deferential. An example is the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Blackwater v. Plint, a tort case involving the residential 
schools to which Aboriginal children were forcibly relocated by churches and 
government in the mid-twentieth century, and where they were subject to a myriad of 
abuses:322 
... to what extent is evidence of generalized policies toward Aboriginal 
children relevant? Can such evidence lighten the burden of proving specific 
fault and damage in individual cases? I conclude that general policies and 
practices may provide relevant context for assessing claims for damages in 
cases such as this. However, government policy by itself does not create a 
legally actionable wrong. For that, the law requires specific wrongful acts 
causally connected to damage suffered. 
It must be recognized, however, that the presumption of Parliamentary supremacy is 
not as strong as it once was. In Canada, it has been undermined by the passage of the 
Charter, and even in the United Kingdom, both devolution and participation in the 
European Community have eroded the doctrine. It may be, therefore, that courts 
would no longer defer to Parliament in human rights matters in the way they would 
once have done. Furthermore, it could be argued that in giving primacy to those 
rights that Parliament chose to recognize in the Charter, the courts are promoting, 
rather than opposing, the Parliamentary will. 
C. Conclusions 
It is suggested above-that people who have·suffered human rights violations, 
including those that occurred in the distant past, will continue to tum to the courts in 
322 2005 sec 58 at ~9. 
_j 
138 
the hopes of obtaining redress. It has also been suggested that it will be entirely 
legitimate for them to expect the courts to give meaningful consideration to their 
claims, and furthermore that the courts have, in fact, legal tools that are sufficient to 
allow them to discharge this function. 
This is not to deny that serious impediments exist to the use of the courts in such 
situations. It can be seen, however, that neither the broad policy objections nor the 
narrow legal objections that have been canvassed above are insurmountable. Instead, 
these should be considered to be merely indicative of possible reasons for the failure 
of the legal system to properly give full effect to the protection of human rights, 
factors that should be noted only in order that they can be overcome. 
It has been asserted above that the means by which difficulties such as those displayed 
in Mack can be overcome is by the judicial recognition of human rights as actual, 
enforceable rights, rights which do not owe their existence to those instruments - such 
as the Charter- in which they are formally manifested. Since it might seem 
questionable whether this novel approach would be compatible with existing 
jurisprudence, the following chapter will demonstrate that nothing in Canadian case 
law would preclude this course. In addition, a shift in perspective regarding 
individual rights will be proposed in the next chapter which might make it possible to 
avoid practical difficulties that arise when those who were the direct victims of human 
rights violations have died. Since arguing that the courts should provide remedies for 
long-past human rights violations in some cases does not mean that they should do so 
in every case, the next chapter will also provide some guidance as to how the courts 
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should exercise their discretion in distinguishing between those cases that might be 
brought before them. 
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Chapter V: Rethinking the Judicial Approach 
If the assessment in the preceding chapter is correct- i.e. that the desirability of 
having courts provide remedies for long-past violations of human rights outweighs 
whatever objections might be raised, then is there any way of improving the courts' 
effectiveness in dealing with such cases? If there is, then it should not lie in a 
legislative expansion of the courts' powers, since it is legislative failure to act on the 
resolution of outstanding human rights grievances that will generally have resulted in 
the need for a judicial solution in the first place. What is required instead is a 
rethinking by the courts of their approach, one that results in a judicial perception of 
the appropriateness of their fulfillment of judicial responsibilities in such cases as well 
as an analytical framework that supports their role. 
With regard to the latter, it is argued here that a rethought judicial approach should 
contain three elements, namely: 
1. recognition that at least some human rights exist independently of the 
legislative instruments that have been created to protect them, and can be 
given judicial effect without recourse to those legislative instruments; 
2. recognition that the policy grounds underpinning judicial remediation of 
human rights violations are essentially the same as those underpinning judicial 
remediation of criminal offences, and that the triggering of judicial action 
should therefore not be dependent upon the initiation and carriage of 
complaints by the very individuals who were the victims of the human rights 
violations. 
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3. development of a reasoned approach by which to weigh long-past human 
rights violations and distinguish between those for which the courts will 
provide remedies and those for which they will not. 
A. Inherent Versus Created Human Rights 
As discussed in the first chapter, "human rights" are rights to which everyone is 
entitled simply by virtue of their humanity and regardless of whether or not they are 
fortunate enough to live in jurisdictions that recognize and protect those human rights. 
If this is so, then they cannot be dependent upon their expression in legislative 
instruments such as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Instead, it must 
be the case that such legislative instruments merely recognize and guarantee those 
human rights that exist independently of them, with the consequence that there is no 
retroactivity involved in the judicial enforcement of rights with respect to the period 
before the Charter was enacted. That some of the rights in the Charter are not new is, 
in fact, what Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau told the public when the Charter was 
introduced:323 
Most of the rights and freedoms we are enshrining in the Charter are not totally 
new and different. indeed, Canadians have tended to take most of them for 
granted over the years. 
Canadian courts, however, do not seem on first blush to have taken this view. Indeed, 
some have explicitly rejected it, while others seem to have simply failed to recognize 
it as an option, and have therefore adopted implicitly by default the-position that 
323 Canada, The Charter of Rights and Freedoms: A Guide for Canadians (Ottawa: Minister of Supply 
and Services, 1982), p. 1. 
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human rights must be grounded in legislative instruments. To comprehend the 
judicial viewpoint on this topic, it is necessary to examine those cases that have 
considered whether the rights protected in the Charter could be given retroactive or 
retrospective application. This is because the courts seemed to have presumed that 
the application of Charter rights to the pre-Charter era must necessarily involve 
retroactive or retrospective operation, so that all judicial discussion of whether rights 
contained in the Charter can apply prior to 1982 involves discussion of retroactive 
and retrospective operation, rather than of inherent versus created rights. As will 
therefore become apparent, in order to argue that the courts should be able to protect 
human rights even when positive law provides no guarantees of those rights, it will be 
necessary to give the existing jurisprudence on retroactive and retrospective 
application of the Charter a careful reading in order to perceive that the courts do 
indeed still have the ability to do this, and that they have not ruled out this possibility. 
The judicial antipathy toward retroactive and retrospective application of statutes 
generally was discussed in the preceding chapter. If the rights set out in the Charter 
were actually conferred by the Charter- and clearly at least some of them were - then 
it might be expected that the courts' general reluctance to give statutes retroactive or 
retrospective application would carry over to their interpretation of the Charter; that 
is, to the extent that the Charter is considered by the courts to have created new law 
or given new rights, then the courts would be reluctant to give these new laws and 
rights retroactive or retrospective application. This is, in fact, what happened when 
the Charter came into effect, and the courts have, at least implicitly, assumed that the 
Charter created new rights and have accordingly been very reluctant to accord it even 
retrospective application, let alone retroactive application. 
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The date upon which the Constitution Act, 1982 (and therefore the Charter as Part I of 
that statute) was to come into force was, pursuant to section 58 of the Act, a day to be 
fixed by proclamation. That proclamation was issued by the Queen at a ceremony in 
Ottawa on April 17, 1982, with that date fixed as the date upon which the Act was to 
come into effect. 324 In the years immediately following the coming into force of the 
Charter, the courts often had to consider how, if at all, the Charter should apply to 
events that predated its existence. 
If one were to evaluate the judicial record on this point only on recent 
pronouncements, the impression might be given that there had been consistent 
application of a straightforward rule. In the criminal context, for example, the court 
in R. v. Cembella made it seem as though the law on point could be briefly and 
h . 1 . d 325 compre ens1ve y summanze : 
The authorities establish that the provisions of the Charter of Rights relating to 
substantive law do not apply retroactively to offences allegedly committed 
before it came into force. But the sections relating to procedural law are 
retroactive and do apply to the trial of such offences, where the trial occurs after 
April 17, 1982. 
Hogg is similarly categorical in his overview:326 
A statute (or regulation or by-law or other legislative instrument) which was 
enacted before April 17, 1982, and which is inconsistent with the Charter will 
be rendered "of no force or effect" by the supremacy clause of the Constitution, 
but only as from April 17, 1982. 
324 Supra, note 293, p. 33-34. Note that pursuant to s. 32(2), s. 15, the equality rights section, did not 
come into effect until three years later. 
325 (2002), 169 C.C.C. (3d) 293 at 298 (B.C. S.C.). 
326 Supra, note 293, at 33-34. 
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... Action of an executive or administrative kind, such as search, seizure, arrest 
or detention, which was taken before April 17, 1982, cannot be a violation of 
the Charter, because the Charter was not in force at the time of the action. No 
remedy under s. 24( 1) would be available in respect of action taken before April 
17, 1982, because the remedy is available only to anyone whose rights or 
freedoms, "as guaranteed by this Charter", have been infringed or denied. 
Closer examination of the case law, however, reveals that the courts had difficulty in 
considering these issues in the years following the adoption of the Charter, that 
appellate courts split in decisions that involved these issues, and that the courts' 
decisions are not always straightforward or convincing. 
One of the earliest trial decisions on point was that ofBorins Co. Ct. J. in R. v. 
Dickson. 327 In a decision that was later quoted by both the British Columbia Court of 
Appeae28 and the Supreme Court of Canada,329 he said:330 
In my view, the proper question to ask relative to the present 
application is whether it was the intention of Parliament in enacting the 
Constitution Act, 1982, that it apply to criminal conduct engaged in 
and completed before the Constitution was proclaimed in force on 
April 17, 1982. 
After posing that question, he confessed that:331 
In approaching the question I find it rather difficult to determine 
whether an affirmative answer would result in characterizing the 
Constitution as retroactive or retrospective legislation, as these words 
are defmed by Driedger. . . . Indeed, it may be that the Constitution 
defies strict doctrinal characterization as either exclusively retroactive, 
retrospective or prospective legislation for, as I suggested in the 
preceding paragraph, different facts may produce different 
327 R. v. Dickson and Corman (1982), 145 D.L.R. (3d) 164 (Ont. Ct. ofG.S.). 
328 R. v. Thorburn (1986), 26 C.C.C. (3d) 154 at 159-160 (B.C.C.A.). 
329 R. v. Stevens, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1153 at 1162-1163. 
330 Supra, note 327, at 169. 
331 Ibid., at 170. 
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interpretations. The operation of the Constitution in different cases 
will no doubt involve quite different considerations. 
Although the Supreme Court of Canada considered the retrospective application of 
the Charter in a number of early decisions/32 the topic was not "examined in depth" 
until R. v. Stevens 333• The defendant in that case had been a fifteen-year old boy 
when he had consensual sex with a thirteen-year old girl. The provisions of s. 146( 1) 
of the Criminal Code made this an absolute liability offence by the words "whether or 
not he believes that she is fourteen years of age or more", an offence which carried a 
maximum punishment of life in prison. It was alleged that this effectively removed 
the requirement for a mens rea element and thereby violated s. 7 of the Charter as not 
being in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Although the trial 
took place after the Charter was in effect, the offence itself had not. Le Dain J. for 
the majority held that the criminal liability was imposed at the time the offence was 
committed and that to apply s. 7 would be to give it retrospective application, 
something which the majority seemed to take for granted could not be permitted. 334 
Quoting the judgment of Tarnopolsky J .A. in the Ontario Court of Appeal's judgment 
332 Although the Court in Dubois v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. held that testimony given before April 
17, 1982 could not be used in a subsequent proceeding because it was precluded by s. 13 of the 
Charter, both the majority and the minority stated that this was not a retrospective application, since 
the right inured to the individual at the moment that the attempt was made to use the prior testimony. 
In Irvine v. Canada (Restrictive Trade Practices Commission), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 181, the Court 
expressed the view in obiter dicta that the procedures to be followed at a hearing are to be determined 
by the law as it existed at the time of the hearing. In R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 
713, Dickson J. for the majority said that he could not see how the alleged abridgement ofs. 15 by the 
Sunday shopping laws could have any bearing on the legality of their convictions or those laws prior to 
s. 15 corniilg Into effect on Apri.ll7, 1985. In Jack-and Charlie v. the Queen, [1985]2 S.C.R. 332, the 
Gourt held tb!lt Jl!t:.accu~ed .~oul<!_n_!l~ attewptJ(!jys!ify !heir <!ll! of sef:l~Ol! .ge~!f.P!lDJ!ng_Q!i_.tb,e gro®d!i 
of theirs. 2(a) right to freedom of religion, since the Charter had not been enacted at the time of either 
the offence or the trial. In R. v. James, the Court gave a short oral judgment in affirming the judgment 
of the Ontario Court of Appeal that the Charter did not apply to conduct that took place prior to the 
Charter coming into force. 
333 Supra, note 329. 
334 Ibid., p. 1159. 
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in R. v. James, 335 Le Dain J. wrote that "it is important that actions be determined by 
the law, including the Constitution, in effect at the time of the action."336 The 
minority, on the other hand, would have held that the defendant was not actually 
seeking a retrospective application of the Charter at all, but was instead seeking a 
prospective application to determine his rights at trial. 
Subsequently, the Court continued to hold that retrospective application of the 
Charter was not allowed, but continued to disagree about whether or not the 
application of the Charter in particular circumstances would or would not be 
retrospective.337 In R. v. Gamble,338 the majority held that the conviction and 
sentencing ofthe accused under the wrong law for an offence committed in 1976 
could be remedied pursuant to the Charter's s. 7 guarantees of life. liberty and 
security of the person without retrospectively applying the Charter. The minority, 
however, held that the proposed remedy did involve retrospective application of the 
Charter and could therefore not be allowed. 
Although R. v. Stewart 339was similar to Gamble on its facts, the Court ruled that the 
appellant's detention under certain transitional provisions was lawful, noting that the 
constitutionality of those provisions could not be attacked because "that would have 
335 Supra, note 332. 
336 --- . -
Ibid., p. 1158. 
~37 R. v"'--Milne,_[1981]2 S.C.R. 512 i!lyolved di~cussjon of whether or not the appellant's da!Jgero.IJS 
offender status could be reviewed without retrospectively applying the Charter, but it was eventually 
found unnecessary to decide the question. Subsequently, however, the Court referred to its having 
"rightly refused to apply 'existing law' to a pre-Charter conviction and sentence": R. v. Gamble, 
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 595 at 630. 
338 Ibid. 
339 [1991] 3 S.C .. R. 324. 
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resulted in a retrospective application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. "340 
In its very brief judgment in Re Workers' Compensation Act, 1983,341 the Court's 
answer to the question "Does s. 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (the 'Charter') apply to causes of action arising prior to April 17, 1985?" 
was ''No", with no further elaboration.342 
Finally, in Benner v. Canada343 the Court had the opportunity to return to the topic 
more than a decade after it had first had to consider it. Benner had been born in 1962 
in the U.S.A. to a Canadian mother and an American father. He applied for Canadian 
citizenship in 1988. Had it been his father who was Canadian, he would have been 
granted citizenship automatically. Since it was his mother who was Canadian, 
however, he was required to undergo a security check and to swear an oath. This 
resulted in the Registrar of Citizenship discovering his criminal record and rejecting 
his application, a decision that Benner challenged as a violation of his rights under the 
Charter, particularly hiss. 15 equality rights. 
The trial judge rejected his claim on the ground that citizenship legislation fixed the 
date of birth as the relevant date for the determination of citizenship status, and since 
Benner's date of birth was pre-Charter, any Charter application would have had to be 
retrospective, and therefore impermissible. The majority in the Federal Court of 
340 Ibid., at 325. 
341 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 924. 
342 Ibid., at 925. 
343 Supra, note 223. 
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Appeal agreed, with Letourneau J.A.·explicitly dismissing any possibility that the 
Charter could be used to remediate past human rights violations:344 
For section 15 to apply, there has to be an actual or an on-going discrimination 
which deprives one of equal protection and benefit of the law. It is not enough 
for one to say that one still suffers from a discriminatory event or legislation 
which took place or existed prior to the Charter. Otherwise, just about every 
instance of past discrimination since the tum of the century could be reviewed 
under section 15, provided the victims still suffer from that past discrimination. 
When the case reached the Supreme Court of Canada, however, the Court held that it 
was not Benner's date ofbirth that was relevant to determining whether or not s. 15 
would apply, but "the date on which he was confronted by a law which took his lack 
of citizenship into account."345 In its most comprehensive review of the questions of 
retroactive and retrospective application of the Charter, the Court stated that it had 
"rejected a rigid test for determining when a particular application of the Charter 
would be retrospective, preferring to weigh each case in its own factual and legal 
context, with attention to the nature of the particular Charter right at issue." The 
Court also quoted with approval its own earlier judgment in Gamble, that it is 
preferable "to avoid an all or nothing approach which artificially divides the 
chronology of events into the mutually exclusive categories of pre and post-Charter" 
and that the nature of the particular constitutional right alleged to have been violated 
will be a "crucial consideration. "346 
This emphasis on flexibility was, however, balanced by explicit statements that would 
hamper-any attempt to use-the-Charter to redress-old human rights violations. This 
344 [1994] 1 F.C. 250 at 291. 
345 Supra., note 223 at 388. 
346 Ibid., at 382. 
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included confirmation that the Charter does not apply retroactively and cannot apply 
retrospectively,347 as well as an indication that courts should be sure that the situation 
to which a litigant is seeking to apply the Charter is not "really one of going back to 
redress an old event which took place before the Charter created the right sought to 
be vindicated .... "348 
Given such explicit discouragement, is there any reason to believe that the 
jurisprudence might allow for courts to use the Charter in providing redress for long-
past human rights violations? A close analysis reveals that both what can be found in 
the Court's judgments as well as what is absent from those judgments would permit 
this, if courts were inclined to attempt it. With regard to the former, the decisions 
cited above clearly indicate the Court's intention to require a flexible approach to the 
application of the Charter to past events, even to the point of fmding in Benner that 
the concept of retrospectivity is itself not subject to a firm test. In addition, the 
recognition that the particular facts of a given case and the particular Charter right 
involved are to be considered in determining whether or not a particular Charter 
application would be considered retrospective opens the door to arguing in any novel 
case that it can be distinguished from previous cases where the Charter has been held 
not to apply. That the courts have so often differed in their findings on whether or not 
proposed Charter applications were retrospective, both between different levels of 
court and between majority and minority opinions on the appellate courts, suggests 
that just because a case may seem to involve retrospective elements does not mean 
that its judicial treatment can be reliably predicted. Finally, the fact that so many of 
the early Charter cases involving retrospective application were criminal cases could 
347 Ibid., at 381. 
348 Ibid., at 383. 
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suggest that courts were motivated to take a restrictive approach by a desire to avoid 
having to reconsider the convictions of large numbers of factually guilty criminals on 
procedural grounds; if so, then a more liberal approach might be acceptable to the 
judiciary in new, non-criminal cases, particularly in types of cases that would not be 
seen as opening the floodgates to large numbers of litigants. 
Another reason for optimism is something which is absent from the decisions of the 
Supreme Court of Canada on this topic, namely an explicit fmding that the rights 
guaranteed by the Charter were created by the Charter, as opposed to merely being 
guaranteed by it. That is, there is nothing in the Court's jurisprudence that explicitly 
rules out the possibility that at least some of the rights contained within the Charter 
could have existed before the creation of the Charter and that the Charter merely 
recognized those rights and acknowledged the ability of the courts to protect them. At 
most, there may be passing references in obiter dicta such as in the quote from Benner 
reproduced above that mention some Charter rights being "created". 
Generally speaking, in fact, the Court seems to have been careful in its choice of 
language to refer to rights being "guaranteed" rather than "created" by the Charter. 
In R. v. 974649,349 for example, the Court said that the Charter "guaranteed new 
rights." In R. v. Silveira, the Court referred to s. 15 rights as being "guaranteed" by 
the Charter.350 In R. v. Prosper, the right to counsel was said to be "guaranteed" by s. 
10(b) of the Charter. 351 In Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), on the other hand, the 
Court noted that "the minority language educational rights created by s. 23 ... [are] of 
349 2001 sec 81at1]39. 
350 [1995] 2 S.C.R. 297 at 1]93. 
351 [1994] 3 S.C.R. 236 at 1]45. 
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a very specific, special and limited nature, unlike the fundamental rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by other provisions [emphasis added]. "352 
If the Supreme Court of Canada has at least left open the possibility that some rights 
had constitutional status that was guaranteed rather than created by the Charter, lower 
courts have gone further. The majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, for 
example, in John Carlen Personal Law Corporation v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General) said the following with regard to rights of access to the courts, the Charter, 
and the implied bill of rights:353 
Some of the rights to which I have referred may be guaranteed, though not 
necessarily created, by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. See 
BCGEU v. B.C. (A.G.) (1983), 48 B.C.L.R. 5 (B.C.S.C.); (1985), 64 B.C.L.R. 
113 (B.C.C.A.); (1988), 31 B.C.L.R. (2d) 273 (S.C.C.). Others of those rights 
may be so fundamental that they may properly be regarded as having 
constitutional status. In this connection see the preamble to the Constitution 
Act, 1867 and the discussion in such cases as Saumur v. Quebec (City), [1953] 
2 S.C.R. 299 at pp. 331,353-4 and 373-4, Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.R. 
285 at pp. 327-8, Canada (Attorney General) and Dupond v. Montreal (City), 
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 770 at p. 796 and OPSEU v. Ontario (Attorney General), 
[1987] 2 S.C.R. 2 at p. 57. See also the lively and learned debate in the House 
of Lords on 14 July 1997 when Lord Ackner "rose to ask Her Majesty's 
Government what action they have taken or propose to take to protect the 
constitutional right of access of a litigant of modest means from the impact of 
new and increased court fees." Lord Irving of Lairg, the Lord Chancellor, gave 
particular emphasis in his speech to whether the right of access to the courts was 
a constitutional right in the sense of an absolute right. 
In the course of argument on this appeal we indicated to counsel that we were so 
persuaded of the existence of those fundamental rights that we did not need to 
hear any argument to the effect that they were granted by Magna Carta of 1215, 
or by some later version of the Great Charter or, assuming that was so, that they 
derived any additional force in British Columbia from having that provenance. 
352 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 at~ 65. 
353 (1997) 40 B.C.L.R. (3d) 181 at 188 (C.A.). 
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If the British Columbia Court of Appeal was correct to hold that a fundamental right 
to access the courts existed prior to the enactment of the Charter and independently of 
the Magna Carta or other instruments, then it is possible that other rights that are now 
enshrined in the Charter also existed prior to the Charter's enactment. With regard to 
those particular rights, their enactment in the Charter would therefore not have 
signaled the creation of those rights, but merely their legislative recognition and a 
signaling to the courts of the Parliamentary willingness to see the courts recognize 
and protect them. Certainly there is nothing in the Charter itself that is inconsistent 
with this proposition. Section 26 of the Charter, in fact, explicitly states that: 
The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and freedoms shall not be 
construed as denying the existence of any other rights or freedoms that exist in 
Canada. 
One effect of recognizing that some of the rights that were enshrined in the Charter -
including in particular the s. 15 right to equality- existed prior to the Charter's 
enactment is that this would provide a resolution to the debate about an implied bill of 
rights discussed in the preceding chapter:354 It would confirm that certain rights did 
indeed have constitutional status prior to the enactment of the Charter, as has been 
argued by the advocates of the theory of an implied bill of rights, and that the effect of 
the passage of the Charter was merely to transform the rights in question from 
implicit to explicit and combine them in a package with additional newly-created 
rights. 
354 Chapter II, section E. 
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If the courts are prepared to recognize that some fundamental rights existed prior to 
their having been recognized in the Charter or other statutory instruments, then giving 
legal effect to those rights with respect to events that happened prior to 1982 would 
not raise a problem of retroactivity or retrospectivity. Instead, the courts would 
simply be enforcing rights that existed at that earlier time and were therefore capable 
of being violated. Surely this is preferable to the alternative of holding that there is no 
such thing as an inalienable "human right", and that states are free to ignore the 
existence of any asserted rights whenever it is convenient for them to do so. 
B. Human Rights Protection as Analogous to Criminal Law 
The preceding proposal that courts recognize that human rights exist independently of 
the instruments that contain them is intended to eliminate an obstacle to the judicial 
recognition of the human rights being asserted by plaintiffs. This would not, 
however, address the related problem that in cases involving human rights cases from 
the distant past, the most appropriate plaintiffs - those who suffered the human rights 
violations directly - may all have died or have otherwise become unable to pursue 
redress. In such cases, it would sometimes be desirable if their cases could be 
advanced by others, such as members of their families or community organizations. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, however, the post-World War II era saw serious 
disagreement about whether human rights could attach to groups or only to 
individuals, with the latter view generally achieving acceptance, at least in the western 
democracies (though see Kymlicka355 for an account of the arguments within liberal 
355 Supra, note 32. 
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and socialist traditions that would suggest that that result was not a foregone 
conclusion). Concomitant with the notion that human rights attach to individuals 
seems to have been the idea that the responsibility for holding to account those who 
have violated the human rights of others must also attach to individuals, namely those 
whose human rights have been violated. While states may provide the mechanisms 
that allow human rights violators to be held to account- e.g. human rights codes, 
human rights commissions and tribunals, constitutionally entrenched bills of rights, 
judicial systems - they do not generally accept the responsibility for initiating human 
rights complaints or prosecutions, except in the most serious cases. Instead, those 
who have suffered human rights'violations are expected to initiate complaints and 
take responsibility for seeing those cases through to their conclusions, a process 
which may bear a strong resemblance to the prosecution of a criminal offence. 
While there may be disagreements about the underlying purposes of the criminal law 
-deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, rehabilitation, etc.- it is at least generally 
accepted that it exists for the benefit of society as a whole rather than just those 
individuals who have been targeted by criminals. For example, the Canadian 
Committee on Corrections wrote that:356 
The basic purpose of criminal justice is to protect all members of society, 
including the offender himself, from seriously harmful and dangerous conduct. 
The courts have made similar statements, such as in R. v. Whiteford:357 
356 Canada, Canadian Committee on Corrections, Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections -
Toward Unity: Criminal Justice and Corrections (Queen's Printer, 1969), p. 11. 
357 [1947] 1 W.W.R. 903 at 906 (B.C.S.C.) 
155 
A criminal offence is not an offence against an individual but is an offence 
against society as a whole. 
Contrast this with statements that the main approach ofhuman rights law "is not to 
punish the discriminator, but rather to provide relief to the victims of 
discrimination,"358 and that human rights law gives rise to individual rights?59 There 
is, of course, nothing wrong with recognizing that human rights law should take the 
interests of the victims of human rights violations into account and that its purpose 
should include restorative justice for those individuals. What is arguably missing, 
however, is explicit recognition that human rights law serves a broader purpose, just 
as criminal law does, and that addressing human rights violations serves the interests 
of society as a whole, not just the interests of those whose rights have been violated. 
Just as the purposes of criminal law and human rights law are respectively seen as 
benefiting society as a whole versus individuals, so too is there a difference with 
regard to who has the responsibility for pursuing cases. With human rights law, 
responsibility for the initiation and carriage of a complaint generally rests with the 
individual who has suffered the human rights violation, with state agencies sometimes 
providing assistance. Because a criminal offence, on the other hand, is considered to 
be an offence against society as a whole, the individual is not expected- and in most 
cases is not allowed- to take responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of 
the offender. Indeed, a prosecution can proceed even where the victim of a crime is 
manifestly opposed to the prosecution proceeding, as is, for example, sometimes the 
:c- case with spousal violence. This is because the responsibility for criminal prosecution 
358 Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Simpsons-Sears, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 at 547. 
359 CN v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114 at 1134. 
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is recognized as not resting with the victim of crime, but instead being the 
responsibility of the Crown:360 
It is undeniable that the theory of our criminal law is that all persons should be 
prosecuted in the name of the Sovereign who is "the proper person to prosecute 
for all public offences and breaches of the peace, being a person injured in the 
eyes of the law .... " 
These distinctions seem curious given that there is no sharp divide between criminal 
law and human rights law. Hate propaganda, for example, clearly violates the human 
rights of its targets, but its dissemination is widely punishable under the provisions of 
criminallaw.361 It seems odd, therefore, that the legal view of human rights violations 
is so different from violations of that wide range of offences that are classified as 
"criminal". 
Tamopolsky points out that there were, in fact, attempts to use a quasi-criminal model 
in human rights statutes adopted by Canadian provinces in the World War II era, and 
that the approach was found to be unsatisfactory on a number of grounds. He cites 
among the reasons for the failure of a quasi-criminal model: reluctance on the part of 
the victim to initiate a criminal action; difficulties with proving the offence beyond a 
reasonable doubt; difficulties proving that access to services did not occur for some 
non-discriminatory reason; reluctance on the part of the judiciary to convict for 
something that was not really considered to be criminal; lack of awareness among the 
public of the existence of human rights legislation; scepticism on the part of minority 
360 R. v. Devereaux, [1966] 4 C.C.C. 147 at 150 (Ont.C.A.). 
361 In R. v. Andrews [1990] 3 S.C.R. 870 at 880, Dickson C.J. referred to "the consensus in the 
international community that hate propaganda should be suppressed by the criminal law, a consensus 
evident in both international human rights conventions and the domestic law of many democratic 
societies." 
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groups that had a history of suffering discrimination; and the failure of the model to 
provide meaningful assistance to those whose rights had been violated, such as by 
helping them to obtain a job or service in a restaurant.362 
While Tamopolsky's observations might indicate that the use of a criminal model for 
resolving human rights issues could be problematic, this is not what is actually being 
proposed in this paper; instead it is a shift in judicial perspective that would result in 
human rights litigation being perceived as analogous or similar in some respects to a 
criminal prosecution, particularly in order to facilitate the carriage of complaints 
arising from those rights violations by groups or individuals other than those whose 
rights were directly violated. Accepting, therefore, that there may have been 
difficulties with the use of a quasi-criminal model of human rights legislation should 
not mean accepting that there would be no benefit to bringing a criminal law 
perspective to human rights law matters. By recognizing the seriousness of human 
rights violations and the harm they cause to society as a whole, the courts could 
consider them to be at least analogous to criminal offences, and treating them in some 
respects in the same manner as they treat criminal offences. This would be useful in 
at least two respects. 
First, as discussed above, it is generally not the case that the victims of crime are 
expected to take responsibility for the prosecution of those who victimized them. By 
divorcing the roles of victim and prosecutor, the criminal law system presents a model 
that suggests that these roles could be similarly separated in the case of human rights 
law. If this is so, then this approach could eliminate the obstacle posed by the notion 
362 W.S. Tarnopolsky, J., Discrimination and the Law, rev. by William F. Pentney (Toronto: Carswell, 
2004) (ongoing supplement) at p. 2-5. 
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that human rights reside only in the individual. If the state can take responsibility for 
carriage of a criminal law prosecution, then it is not a great leap to assert that the 
family or ethnic community of a human rights victim could take responsibility for the 
carriage of an action based upon the wrong they suffered. 
Second, the common law has never regarded the passage of time as creating any bar 
to a criminal prosecution: nul/um tempus occurrit regi?63 Some jurisdictions have, 
admittedly, created statutory limitation periods for criminal law prosecutions, such as 
the three year limitation period under Canada's Criminal Code for treason and the six 
month limitation period for summary conviction offences. To a large extent, 
however, common law jurisdictions do not view the effiuxion of time as a bar to 
criminal prosecution for serious offences. International law is similar, in that it is 
generally agreed that there should be no statutory limitation for the prosecution of war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and similar offences.364 
The criminal law perspective on this subject would obviously be advantageous in 
terms of facilitating the courts' ability to deal with long-past violations of human 
rights. By recognizing that human rights violations are more similar to criminal acts 
than to civil wrongs, the courts would automatically accept that the mere effiuxion of 
time should not automatically present an obstacle to providing remedies in such cases 
and should not outweigh the societal interest in addressing outstanding human rights 
violations. 
363 Hon. R.E. Salhany, Q.C., Canadian Criminal Procedure, Sixth Edition, (Aurora: Canada Law 
Book, 2005 update). 
364 See, for example, European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitation to Crimes 
against Humanity and War Crimes, Strasbourg, 25.1.1974, CETS No. 082. 
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C. A Reasoned Approach 
The most attractive aspect of the courts' current failure to deal with long-past 
violations of human rights is its simplicity. By not dealing with any violations of 
human rights that predate the creation of legislated human rights schemes, the courts 
treat all victims of long-past human rights violations equally. If the courts were to 
adopt a perspective that permitted them to deal with at least some long-past violations 
of human rights, it would be necessary to distinguish between those human rights 
violations for which the courts would provide remedies and those for which they 
would not. The alternative would be that there would be no distinction between the 
most ancient of recorded human rights violations and those that have happened within 
living memory, or between those that have caused hurt feelings and inconvenience as 
opposed to those that resulted in the deaths of countless thousands of people 
If judges were to believe that there is no meaningful legal distinction to be made 
between such divergent types of human rights violations, this might well result in 
judicial inertia such that they would be reluctant to take even the first step down a 
potentially slippery slope. It would therefore seem to be desirable to identify a 
framework that might be used to analyze the different cases that could come before 
the courts and to distinguish between those cases that the courts should deal with and 
those that they should not. Rather than simply adopting an arbitrary cut-off- e.g. 
that no human rights violations more than a century old will be considered - it should 
be possible to devise a more nuanced approach that provides a credible basis for 
balancing the demands of justice with those ofpracticality. 
.t-_ 
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The following criteria are suggested as those which should be relevant to determining 
the appropriateness of judicial intervention. 
1. Egregiousness of the Human Rights Violation 
It is a well-known principle that the law does not deal with trivial matters: de 
minimus non curat lex. The principle that excuses the courts from having to deal with 
trivial matters does not, however, apply to human rights tribunals, which are apt to 
find themselves dealing with the sorts of disputes that provide fodder for right-wing 
commentators and cause average citizens to roll their eyes. 
To say that the courts should only have to deal with more serious long-past human 
rights violations as opposed to less serious ones, however, only raises the question of 
what constitutes a serious or egregious violation of human rights. Several factors will 
be relevant to such a determination. First, there are certain rights the violation of 
which will inevitably have a more serious effect. The right to life is the most obvious 
of these. While it might be difficult to create a hierarchy of other rights, it may be 
possible to at least recognize that the loss of some rights, such as the loss of the right 
to freedom through enslavement, will be worse than others, such as the loss of the 
right to be free from discrimination in the receipt of services. Second, even with 
respect to any one particular right, it may be possible to distinguish some rights 
violations from others in terms of their seriousness. When someone is discriminated 
against on the basis of ethnicity for example, it will often be in the provision of some 
good or service. In such cases, the closer to the base of Maslow's hierarchy of 
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needs365 the denied good or service lies- with denial of water, shelter or food being 
more fundamental than denial of aesthetic needs - the more serious will be the human 
rights violation. Third, the number of people involved will also be significant. Given 
that the nineteenth and twentieth centuries provide no shortage of instances where the 
rights of thousands or even millions of people were violated, it will be easier to make 
the argument for dealing with such cases as opposed to those where only a single 
individual has suffered. 
2. Relative Shortness of Time That Has Passed 
To suggest that the effluxion of time should not be an absolute impediment to 
obtaining remedies for past human rights violations is not to assert that time is 
irrelevant. All of the reasons for the existence of limitation periods - the social value 
in litigating quickly, the promotion of personal and commercial certainty, the 
evidentiary problems that arise from aging witnesses and disappearing exhibits - are 
valid concerns. The passage of time is therefore one factor to weigh in considering 
whether the courts should accept a long-past human rights claim for adjudication, 
albeit not the only factor. 
It will certainly be advantageous if a court case can be initiated within the lifespan of 
survivors of a human rights violation, for evidentiary reasons, in order for it to be 
possible to craft a remedy that directly benefits those survivors, and because there will 
-
be a greater sense of urgency in the pursuit of justice than would be the case after 
their deaths. Failing that, other benchmarks will apply: has the court case been 
365 A.H. Maslow, (1943). A Theory of Human Motivation. Psychological Review, 50,370-396. 
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initiated while those who have committed the human rights violation can still be held 
to account; is it within living memory, so that those who were present for the 
wrongful actions can also be witness to the remedy for those actions; are members of 
the immediate families of the victims still alive, who might have been affected by the 
wrongful actions, or could be potential beneficiaries of a remedy; were the wrongful 
events sufficiently contemporary that there are reliable records available? 
3. Existence of Plaintiffs That Could Legitimately Claim to Assert the Rights of the 
Victims 
As mentioned above, it may be that in some cases where victims of human rights 
violations are unable to seek remedies directly, members of their immediate families 
should be able to act on their behalf. Alternatively, there may be extended families, 
clans, indigenous governments or other bodies that can assert that their ties to the 
victims are sufficiently direct that they should be able to step into the shoes of the 
victims and act in their stead. One remove further would be non-governmental 
organizations that advocate for the interests of members of specific minority groups, 
as well as those which act in pursuit of specified ideals, rights or values, such as 
Amnesty International or the various civil liberties associations. 
A problem that arises in such situations, however, is that different groups may have 
different views as to what should be done in respect of human rights violations. This 
was seen in the case of the Chinese head tax and exclusion laws, where one group 
advocated direct financial payment to head tax payers and their families, while 
another was opposed to any such proposal. Clearly, the further removed a group is 
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from those individuals who directly suffered a human rights violation, the more 
difficult it will be for it to assert that it legitimately represents the interests of those 
individuals, and the less persuasive its submissions will be to the courts. 
4. Continuing Harm Caused By the Human Rights Violation 
The attempt by the plaintiffs in the Mack case to assert that they were suffering 
continuing harm as a result of the Chinese head tax and exclusion laws was 
undoubtedly an attempt to bring themselves within the scope of jurisprudence that 
indicated that it would not be a retrospective application of the Charter to· apply it to 
ongoing situations, even if the cause of those situations predated the Charter. That 
does not mean, however, that the Chinese head tax and exclusion laws did not have an 
ongoing effect, or that other human rights violations cannot have an effect that 
persists across generations. Empirical proof of such effects will be difficult to obtain, 
however, and prospective plaintiffs may be unable to demonstrate anything more than 
a lingering sense of resentment over past injustices. Certainly, the further in the past 
is the human rights violation, the more there will exist the possibility that other 
intervening factors have contributed to whatever harm is alleged to have resulted from 
it. 
While it may be difficult to trace a causal connection between a human rights 
violation and, for example, the impoverishment, shame or alienation suffered by the 
descendants of the people who actually suffered it, it may be easier to identify 
ongoing harm suffered at the societal level. Where the demand for past human rights 
violations to be addressed persists despite the passage of time, it would be reasonable 
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to infer that at least some segment of society continues to feel aggrieved, and that this 
negatively affects societal unity. Awareness of an unresolved injustice may also 
undermine the legitimacy of state and societal institutions, both domestically and 
abroad. As Gladstone noted, "National injustice is the surest road to national 
downfall. "366 
5. Ability to Craft an Appropriate Remedy 
An earlier chapter discussed the principle that where there is a right there is also a 
remedy: ubi jus, ibi remedium. Realistically, however, it will be easier to craft 
effective remedies in some cases than in others. Cases that involve some form of 
economic loss, for example, should be amenable to the provision of pecuniary 
remedies. Where human rights violations have resulted in harm that is not easily 
monetizable, on the other hand, such as death or humiliation, then it may be difficult 
to perceive how the courts can fashion a remedy that will result in any meaningful 
resolution of the outstanding issues. While the symbolic value of a declaratory 
judgment should not be underestimated, a more compelling case can be made for 
judicial intervention in cases where there is at least the possibility of arriving at an 
outcome that could directly and effectively remediate long-standing grievances. 
6. Proof That Ethical Standards Were Recognized but Disregarded 
As discussed in an earlier chapter, the question of whether contemporary standards 
can fairly be applied to earlier times can be a difficult one. In looking at atrocities 
366 William Ewart Gladstone, Speech at Plumstead [1878], quoted in John Bartlett, Familiar 
Quotations, 15th and I 25th Anniversary Edition (Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1980), p. 517. 
_, 
165 
committed by European conquerors and colonialists in the Americas and elsewhere, 
for example, it is difficult to imagine what combination of self-interest, social 
conditioning, and religious dogma could have resulted in an attitude that allowed 
them to justify their actions. Some commentators have suggested that oppressors 
historically have attempted to dehumanize other people; by relegating them to the 
status of domesticated or wild animals, they eliminated any obligation to accord them 
the rights and respect that are owed to other humans. 367 Even in recent decades in 
industrialized nations, the mentally ill and mentally handicapped have been treated in 
ways that seem incompatible with their human status and possession of human rights. 
Looking back in judgment upon past human rights violations, one wonders of those 
who committed them: did they not know or did they not care? 
If courts are to be asked to provide remedies for past human rights violations, it will 
be useful if they can be shown evidence that was contemporaneous with those events 
to indicate awareness that what was being done was wrong, even if the expression of 
that awareness is couched in the language of morality rather than human rights. In the 
case of the Chinese head tax, for example, the remarks of Secretary of State Chapleau 
in 1885368 suggest that the tax was recognized from the outset as being a concession 
to prejudice and protectionism. It was not, of course, the case that this was 
universally recognized, or even recognized by a majority, and it would be unrealistic 
to look in the hope of finding such a standard. Instead, it should be sufficient to show 
that someone was expressing opposition to the measures that were taken, and that 
those who committed the human rights violations had had the option of heeding that 
opposition. In such cases, the courts can take comfort from knowing that they are 
367 David Brion Davis, Inhuman Bondage (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 2-54. 
368 Supra, notes 92 and 94. 
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truly being asked to provide remedies for past wrongs rather than to engage in 
historical revisionism. 
7. Failure by Governlnent to Address the Problem 
As noted in the introductory chapter, one of the questions that gives rise to this study 
is what happens to unresolved human rights issues with the passage of time. The fact 
that they are unresolved is indicative of a failure by the legislative and executive 
branches of government to address them. Arguably, the role that these governmental 
institutions play in representing the electorate, assessing its collective will and 
implementing its collective choices makes them the preferable bodies for bringing 
closure to such issues. That they have not done so would be a factor to be taken into 
account by the courts in deciding whether or not a judicial remedy would be 
appropriate in any given case. 
The history of the Chinese head tax and exclusion laws does, however, demonstrate 
that even the passage of very long periods of time need not preclude the possibility of 
governmental action. When the Governor General of Canada announced in the 
Throne Speech that there would be a formal apology in Parliament, one hundred and 
twenty-one years had passed since the head tax was first introduced and fifty-nine 
years had passed since the Chinese Immigration Act had finally been repealed. Even 
if the courts should be able to provide remedies for long-past human rights violations, 
it is reassuring to be reminded that they will not always have to do so. 
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8. Government Was the Rights Violator 
Human rights can be violated by any number of different actors. Landlords, 
restaurants, schools, employers, voluntary associations, and others can all be found 
listed as defendants in the reports of human rights cases. It must be suggested that the 
situation is different, however, when it is government, and particularly government at 
the senior rather than the local level, that is the violator of human rights, and that this 
difference should make courts more willing to deal with human rights violations that 
have been committed by governments. 
Governments are both the guarantors ofhuman rights and the embodiments of the 
collective public will. When governments commit human rights violations, their 
victims can claim to have suffered in a very particular way, knowing that their rights 
were violated by entities that should exist to protect them. For the rest of society as 
well, human rights violations committed by a government have a special importance, 
in that all citizens of a democratic state are culpable for the wrongs committed by the 
state and have an interest in their remediation. Courts must recognize that when 
governments fail in their human rights responsibilities, the judiciary has an important 
role to play in restoring them to an awareness of their roles and responsibilities, and 
that this should be weighed in the decision on whether or not to consider providing a 
remedy for a long-past human rights violation. 
_53 
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D. Application of the Criteria to the Chinese Immigration Act 
Having advanced the preceding list of criteria as being relevant to a court's decision 
on whether to exercise its discretion with respect to long-past violations of human 
rights, it will be useful to consider what result would have obtained if those criteria 
had been applied to the case of Canada's Chinese Immigration Act. The fact that the 
Government of Canada did eventually decide to award compensation to head tax 
payers and their spouses would seem to be evidence that this was a case in which 
there was a pressing societal interest in providing a remedy. If the criteria suggested 
above are appropriate, then they should have led to the same result. 
In fact, most of the criteria would have been likely to result in a judicial decision in 
favour of considering the case. The separation of family members, the large sum 
represented by the $500 head tax at the time of its imposition, and the tens of 
thousands of people who were directly affected all indicate the egregiousness of the 
rights violation. The time since the incidents took place was short enough that at least 
a small minority of the victims were still alive. These individuals and the surviving 
spouses of other victims were a group that could legitimately have brought a claim 
before the courts. Because some of the harm caused- i.e. the head taxes levied- was 
directly monetizable, it would have been possible to craft an appropriate remedy, 
albeit one that would not have involved the remorse and acknowledgment of 
wrongdoing that was expressed in the remedy that was actually provided. As 
discussed earlier, it would have been possible to fmd evidence in the historical record 
that would have made it possible for the Government of Canada to recognize the 
wrongness of its action, even if popular sentiment supported it. There was certainly a 
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failure by government to address the problem, at least until its sudden and surprising 
reversal of position. Finally, it was, of course, the Government of Canada itself that 
was the rights violator. 
The only one of the proposed criteria that it would have been difficult to demonstrate 
favoured judicial intervention would be that of whether there was continuing harm 
caused by the human rights violation. The extraordinary levels of Chinese 
immigration into Canada in recent decades, the degree of integration that has been 
achieved, the economic success and the social prominence of many Chinese-
Canadians, all of these factors would probably have suggested that there was no 
continuing harm still lingering sixty years after the Chinese Immigration Act was 
repealed. On the other hand, the very fact of the continuing agitation for a remedy 
could be taken as indicative of some lingering resentment and fracturing of the 
Canadian polity, so perhaps a credible argument could have been advanced even on 
this point. 
Had the courts made the decision to consider the case of victims of the Chinese 
Immigration Act on its merits, and had they adopted the other two changes proposed 
in this chapter- viewing human rights violations as being conceptually similar to 
criminal acts and recognizing that human rights exist independently of the Charter 
and other instruments - then it seems very likely that a remedy would ultimately have 
been awarded. 
This chapter has suggested three ways in which the courts could rethink their 
approach to long-past violations of human rights in order to be able to more 
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effectively address them. Whether or not the courts would wish to do so, however, is 
another question. Floodgates, sleeping dogs, and other metaphors abound by which 
decisions to do nothing can be justified, whereas making a decision to grapple with 
big, difficult issues in innovative ways requires initiative and courage. At most, the 
approach suggested in this chapter can help to show that doing so is not too difficult, 
and is certainly not impossible. 
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Chapter VI: Conclusions 
The introduction to this paper asked what the relationship is between human rights 
and time, and specifically whether the passage of enough time allows governments to 
evade accountability for human rights violations that they committed in the past. 
With regard to the first question, this paper posited that there should be almost no 
relationship at all between human rights and time, in that the former exist 
independently of the latter and should be unaffected by it. The answer to the second 
question, however, as illustrated by an examination of the Chinese head tax and 
exclusion laws, seems to be that while governments may find it difficult to escape 
judicial scrutiny for actions taken in the post-World War II era of explicit human 
rights guarantees, they have been able to do so for human rights violations that they 
committed prior to this time. Of course, avoiding legal liability is not the same as 
actually resolving an issue, and the Chinese head tax and exclusion law issue also 
illustrates the point that failure to provide meaningful remedies for human rights 
violations can result in those issues remaining on the political agenda for a very long 
time. To quote from the title of one of Hans Christian Andersen's stories, "Delaying 
is Not Forgetting." 
A surprising aspect of the Chinese head tax and exclusion issue was that it finally 
came to a "happy ending" long after any realistic hope that it might do so could have 
been abandoned. Although there may have been those in the Chinese-Canadian 
community who remained unhappy with the means by which it was resolved, the 
decision by the Government of Canada to make a formal apology and financial 
reparations while some of those who directly suffered because of its earlier policy and 
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legislation are still alive to accept that apology and the accompanying payments 
seems likely to have brought an end to a very long history. 
What might be interpreted as an eventual triumph of parliamentary democracy, 
however, can also be interpreted as a failure of the judicial system. When individuals 
who had suffered as a result of the head tax and exclusion laws brought their demands 
for a remedy before the courts, their claims were rejected not because they were 
without merit, but because despite the clear judicial recognition of the wrong that had 
been committed, the courts believed themselves to be without the power to provide a 
legal remedy for that wrong. The result was an injustice, but regrettable as that is, the 
mere fact of it being an injustice is not what makes it most objectionable. Instead, it 
is that the decision negates the very concept of human rights. 
As was shown in Chapter I, "human rights" is a modem term for a concept that can be 
traced back for thousands of years, namely that certain rights are fundamental and 
inherent and are based upon something other than positive law. This notion has 
resonated with political and legal thinkers and has figured in historical events that 
have helped to shape the nature of the nation-state. Modem states have endorsed the 
concept at the international level and have given it expression in statutory and 
regulatory protections at the domestic level. These positive law protections have 
governed the resolution of human rights disputes in recent years, so that it would be 
easy to assume that human rights are ineluctably bound up with the mechanisms set 
up by governments to protect them. An examination of the Chinese head tax and 
exclusion issue, however, has made it possible to separate one from the other; since 
the human rights violation in this case predated the creation of post-World War II 
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positive law protections for human rights, the latter could not apply, leaving the courts 
to grapple with human rights simpliciter. That is, not only has the Chinese head tax 
and exclusion issue proven worthy of consideration because of its importance to those 
who were harmed by the discriminatory measures and because of the light it shines 
upon the relationship between human rights and time, it has also provided a controlled 
situation in which to examine the judicial attitude toward human rights as they exist 
independently of their positive law protections. The Mack case offered the courts the 
opportunity to, in effect, either endorse the view expressed by academics and 
ringingly endorsed by international covenants that human rights simply exist, or to 
endorse the view that human rights only exist because governments have created 
them. 
By finding that the human rights that are manifested in the Charter can only be given 
effect for events that took place after the Charter's passage, the courts found, in 
effect, that those human rights did not exist prior to its creation. That is, contrary to 
the concept discussed in the first chapter of this paper that human rights are rights 
possessed by everyone simply by virtue of their being human, the courts' judgments 
would have the effect that human rights are only possessed by those who live in a 
place and time where artificially-created rights are embodied within statutory or 
constitutional instruments. "Human rights" would thus be rendered a misnomer. 
Courts, of course, at least in the adversarial system found in common law countries, 
are only supposed to weigh the arguments put before them, so the judges in Mack 
cannot fairly be faulted for not having considered that giving effect to the rights 
contained in the Charter would not necessarily mean giving the Charter retroactive 
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effect. If courts were to recognize in future, however, that human rights exist 
independently of the Charter and similar instruments, their decisions would be in 
better accord with the conceptual basis of human rights while still being in accord 
with existing case law. In addition, if the courts were to view human rights violations 
as being analogous to criminal acts, they might be prepared to exercise greater 
flexibility in order to permit outstanding human rights violations to be brought 
forward for redress, such as by allowing people other than those whose rights were 
directly violated to represent their interests. 
It might, perhaps be questioned whether the relatively small number of outstanding 
human rights violations that both predate modem human rights instruments and are 
championed by groups or individuals that continue to press for remedies warrant the 
attention and conceptual shifts proposed in this paper. Obviously, those who were 
directly affected by such human rights violations would say that they do. It might be 
worth noting in this respect that the resolution of the Chinese head tax and exclusion 
issue has prompted renewed calls for government to address some of the other 
outstanding human rights violations from Canada's past that were mentioned earlier 
in this paper, such as the incidents involving Jewish and Sikh passengers respectively 
on the St. Louis and the Komagata Maru.369 
It may also be, however, that the benefits of this approach would be more widely 
applicable in the future. That is, while this look at the resolution of an outstanding 
human rights complaint from the distant past is directly applicable to similar human 
rights complaints from such times, it has also been a means of isolating a human 
369 See, for example, Fred Kunst Sr., "Other doomed passengers shouldn't be forgotten," Vancouver 
Sun, Monday, February 5, 2007, p. AlO. 
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rights dispute from the cur-Tent milieu of legislated human rights guarantees. It could 
therefore also apply if the courts some day have to consider a human rights violation 
in a situation in which the guarantees set out in the Charter do not apply for some 
reason other than the passage of time, perhaps even because some future government 
may have purported to repeal the Charter. 
In such a situation, courts might choose to follow the reasoning exemplified by Mack, 
and accept that it is their proper function to uphold human rights only when legislative 
bodies have approved of their doing so. Alternatively, however, they might wish to 
recognize that certain human rights must be protected even -perhaps especially - in 
situations where governments deny the very existence of those rights. The approach 
advocated for the treatment of past human rights violations in this paper could provide 
a legal tool for courts that might choose to follow the latter course in such a 
hypothetical future situation. 
While it is impossible to prejudge what might happen in future cases, this paper has 
suggested a change in perspective that could allow judges to provide remedies in 
future cases involving human rights violations. To suggest that they should be 
prepared to do so is really to do no more than to acknowledge that fundamental 
human rights do exist and that in cases where governments fail to uphold those rights, 
the task of doing so will fall to the courts. 
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Appendix A: Abbreviations Used in this Paper for Courts and Law Reports 
Courts and Tribunals 
Alta. S.C.A.D. -Alberta Supreme Court, Appeal Division 
B.C.C.A. -British Columbia Court of Appeal 
B.C.S.C. -British Columbia Supreme Court 
C.A. - Court of Appeal (of a province identifiable from the report series) 
Co. Ct. - County Court (of a province identifiable from the report series) 
F.C.A.- Federal Court (of Canada), Appeal Division 
F.S.T.- Financial Services Tribunal (Ontario) 
J.C.P.C.- Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
Man.C.A. -Manitoba Court of Appeal 
N.B.C.A.- New Brunswick Court of Appeal 
Ont. C.A. - Ontario Court of Appeal 
Ont. Ct. ofG.S.- Ontario Court of General Sessions of the Peace 
S.C.- Supreme Court (of a province identifiable from the report series) 
Sup. Ct. Jus. - Ontario Superior Court of Justice 
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